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Foreword
Post-18 (or ‘tertiary’) education in England is a 
story of both care and neglect, depending on 
whether students are amongst the 50 per cent of 
young people who participate in higher education 
(HE) or the rest.1 The panel believes that this 
disparity simply has to be addressed. Doing so 
is a matter of fairness and equity and is likely to 
bring considerable social and economic benefits 
to individuals and the country at large. It is our 
core message. 
Following a major refunding of the higher education 
sector in 2012, universities and university students 
are both cared for and cared about. They receive 
the majority of public funding and attention: in 
2017-18, over £8 billion2 was comitted to support 
1.2 million UK undergraduate students in English 
HE institutions.3 Their experience is the subject of 
much comment. The sector is studied by specialist 
university departments and by education think 
tanks, some of which are funded by the sector 
they are thinking about. The universities also fund 
several mission groups – including Universities 
UK (UUK), University Alliance, Million+, Guild HE 
and the Russell Group - who lobby on their behalf. 
The mainly university-educated media is deeply 
interested in their activities. We note this without 
criticism. Universities serve important social and 
economic purposes. They are one of the UK’s 
world-class industries: second only to the US in 
terms of research citations, with a fraction of the 
spend.4 As such they are worth caring about and 
large parts of this report are devoted to building on 
their considerable achievements. 
But what of the neglected, the 50 per cent of 
the 18-30 year-old population who do not go to 
university, and older non-graduates? They too 
are worthy of attention. They are mostly at work 
and, if they are educated at all after the age of 18, 
are being educated mainly in further education 
colleges (FECs). The same is true of older adults 
in the workforce with basic or intermediate skills, 
for whom upskilling and reskilling are vital in a 
changing labour market. There are 2.2 million 
full and part time adult further education (FE) 
students5 receiving £2.3 billion of public funding,6 
a large under-investment relative to the state 
support afforded university students. In 1989, the 
then Secretary of State for Education Kenneth 
Baker described further education as the Cinderella 
sector but successive governments have failed to 
deliver the glass slipper.7 There have been a few 
reviews, such as the Leitch review on basic and 
intermediate skills (2006) and the Foster review 
of the FE college landscape (2005) but despite 
widespread acknowledgement that this sector is 
crucial to the country’s economic success, nothing 
much has happened except for a steep, steady 
decline in funding. 
That decline is widespread and protracted.8 
Teachers in FE colleges are paid on average less 
than their counterparts in schools.9 Funding levels 
are inadequate to cover essential maintenance or 
to provide modern facilities, and funding flows are 
complex to navigate. Not surprisingly, the sector is 
demoralised, has little to spend on mission groups 
and is consequently under-reported in the media 
and under-represented in Westminster. No prior 
government of any persuasion has considered 
further education to be a priority. The consequence 
has been decades of neglect and a loss of status 
and prestige amongst learners, employers and the 
public at large. 
The present government’s review is the first since 
the Robbins report in 1963 to consider both parts 
of tertiary education together. It is an opportunity 
to consider the roles both should play in meeting 
the country’s social and economic needs, how 
they fit together, how they should be funded and 
whether they are delivering value for students 
and taxpayers. The panel informing the review 
is independent and impartial and is determined 
not to waste this unique opportunity to deliver an 
objective assessment of the current situation, to 
articulate the country’s future needs from tertiary 
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education, and to propose remedies that are 
practical and realistic in addressing the issues it 
has identified.
I am indebted to my fellow panel members 
Professor Ivor Crewe, Jacqueline de Rojas, Professor 
Edward Peck, Beverley Robinson and Professor 
Alison Wolf for the considerable expertise, counsel 
and commitment they have brought to this project. 
We have been helped by constructive engagement 
with students - particularly through our student 
reference group - employers and further and higher 
education institutions and their representative 
bodies. Our work has been informed by almost 
400 respondents to our call for evidence, by 
discussions with academic and other experts and 
by visits to a great many educational institutions. 
We are grateful to our hard working secretariat 
at the Department for Education led by Matt 
Toombs and Lucy Ryan, and particularly to the 
Prime Minister, Theresa May, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Philip Hammond, and the Secretary 
of State for Education, Damian Hinds, for giving 
us this opportunity and, above all, for asking the 
right question.
I have pleasure in enclosing the panel’s report.
Dr Philip Augar,
Chair, Post-18 Education and Funding Review Panel
Introduction 
7
Post-18 Review of Education and Funding 
Independent Panel members
Dr Philip Augar Professor Sir Ivor Crewe Jacqueline de Rojas CBE
Professor Edward Peck Beverley Robinson OBE Professor the Baroness  
Alison Wolf
Introduction 
8
The Panel’s Principles
In setting about our task, we have been guided by 
a set of principles. Some of these were self-evident 
to us at the start, others have been developed in the 
light of emerging evidence during the panel’s life. 
The principles and their rationale are set out below.
Principle 1. Post-18 education benefits 
society, the economy, and individuals.
The potential benefits of an increasingly educated 
adult population have guided our work. But 
increasing the sheer volume of tertiary education 
does not necessarily translate into social, economic 
and personal good. That depends on the quality, 
accessibility and direction of study. 
Principle 2. Everyone should have the 
opportunity to be educated after the age of 18.
We have noted the disparity of resources between 
higher and further education and the steep decline 
in opportunities for education and training in later 
life. We have this in mind in seeking to create an 
integrated and sustainable post-18 system with 
opportunities for the whole population.
Principle 3. The decline in numbers of those 
getting post-18 education needs to be 
reversed. 
In many developed economies, increased 
participation in tertiary education has been 
associated with productivity growth over the past 
half century but in England - where attention has 
focused largely on degree-level study - the total 
number of people involved in post-18 education 
has in fact declined. This decline needs to be 
reversed urgently.
Principle 4. The cost of post-18 education 
should be shared between taxpayers, 
employers and learners. 
This was the defining principle of the seminal 
Dearing Report (1997) and continues to 
have resonance: the alternatives are simply 
inconceivable. Getting the taxpayer to pay for 
everything is unaffordable. Getting learners to 
pay all their own costs is unfair to those of limited 
means. Getting employers to pay for the whole 
system would put too much emphasis on economic 
value alone. A shared responsibility, in our view, is 
the only fair and feasible solution.
Principle 5. Organisations providing 
education and training must be accountable 
for the public subsidy they receive. 
The receipt of taxpayer funding, whether this 
is directly through grants or indirectly through 
forgiveable loans, carries with it the expectation of 
transparency and accountability for the purposes 
to which it is put and the outcomes that it delivers. 
There should be no sense of entitlement. 
Principle 6. Government has a responsibility 
to ensure that its investment in tertiary 
education is appropriately spent and 
directed. 
The government should consider public spending 
on tertiary education alongside its spending on 
other parts of the public sector and should hold the 
sector accountable whilst respecting its intellectual 
freedom and academic autonomy. 
Principle 7. Post-18 education cannot be left 
entirely to market forces. 
The idea of a market in tertiary education has 
been a defining characteristic of English policy 
since 1998. We believe that competition between 
providers has an important role to play in creating 
choice for students but that on its own it cannot 
deliver a full spectrum of social, economic and 
cultural benefits. With no steer from government, 
the outcome is likely to be haphazard. 
Principle 8. Post-18 education needs to be 
forward looking.
The future challenges of technological innovation, 
artificial intelligence and shorter job cycles will 
require greater labour market flexibility. The post-
18 education system needs to respond to this: 
doing more of the same will not be enough.
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The Panel’s Proposals
We were asked to provide input into the 
government’s review of post-18 education and 
funding. We have assessed the present system 
and made recommendations about how it 
can be strengthened, in the light of its current 
performance and the future challenges we expect 
it to face. 
There is much to be celebrated in England’s 
post-compulsory education system. Record 
numbers of young people and young people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds in particular are 
now entering higher education. Many universities 
make a considerable civic contribution, being 
torch carriers for economic, cultural, social and 
environmental development, often in partnership 
with communities and businesses. England has 
a world-leading reputation in research and some 
of the best performing research universities in 
the world. Many further education colleges play 
important roles in their local economies with strong 
employer relationships. 
Our proposals look to build on these strengths 
by identifying areas where the post-18 education 
system could be improved. The objective - to quote 
from the government’s terms of reference - is to 
provide a joined-up system that ‘is accessible to all, 
supported by a funding system that provides value 
for money and works for students and taxpayers, 
incentivises choice and competition across the 
sector and encourages the development of the 
skills that we need as a country.’
Our core message is that the disparity between 
the 50 per cent of young people attending higher 
education and the other 50 per cent who do not has 
to be addressed. Doing so is a matter of fairness 
and equity and is likely to bring considerable 
social and economic benefits to individuals and 
the country at large. This underpins our proposals 
which are outlined in detail in subsequent chapters 
and summarised below: 
• Strengthening technical education - England 
needs a stronger technical and vocational 
education system at sub-degree levels to 
meet the structural skills shortages that are 
in all probability contributing to the UK’s weak 
productivity performance. Improved funding, a 
better maintenance offer, and a more coherent 
suite of higher technical and professional 
qualifications would help level the playing field 
with degrees and drive up both the supply of 
and demand for such courses. 
• Increasing opportunities for everyone - 
Despite the very large increase in participation 
in higher education by young people, the total 
number of people involved in tertiary education 
has declined. Almost 40 per cent of 25 year olds 
do not progress beyond GCSEs as their highest 
qualification and social mobility shows little sign 
of improvement. Our recommendations seek 
to address these problems by reversing cuts in 
adult skills provision and encouraging part time 
and later life learning. 
• Reforming and refunding the FE college 
network - Further education colleges are an 
essential part of the national educational 
infrastructure and should play a core role in the 
delivery of higher technical and intermediate 
level training. Our recommendations are 
intended to reform and refund the FE college 
network by means of an increased base rate of 
funding for high return courses, an additional 
£1bn capital investment over the coming 
spending review period and investment in 
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the workforce to improve recruitment and 
retention. Rationalisation of the network to even 
out provision across over-supplied and under-
supplied areas, funding for some specialised 
colleges and closer links with HE and other 
providers would help establish a genuinely 
national system of higher technical education.
• Bearing down on low value HE - There 
is a misalignment at the margin between 
England’s otherwise outstanding system of 
higher education and the country’s economic 
requirements. A twenty-year market in 
lightly regulated higher education has greatly 
expanded the number of skilled graduates 
bringing considerable social and economic 
benefits and wider participation for students 
from lower socio-economic groups. However, 
for a small but significant minority of degree 
students doing certain courses at certain 
institutions, the university experience leads to 
disappointment. We make recommendations 
intended to encourage universities to bear down 
on low value degrees and to incentivise them to 
increase the provision of courses better aligned 
with the economy’s needs.
• Addressing higher education funding - 
Generous and undirected funding has led to 
an over-supply of some courses at great cost 
to the taxpayer and a corresponding under-
supply of graduates in strategically important 
sectors. Our recommendations would restore 
more control over taxpayer support and would 
reduce what universities may charge each 
degree student. Universities should find further 
efficiency savings over the coming years, 
maximum fees for students should be reduced 
to £7,500 a year, and more of the taxpayer 
funding should come through grants directed to 
disadvantaged students and to high value and 
high cost subjects.
• Increasing flexibility and lifetime learning 
- Employment patterns are changing fast with 
shorter job cycles and longer working lives 
requiring many people to reskill and upskill. 
We recommend the introduction of a lifelong 
learning loan allowance to be used at higher 
technical and degree level at any stage of an 
adult’s career for full and part-time students. 
To encourage retraining and flexible learning, 
we recommend that this should be available 
in modules where required. We intend that our 
proposals should facilitate transfer between 
different institutions and we make proposals for 
greater investment in so-called ‘second chance’ 
learning at intermediate levels. We endorse 
the government’s National Retraining Scheme, 
which we believe to be a potentially valuable 
supplement to college based learning.
• Supporting disadvantaged students - 
Disadvantaged students need better financial 
support, improved choices and more effective 
advice and guidance to benefit fully from 
post-18 education. Our recommendations 
would provide them with additional support by 
reintroducing maintenance grants for students 
from low income households, and by increasing 
and better targeting the government’s funding 
for disadvantaged students. 
• Ensuring those who benefit from higher 
education contribute fairly - Most graduates 
benefit significantly from participating in higher 
education – as does the economy and wider 
society. We therefore endorse the established 
principle that students and the state should 
share the cost of tertiary education. We support 
the income-contingent repayment approach 
as a means of delivering this fairly, with those 
benefitting the most making the greatest 
contribution. However, public misunderstanding 
is high and better communication is required, 
including a new name, the Student Contribution 
System. We believe that more graduates should 
repay their loans in full over their lifetimes, and 
recommend extending the repayment period 
for future students and effectively freezing the 
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repayment threshold. These changes – with 
the reduction in fees – would apply only to 
students entering higher education from 2021-
22 at the earliest: students starting before then 
would not be affected. Some aspects of the 
present system appear to be unfairly punitive 
and we recommend reducing students’ in-study 
interest charges and capping graduates’ lifetime 
repayments. 
• Improving the apprenticeship offer - 
Apprenticeships can deliver benefits both 
for apprentices and employers but there 
is evidence of a mismatch between the 
economy’s strategic requirements and current 
apprenticeship starts. Our recommendations, 
together with recent government reforms, 
look to make further improvements in the 
quality of the apprenticeship offer by providing 
learners with better wage return information, 
strengthening Ofsted’s role – and thus the 
quality of providers – and better understanding 
and addressing the barriers SMEs face within 
the apprenticeship system. We have considered 
how best to use the finite funding which is 
available for apprenticeships and recommend 
that apprenticeships at degree level and above 
should normally be funded only for those who 
do not already have a publicly-funded degree.
Introduction 
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Purposes of post-18 education
In our highly developed industrial society, tertiary 
education serves a range of economic and 
social purposes and the age of 18 is something 
of a watershed for the way in which people are 
educated. Full-time education up to that age is 
close to universal in developed countries including 
England, where some participation in formal 
education or training is legally required until this 
age. Prior to that age, education takes place largely 
in classes of pupils the same age, and with the vast 
bulk of content taught to the whole cohort until the 
final few years. Post-18 education is very different. 
It is the stage at which specialisation intensifies 
and delivery methods diversify. Universities, further 
education colleges, independent training providers 
and employers are all involved and the system as 
a whole needs to fulfil several core purposes. The 
figure below summarises what we take these to 
be in a country committed: to equity and equal 
opportunity; to democracy and civic integration; 
to scholarship, open enquiry and dialogue; and, of 
course, to maintaining economic prosperity in a 
world of global competition. It also highlights the 
core themes of our later analyses.
Figure 1.1: Purpose of post-18 education 
Purpose: Promote citizens’ ability to realise their full potential, economically 
and more broadly.
Post-18 education plays a central role in enabling social mobility and lifetime 
remunerative employment, and in realising wider benefits across the population. 
Higher levels of education are associated with wider participation in politics and 
civic affairs, and better physical and mental health. Education brings together 
people from different backgrounds, demonstrating the value of diverse voices 
and connecting learners with lifestyles that differ from their own.
Assessment: Despite an overall increase in numbers of young students 
from across the population accessing higher education, course completion, grade 
attainment and longer-term employment outcomes for disadvantaged learners 
remain disappointing and there are regional gaps in access to tertiary education. Numbers 
undertaking adult education and part time study have fallen at all levels. 
Purpose: Provision of a suitably skilled workforce.
The country needs a population with the right mix of basic and advanced skills 
to support economic activity in both the private and public sectors. It needs 
a workforce able to respond to change and develop further skills throughout 
their lives.
Assessment: England’s workforce is reasonably well aligned with economic 
requirements but there are some grounds for concern. Many graduates are 
working in non-graduate jobs and some employers report dissatisfaction with 
graduate skills. Both higher technical and craft skills are in short supply with 
long-standing skills gaps in strategic sectors such as engineering, IT and digital. 
Migrant labour is required in many sectors and at different levels.
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Figure 1.1: Purpose of post-18 education continued
Purpose: Contribute scholarship and debate that sustain and enrich 
society through knowledge, ideas, culture and creativity. 
Assessment: Tertiary institutions generate the knowledge and skills that 
fuel our economy and provide the basis for our nation’s intellectual and 
cultural heritage. The UK is an acknowledged leader in a wide variety of artistic 
and academic fields.3 
Purpose: Contribute to growth by virtue of post-18 institutions’ direct 
contributions to the economy.
High quality institutions producing a skilled and adaptable labour force are 
central to the development of high-skill industrial clusters, enhancing localities’ 
attractiveness to enterprises and employers.
Assessment: The post-18 sector contributes 2 per cent of GDP, employing 
nearly half a million people in England.4 Non-EU students pay £4.7bn in tuition 
fees5 and also contribute £4.6bn to the economy as consumers of goods and 
services.6 From Weston-super-Mare to Wearside, universities and FE colleges are 
frequently found at the centre of local growth initiatives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Purpose: Support innovation through research and development (R&D), 
commercial ideas and global talent. 
World class R&D is a fundamental driver of economic growth and the system 
needs strong links with business to transfer this knowledge and support 
innovation.1
Assessment: The UK punches above its weight in research league tables, 
commercial innovation and cultural contribution. In 2014, the UK represented 
just 0.9 per cent of global population, 2.7 per cent of R&D expenditure, and 4.1 
per cent of researchers, while accounting for 9.9 per cent of downloads, 10.7 per 
cent of citations and 15.2 per cent of the world’s most highly-cited articles.2 
But questions about the UK’s capacity to convert research into productivity growth and 
intense global competition give no grounds for complacency.
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Purpose: Play a core civic role in the regeneration, culture, sustainability, and 
heritage of the communities in which they are based. 
Tertiary institutions serve as local centres for a wide range of social, economic and 
educational activity. To quote a recent report on universities from the UPP 
Foundation Civic University Commission, “if you strip all these things away, you 
are left with an impoverished place – and it is impossible to think of another 
institution that could deliver these benefits”.7 The same is at least as true of 
further education colleges which are in effect community colleges in many 
towns and cities.
Assessment: The same UPP report asked of universities, “are they fulfilling 
their true civic role? The truth is ‘only in part’. Many universities have an 
impressive menu of ‘civic engagement’. But few can claim to be strategically civic 
institutions.”8 Further education colleges could also potentially fulfil a more strategic 
role but funding cuts have caused them to cut back on some aspects of community 
engagement. 
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Post-18 education in England: 
the institutional structure
When English people speak of post-18 education, 
many think first of universities. However, there 
are more over 18s attending other educational 
institutions, 2.2 million9, than there are at 
university, with 1.2 million UK-domiciled 
undergraduates in England in 2017/18.10 These 
other institutions include further education 
colleges (FECs); public sector non-university 
providers (including local authority institutions); 
and independent training providers (ITPs), some 
charitable and others for-profit. In this report the 
terms ‘post-18 education’ and ‘tertiary education’ 
are used as descriptors for the whole system. 
Formal qualifications which can be delivered with 
government funding are all ascribed a numerical 
level (see Figure 1.2 below). ‘Higher education’ (HE) 
means Level 4, 5 and 6 (degree) and above. ‘Further 
education’ (FE) means post-18 education up to 
Level 4, and is also used to refer to provision below 
Level 6 in the FE sector. 
Universities
Within England there are currently 141 higher 
education institutions (HEIs) of which 134 receive 
public funding from the Office for Students (OfS).11 
Two dozen of these are specialist or postgraduate 
institutions, such as the Royal College of Music 
or London Business School, reducing the number 
of full-scale publicly funded HEIs in England to 
about 110. The vast majority of students studying 
for degrees (undergraduate and postgraduate) are 
found in these institutions. 
The academic autonomy of universities is 
recognised in statute and - with the exception of 
a few private universities - they are self-governing 
charitable institutions with a chair and a board 
of trustees. The university’s vice-chancellor is its 
senior academic and administrative officer and is 
accountable to the board. The vice-chancellor is 
usually supported by a number of pro or deputy 
vice-chancellors with responsibility for specific 
aspects of the institution’s work. An important 
aspect of the University structure is that they 
validate their own degrees.
In English higher education the typical university 
offers all levels of degree: undergraduate, 
taught postgraduate and research degrees. 
This arrangement is highly unusual. Almost all 
other countries in the world have very clear sub-
categories of university, distinguished by the level 
of degree that they award. But England’s university 
model is far from homogeneous.12 A distinctive 
group of ‘research intensive universities’, with very 
large levels of such activity, are perceived to be the 
most prestigious institutions. Newer universities 
focussing on teaching and research specialisms 
have their own distinctive standing. This latter 
group, including many former polytechnics which 
achieved university status after the educational 
reforms of 1992, has its own hierarchy based on 
reputation for teaching, student experience and 
successful graduate employment. 
Further education colleges 
The second major set of institutions providing 
post-18 education are the country’s FECs. Originally 
they provided specialised skills training and more 
general education to apprentices and employed 
workers, but after the second world war FECs also 
became major providers of more general adult 
education. Most recently, this has included large-
scale provision for unemployed people and English 
for speakers of other languages (ESOL) and full-
time education for 16-18 year-olds.13 This latter role 
has resulted in them becoming, effectively, the 
default institutions as the country moved towards 
near-universal continuation of secondary schooling 
post-GCSE. Such a broad mission is very unusual: 
education institutions in other countries do not 
tend to combine large amounts of secondary and 
post-secondary education. 
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A number of English FE colleges also teach 
advanced courses in vocationally-related fields. 
They cover various levels including foundation 
degrees (Level 5 awards typically requiring two 
years full-time-equivalent study), bachelor’s 
degrees and vocational sub-degree qualifications 
such as Higher National Diplomas (HNDs) and 
Higher National Certificates (HNCs). Degree courses 
are usually offered under franchise or validation 
arrangements with a university but a small number 
of FECs have their own degree-awarding powers. 
These colleges are the closest England has to higher 
technical institutions like the country’s former 
Colleges of Advanced Technology and Polytechnics 
or the higher technical institutions that exist in 
many other countries. For example, the USA has 
both universities (which differ in the levels of degree 
they award) and community colleges; Canada 
has separate college and university networks; 
Germany has both universities and technical 
universities (Fachhochschulen); the Netherlands 
has hogescholen (polytechnics); France has IUTs 
(Instituts Universitaires de Technologie). 
FECs are autonomous exempt charities governed 
by a chair and a board of governors.  They moved 
from local authority control under the Further 
and Higher Education Act of 1992. They have a 
contractual relationship with central government to 
deliver education and training. There are currently 
200 general, tertiary and specialist FECs providing 
learning in England14, down from 246 in 2013/14.15 
In recent years, and in considerable part as a result 
of a coordinated process of area-based reviews led 
by central government, there have been multiple 
mergers or closures.16 While many FECs remain as 
single institutions, college groups have also been 
formed with a single managing body for several 
institutions, usually, though not always, covering a 
contiguous geographic area.
Independent training providers (ITPs) and 
other publicly funded provision 
Government-financed education and training in 
England is also provided by 1,179 private sector 
training providers (also referred to as ITPs) and 
312 ‘other publicly funded’ providers of further 
education and training (e.g. local authorities 
providing adult education classes and HE 
institutions delivering FE) as of 2017/18.17 ITPs range 
from niche operators with just a handful of staff 
to full-scale enterprises: a definitive list is almost 
impossible to create since there are frequent exits, 
takeovers and the formation of new companies. 
This aspect of post-18 provision is another distinctive 
feature of contemporary England (and, to a lesser 
degree, the UK generally). This large private sector, 
dependent largely, and in many cases wholly, 
on government training contracts is a recent 
development. It derives from a ‘market based’ 
approach to the delivery of non-advanced (non-
degree) vocational training, including apprenticeship 
training, which has characterised English policy for 
the last 30 years and is discussed further below.
Important sub-sets of the independent and 
‘other public’ sectors are adult and community 
learning providers (who tend to specialise in sub-
Level 2 provision for disadvantaged learners) and 
independent specialist colleges (who provide 
education for learners with additional needs). 
Employers 
Employers play a vital role in post-18 education. 
They provide on-the-job training on a daily basis; 
they co-produce and deliver skills training with 
providers; they work with local and regional 
bodies to address skills needs; and, through 
their representative organisations, they have a 
fundamental role in setting the skills agenda. Much 
of this is simply part of employers’ daily business 
but it is a core part of skills provision and is taken 
very seriously indeed by the vast majority of private 
and public sector employers and professional bodies.
However, we note with concern a decline in work-
based training over the last twenty years.18 The 
scale of the decline is hard to quantify, since 
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results differ according to the measure of training 
which is used, as well as survey methodology, 
but the finding is quite consistent. In addition, a 
smaller proportion of employers is now directly 
engaged with, or purchases training from FE 
colleges. This is partly because of major changes 
in the organisation and funding of apprenticeship 
training - one of the most important sources of 
skill formation in the economy. For some decades 
now government policy has removed most 
apprenticeship training and funding from employer 
control; as we discuss later, current reforms are 
intended to reverse this. 
Changes in the pattern of study 
In recent years the post-18 sector has experienced 
a number of changes in what is studied, how, 
by whom and where. The most important 
developments are summarised below:
• The growth in university enrolments: There 
has been steady growth in the proportion of 
young people moving more or less directly from 
school to university. Successive governments 
have supported and promoted this trend, 
particularly after the Labour government’s 
1998 commitment to get 50 per cent of young 
people into higher education, and the coalition 
government’s decision to abolish any limits on 
the number of home students it would support 
at university in 2015.19 England now has one of 
the highest university participation rates among 
OECD countries.20 
• The decline in part time and older university 
students: While the proportion of English young 
people attending university has been going 
up, the numbers and proportions of older and 
part-time students enrolled in higher education 
have been going down. In 2009/10, there were 
594,550 full-time entrants to English universities 
and 385,965 part-time entrants in universities 
in England.21 By 2017/18, there were 654,235 
full-time entrants but only 180,675 part-time 
entrants – a fall in part time entrants of 53 
per cent.22
• The decline in level 4 and 5 qualifications: 
At the same time as the number of students 
taking full bachelor’s degrees (Level 6) has risen 
dramatically, higher technical qualifications 
(Level 4 and 5) have become a smaller part 
of England’s higher education landscape. 
HNCs and HNDs, once an important part of 
polytechnics’ programmes, are now a minority 
qualification.23 In 2016/17, only 15,000 students 
were registered for HNDs and only 19,500 were 
registered for HNCs in English higher education 
institutions and FE colleges24: equivalent to 
approximately 2 per cent of the undergraduate 
student body.25 By comparison, there were 
63,900 registered for HNDs and 48,700 for HNCs 
in 2000/01.26 There has been a similar decline 
in foundation degrees, Level 5 qualifications 
originally introduced in 2001 and intended to be 
“high-quality, intermediate, vocational higher 
education qualifications.”27
• The decline in qualifications at Level 3 and 
below: The numbers of achievements at Levels 
3 and below have fallen for all categories. It has 
been a sharp decline. The number of full Level 
2 achievements fell from 550,000 in 2011/12 
to 160,000 in 2017/18 and the majority of 
achievements are below this level. This can be 
seen from the results for 2017/18, when there 
were only 170,000 full Level 3 achievements 
compared to over 800,000 achievements 
below Level 2.28
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Figure 1.2: Qualification Levels and Examples: England 201929
Level Examples
8 Doctorate
7 Master’s (MA, MSc, MEng, MBA), PGCE
6 Bachelor’s degree (BA, BSc), degree apprenticeships
5 Foundation degree, HND, DipHE
4 HNC, full Accounting Technician qualification
3 A levels, BTEC diplomas, City & Guilds trade Diplomas (e.g. plumbing), Dental Nursing Level 3 Diploma (for 
dental assistants), Access to HE diplomas
A ‘full Level 3’ must be substantial: 2 A level passes or a BTEC National Diploma count as ‘full’ 
2 GCSEs at grades A-C/9-4; Level 2 occupational qualifications
A ‘full Level 2’ must be substantial (e.g. 5 GCSEs, an occupational qualification requiring a full year to 
complete)
1 GCSEs at D-G/3-1
Entry level 
(subdivided 
into three sub-
levels)
Entry-level certificates in e.g. English for speakers of other languages, literacy, numeracy, employability 
and a range of independent and life skills
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Post-18 education in England: the finance 
systems
The systems used by government to finance 
higher and further education are very different. 
Universities are funded largely through fees which 
follow enrolments: if providers can attract more 
students, they earn more money. Student loans in 
which the state eventually writes off any unpaid 
debt have replaced central and local government 
grants as the primary means of funding students’ 
fees. This mechanism, first introduced in 1998 
and subsequently expanded in 2012 when the fee 
cap was raised to £9,000 following the Browne 
Review, splits the cost of higher education 
between the student and the taxpayer and so 
enabled government to lift the previous cap on 
student numbers. It has been the key driver in the 
fulfilment of successive governments’ ambitions to 
increase the proportion of young people going to 
university.
The move led to a reduction in public funding for 
higher education, and - because of public sector 
spending rules - a deferral of the cost. The system 
of income-contingent loans collects interest and 
repayments from borrowers depending on their 
post-study earnings. Unpaid loans are written off 
against the Department for Education’s balance 
sheet; it is estimated that an average of 45 per cent 
of the amount loaned to students will ultimately be 
written off.30 However, under the public spending 
regulations in place when this system was 
introduced, this write off would not be reflected in 
the whole government accounts on which public 
spending is calculated until 30 years after the loan 
was taken out. This public spending treatment took 
the taxpayer subsidy of higher education funding 
out of the public debate: it came to be regarded as 
tomorrow’s problem. 
This situation is about to change. In a review 
announced after the government’s review of 
post-18 education and funding was launched, the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS), after consulting 
international authorities, concluded that the write-
off should be scored in the public finances in the 
period loans are issued to students, rather than 
at maturity (after 30 years) thus bringing public 
spending statistics into line with the DfE accounts. 
The sums are substantial; at Spring Statement 
2019 the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
estimated an impact on the deficit of £10.5bn in 
2018-19 rising to £13.7bn in 2023-4.31 This will 
make the taxpayer subsidy more visible and more 
immediate - and as a result will bring HE financing 
back into the arena of budgetary debate. 
FECs, ITPs and other providers are funded in a 
completely different way - FECs receive annual 
contracts for adult (post 18) education based on 
the amount of education and training - delivered 
in the previous year using a centrally set list of 
approved prices for different qualifications. Once 
a contract is awarded by the Education and Skills 
Funding Agency (ESFA) - a government body - 
an FEC can claim for the cost of provision, up to 
the limit of the contract. This system is far more 
restrictive and cumbersome than that enjoyed by 
the universities: in effect it constitutes a college-
by-college number cap. A further important 
difference is that the government records costs 
up front, as it does for schools: the full cost of the 
contracts appears at once in the public accounts.32 
There are in effect two different systems of funding 
tertiary education. The one allows uncapped 
student numbers, is unrestricted in the application 
of funds and until recently did not have to be 
recognised in the public accounts for 30 years. 
The other caps numbers, is restrictive in the use of 
funds and has to be accounted for upfront in public 
expenditure. Given these fundamental differences, 
it is no wonder post-18 education is the story of 
care and neglect we identified at the beginning of 
this report: the funding system guarantees that 
it will be. 
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Social mobility
“If progress continues at the current rate, it will 
take 120 years before disadvantaged young 
people become as likely as their better-off peers 
to achieve A levels or equivalent qualifications. 
In higher education, it will take more than 80 
years before the participation gap between 
students from disadvantaged and more 
advantaged areas closes.”
Social Mobility Commission, 201733
According to authoritative academic research there 
has been no improvement in social mobility in 
Britain over half a century: increases in wealth and 
changes in the overall structure of the job market 
have had no impact on the relative chances of 
people born into less advantaged groups. Indeed, 
‘rising upward and falling downward mobility in 
the mid-20th century are now being reversed.’34 A 
recent OECD report on social mobility found it to be 
frozen or declining in many countries. The report 
estimates that, on current trends and despite 
recent progress, it would take five generations 
for a low-income UK family to reach the average 
UK family income. This is slower than the OECD 
average and much slower than in Scandinavian 
countries with the highest income mobility rates. 
The same report comments that those born 
between 1945 and 1975 had much greater chances 
of social mobility than those born afterwards.35 
Education is a potential means of thawing this 
social permafrost. Yet despite some people 
obtaining considerably more education at higher 
levels than they would have done in the past, 
social mobility in England is not improving. We 
begin by illustrating recent patterns in the English 
education system.36 
At school level, there have been some significant 
improvements in recent decades. A level 2 
qualification – which within the academic/school-
based route is equivalent to 5 ‘good’ (grades A* - C 
or Level 4 – 9) GCSEs - is widely considered the 
minimum benchmark for employability in a range 
of productive occupations. Between 2005 and 2017 
the percentage of the cohort achieving Level 2 by 
age 19 rose from 67 per cent to 84 per cent and 
the percentage achieving Level 2 with English and 
Maths rose from 46 per cent to 69 per cent.37 
There has also been a significant increase in the 
proportion of young people achieving a Level 3 by 
age 19: up from 43 per cent in 2005 to 58 per cent 
in 2017.38 A large part of this increase reflects a rise 
in the number of people attending university with 
Level 3 BTEC diplomas, a more practically-taught 
alternative to A level.39
However at age 18, the starting age for our report, 
the picture becomes very different. Figure 1.3 
shows, in more detail, that progress for learners 
who do not complete their Level 3 by age 18/19 is 
virtually non-existent. The cohort analysed here 
took GCSEs in 2011. Two years later, in 2013, over a 
third of young people had failed to achieve Level 3 , 
whether through A levels, a BTEC Diploma or a craft 
qualification. For all but a tiny few, their highest 
qualification in the years that follow remains at 
Level 1 or 2: in 2017, the numbers stuck at this 
level remains over a third of the age cohort. The 
table also illustrates very clearly that among those 
who do achieve a Level 3 at age 18/19, extremely 
few progress to a Level 4 or 5: the numbers who 
gain that level of award at any point is tiny. The 
next step after Level 3 is, effectively, a Level 6 (full 
degree), or nothing: there is a near-total barrier 
to progress for people who have achieved a basic 
level of education at age 18, but do not progress to 
university or an apprenticeship.
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Figure 1.3: KS4 leavers’ cohort 2010/11. Highest level of education acquired per year during period 
2011-2017 (Source: Espinoza and Speckesser 2018)40
Highest level of education 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Level 1 or below 46.6% 31.1% 26.8% 25.4% 24.8% 24.6% 24.4%
Level 2 53.4% 12.6% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.4% 11.4%
Level 3 Vocational 14.6% 15.4% 16.4% 16.7% 11.2% 10.4%
Level 3 Mix 2.0% 3.8% 3.8% 3.7% 4.2% 3.5%
Level 3 A-Level 39.4% 42.3% 42.2% 42.2% 25.3% 17.8%
Level 3 + Apprenticeship 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0%
Level 4 and 5, and Level 6 Vocational 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 0.6%
Level 6 Academic 0.0% 0.1% 21.8% 30.8%
Sample: 637,000
Turning now to those who apply to go to university, 
the Centre for Vocational Education Research 
found that, even after controlling for many other 
characteristics, including prior attainment at GCSE 
level, the following trends existed, and that, for 
most of these differences, the gaps are widening 
rather than closing:
• Regions differ in the likelihood that young 
people will apply to higher education. 
• There are wide differences among different ethnic 
groups (and all minority ethnic groups, other than 
Afro-Caribbean, are more likely to apply to higher 
education than their white equivalents). 
• Girls are more likely to apply to university 
than boys.
• Young people with a graduate parent are more 
likely to apply to university, for any given set of 
GCSE or A level grades. 
• Those with graduate parents are more likely 
to do A levels in preparation for University: a 
third of individuals with less than 5 good GCSEs 
(grade A*-C) who aspired to an academic route 
and had graduate parents followed an academic 
route, compared with 15 per cent or fewer of 
those with academic aspirations but whose 
parents were not educated to degree level. 41
These findings help to explain why even though 
the higher education entry rate for disadvantaged 
18-year-olds in 2018/19 was the highest on record, 
huge gaps in access and progression remain.42 
Using generally accepted definitions, advantaged 
students were more than twice as likely to 
enter full time higher education in 2018 as their 
disadvantaged peers.43 The most advantaged 
students are 4.5 times more likely to go into 
higher education than the least disadvantaged.44 
While some areas of London see over 60 per 
cent of young people in the area entering higher 
education, fourteen local authorities outside 
London see less than a third of their young 
people progressing to university or a HE course 
in a college.45 Students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds are disproportionately likely to attend 
low tariff institutions46 and more likely to drop 
out.47 These students are also less likely to achieve 
first class or upper second degrees compared to 
their more advantaged counterparts48 and to earn 
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less after graduation.49 Lower prior attainment is 
the predominant factor.50 
Expanding higher education does not automatically 
lead to more social mobility: as we stated in our 
first principle, ‘increasing the sheer volume of 
tertiary education does not necessarily translate 
into social, economic and personal good. That 
depends on the quality, accessibility and direction 
of study’. Later sections of this report make 
recommendations that are intended to improve 
those outcomes.
Skills and skills mis-matches
In many respects the UK has a highly successful 
economy, ranking as the seventh largest in the 
world51, with 76 per cent of the working age 
population in employment, the joint-highest 
since measures began in 197152, and strengths in 
sectors as diverse as automotive, aerospace, digital 
and financial services. However, we heard from 
employers and academic experts of a shortage 
of higher technical and craft skills which in some 
sectors and regions is acute. Skill shortages and 
skill mis-matches reduce efficiency and act as 
drags on productivity growth. This is of particular 
concern given the British economy’s extremely 
poor growth in productivity since the 2008 
financial crisis, both in absolute terms and in 
comparison with many other developed countries.53
In an important speech at the Academy of 
Social Sciences in 2018, Andrew Haldane, Chief 
Economist at the Bank of England, said that “UK 
productivity is running almost 20% below its 
level had it continued along its pre-crisis trend”. 
He went on to add that “The UK faces perhaps no 
greater challenge, economically and socially, than 
its productivity challenge. Meeting that challenge 
would deliver benefits to workers in improved 
wages and skills and to companies in greater 
efficiency and profitability. It would also contribute 
to closing inequalities of income, wealth and 
opportunity which have rightly and increasingly 
preoccupied policymakers over recent years.”54 
It would be simplistic to believe that the 
productivity puzzle can be solved just by improving 
the supply of skills in the economy. Factors such 
as England’s institutional infrastructure, regional 
differences, the means of technology transfer and 
the availability of financial capital all play a part 
but it would be equally simplistic to believe that 
skills shortages have nothing to do with it. Andrew 
Haldane’s belief that improving productivity 
would help close ‘inequalities of income, wealth 
and opportunity’ is closely aligned with our own 
objectives. We believe that the skills gap is both a 
cause of the problem and - if it can be filled, can 
help to solve it.
Skills shortages are certainly to be expected in 
a buoyant economy with full employment but 
when they persist over a long period in particular 
occupations, they indicate failings in the education 
and training system. The panel heard repeated 
evidence of such long-standing problems. These 
systemic failures are of particular concern in a 
fast-changing labour market characterised by 
shortening job cycles in which the nature of work 
can change every decade, the steady advance of 
automation and artificial intelligence, and fierce 
global competition. 
The evidence for skill shortages is particularly 
strong in STEM-related areas and the skilled 
trades.55 Although there is evidence of some 
‘hollowing out’ of the labour market, with falls in 
the share of intermediate skilled jobs in recent 
years, there are still very large numbers of such 
jobs, within a workforce that has been growing 
in size overall. Moreover, and crucially, there are 
very different rates of change in demand within 
this broad category. In the UK, for example, 
there has been rapid growth in demand for 
intermediate or technician level jobs in sectors 
that include construction and agriculture as well 
as health and information technology.56 Recent 
detailed analysis of occupations with persistent 
skills shortages highlights a sizeable number of 
technician and skilled trade jobs as skill shortage 
occupations, many of which are in these sectors.57 
These long-standing shortages indicate serious 
structural problems.
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National longitudinal studies and earnings data 
provide clear evidence of very strong demand 
for mathematics and for STEM expertise more 
generally: the consistently high returns to these 
subjects are a classic manifestation of high 
demand and constrained supply. Controlling for 
a multitude of other factors (including tertiary 
qualifications), someone who has passed a Maths 
A level can expect earnings that average over 10% 
more than those of others in their peer group, 
and the returns have been increasing over time. 
Individuals who achieved an A* in Maths GCSE 
achieve especially rapid earnings growth in their 
early careers compared to their peers. At university, 
individuals with at least one STEM A level are 
mostly found taking degrees with high returns 
again reflecting the high labour market demand for 
STEM skills.58 
The polarisation in educational attainment 
noted above manifests itself particularly in the 
development of intermediate and advanced 
technical skills: 
• In England, only 4 per cent of 25 year-olds hold 
a Level 4 or Level 5 qualification as their highest 
level, compared to nearly 30 per cent for both 
Level 3 and Level 6.59 In contrast, in Germany, 
Level 4 and 5 makes up 20 per cent of all higher 
education enrolments.
• We also compare quite poorly with OECD 
comparators on the stock of people with 
intermediate (Level 2/3) skills in the workforce.60 
Almost 40 per cent of 25 year-olds hold a Level 
2 or less as their highest qualification; while 
a further 26 per cent of individuals do not 
progress beyond Level 3.61
Those few who do obtain a Level 4 or 5 award 
– often by a rather circuitous route – move 
into well-paid skilled jobs; the median annual 
income of someone with a Level 4 or 5 is around 
£2,000 higher than someone with a Level 3 by 
the age of 26 and comparable to the earnings of 
some graduates.62 Similarly, as discussed later, 
Level 3 apprenticeships in the skilled trades and 
engineering are very highly valued by employers – 
indeed in the latter case, for men at age 28, more 
than some Level 6 degrees.63 However, as discussed 
further below, apprenticeship in England has in 
recent years been concentrated at lower levels 
(typically Level 2) than is common in the rest of 
Europe. Skill shortages in contrast are most evident 
at Levels 3 and above.
Employers have dealt with some skills shortages 
(for example in construction) by hiring recent 
immigrants with the relevant skills. They have 
also responded to the lack of Level 4 or 5 qualified 
applicants by taking on graduates as technicians, 
although without the relevant practical training 
graduates are often actually under-skilled for such 
roles and tend to leave quickly.64 
England’s education and training system currently 
stands in the way of taking on technician 
apprentices in emerging and small sectors. With 
no central mechanism for ensuring coverage, some 
employers have told us that it is often hard to 
identify colleges or other training providers willing 
to provide the necessary education and training. 
Providers will only do so if they are assured of a 
critical mass of apprentices, since otherwise the 
training is financially non-viable – especially if it 
requires expensive equipment. 
“the prevailing funding regime….all too often 
discourages providers from offering … longer, 
more expensive higher-level (training)”
Paul Lewis, a leading expert on technician skills 
and training from King’s College London, in 
evidence submitted to our skills workshops.65
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Some recent attempts have been made to address 
the need for specialised centres of training. 
England’s four National Colleges, announced in 
2015 are intended to develop national centres of 
excellence in specific areas, at levels up to degree 
(Level 6), with a strong emphasis on technician 
training.66 However, it has proven difficult for 
them to grow, and develop Level 4 and 5 provision, 
within the current funding regime. In addition, the 
government has recently announced 12 Institutes 
of Technology, collaborations of HE and FE 
providers and local employers, designed to increase 
technician level provision.67 We support these 
initiatives but believe that a more comprehensive 
solution to skills shortages will be required, 
encompassing all higher and further education 
institutions, and providing systematic sectoral and 
geographic coverage.
Oversupply of graduates
We heard evidence indicating that the current 
supply of graduates is greater than job and skill 
requirements. It is hotly contested territory, with 
the HE sector referring to reports that a rising 50% 
of employment vacancies require applicants to hold 
a degree and some going so far as to suggest that 
in the modern world of work, graduate skills are 
relevant to most jobs.68 However, although there is 
no consensus on how to measure oversupply, most 
studies consider the number of English graduates 
in ‘non-graduate employment’ to be between 30 
and 50 per cent. The ONS find an overall upward 
trend since 200269, whereas in an analysis of 
graduate jobs published in 2014, the academics 
Green and Henseke concluded that ‘over education’ 
of graduates in the economy had remained 
reasonably stable at 30 per cent.70 The panel is in no 
position to provide a definitive estimate, but notes 
that the UK is an outlier internationally in terms 
of the proportions of graduates in non-graduate 
employment. Using the 2012 Survey of Adult Skills, 
the OECD found that 28 per cent of university degree 
holders in England reported being overqualified 
for their jobs, compared to 14 per cent on average 
across OECD countries.71 And in a follow-up study 
to their 2014 report, Green and Henseke (2016) 
concluded that 34 per cent of graduates in England 
and Northern Ireland are in non-graduate jobs, more 
than all the other countries in Europe except for 
Ireland and the Czech Republic.72 
The social and economic value of a degree is not 
always reflected in wages – nursing and healthcare 
are examples of modestly paid but socially valuable 
professions - but analysis conducted by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies for the DfE compares wage returns 
for graduates at age 29 with wage returns for those 
who have similar prior attainment at age 18 and 16, 
but did not attend university.73 This shows a wide 
variation – and for some courses and institutions, 
lower returns than for those with similar prior 
attainment who did not attend university. This is 
likely to lead to disappointment for those graduates 
who went to university with greater expectations 
but the consequences are felt not only by them. As 
the sociologist John Goldthorpe has pointed out ‘a 
situation of over-qualification at the graduate level 
in turn results in the ‘bumping down’ of the labour-
market value of all lower-level qualifications.’74 
Once we understand that relationship we can 
understand the complex organism that is tertiary 
education in England, the important role it plays 
in the country’s social and economic life and the 
benefits of ensuring that the system genuinely 
works for everyone. The rest of this report makes 
recommendations that are intended to address 
these issues.
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Introduction
This chapter focuses on the capacity of the post-
18 education system to produce a suitably skilled 
workforce, and how this might be improved. It 
proposes a number of changes which we believe 
would improve higher and further education’s 
responsiveness to the labour market, both in the 
immediate and longer term future. 
Skills formation is not the only purpose of our post-18 
education system but it is fundamental to the future 
prosperity of the country and is the single most 
important reason why taxpayers and individuals alike 
contribute to its costs. The previous chapter outlined 
how current arrangements are allowing skills gaps to 
endure and the barriers to progress that remain. 
Part of the solution to current problems lies in 
improving the quality of technical education both 
for students under 18 and for adults. This is a 
government priority and we welcome a number 
of recent initiatives in this area. These include 
the introduction of T levels from autumn 2020 
and proposals announced in December 2018 by 
the Secretary of State for Education to introduce 
employer-led national standards for higher technical 
education.1 This chapter identifies further changes 
which we believe to be necessary if the government’s 
ambitions for improved technical education and a 
more skilled workforce are to be realised.
Delivering technical education at Levels 4 and 5
The missing middle
England’s highly distinctive pattern of post-18 
participation was outlined in chapter 1 and is 
further summarised by two submissions to our call 
for evidence:
“…for years, technical education at Levels 4 and 
5 has been a neglected area of skills policy. 
This neglect has led to the current situation, 
where progression routes into and from Level 
4 and 5 courses are poorly defined and rarely 
communicated to individuals who could benefit 
from training at these levels.” 2
Lord Sainsbury of Turville, Founder of the Gatsby 
Foundation and Chancellor of the University of 
Cambridge.
“The Government must therefore 
comprehensively challenge the school to A level 
to University narrative that persists in the public 
consciousness in order to ensure that awareness 
of level 4 and 5 technical and vocational 
qualifications increases and that these options 
are seen as more desirable.”3 
Burton and South Derbyshire College, a further 
education college.
The country’s very small number of Level 4/5 
students translates into persistent skill gaps 
at technician level and also severely reduces 
opportunities for people who are unable, for 
whatever reason, to progress directly from Level 
3 to Level 6. Evidence to the panel showed wide 
support for expanding Level 4 and 5 enrolments 
from their current levels. What is less well 
recognised is that enrolments at these levels have 
actually been falling recently, in spite of renewed 
concern about technical education and technician 
shortages. In 2009/10, there were approximately 
510,000 learners enrolled on a sub-bachelor 
(Level 4-5) course: by 2014/15 this had reduced 
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to 240,0004 and by 2016/17 to 190,000.5 These 
declines are accounted for in large part by the way 
in which post-18 funding is currently organised. 
Experts on adult and part-time higher education 
(HE) agree that changes in the funding rules for 
degrees have forced changes in the type of HE 
course taken as well as reducing total numbers at 
sub-degree levels. For example, Professor Claire 
Callender informed us:
“There has been a dramatic shift in entrants’ 
qualification aims and their intensity of study, 
signalling a change in the nature of part-time 
provision with a move towards more degree 
courses and away from vocationally oriented 
short ‘continuing’ education type courses. These 
shifts are associated with the student loan 
eligibility criteria.” 6
We believe that funding structures and incentives 
must be changed if Level 4 and 5 uptake is to 
increase. Changes are also needed for Levels 2 
and 3: these are discussed in the later part of 
this chapter.
Level 4/5, or higher technical provision, is currently 
delivered across further and higher education and 
includes a range of qualifications and duration 
of study. Learners are on average aged 307 and 
around half study part-time.8 Qualifications at 
these levels include higher nationals (HNCs/HNDs), 
Foundation Degrees and Certificates and Diplomas: 
they can support either entry to skilled work or 
further study. However, as noted above, there were 
only 190,000 people studying at Level 4 or 5 in 
2016/17 (excluding apprenticeships),9 compared 
with approximately 1.14 million learners at Level 
6.10 Only 4 per cent of the English cohort who will 
shortly turn 30 had achieved a Level 4/5 as their 
highest qualification by the age of 25, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. More recent data on a younger cohort, 
discussed in chapter 1 (Figure 1.3) show that very 
few people – less than 1 per cent – do so by their 
early twenties. 
Figure 2.1: Highest level of qualifications 
achieved by age 25, England: cohort that 
undertook GCSEs in 2004/0511
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Moreover, overall, as Figure 2.2 demonstrates, only 
a small minority of Level 4/5 learners are found in 
the STEM-related technical areas where skills gaps 
are especially evident. The most common subject 
areas are Health, Public Services and Care, and 
Business, Administration and Law – with relatively 
few in technical subjects such as Construction 
and Science.12
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Figure 2.2: Level 4/5 learners by sector subject area, 2016-1713
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Preparation for life and work.
This gap in higher technical education makes 
England an outlier by international standards. To 
match the proportion of learners studying Level 
4 and 5 qualifications in Germany and the OECD 
average England would need to double current 
numbers14 but the long term trend in England is 
that numbers are declining.15
This was never deliberate government policy. 
The Dearing Report of 1997 – in many respects 
the inspiration for recent developments in 
higher education – both expected and strongly 
recommended that a large part of future growth in 
universities should involve ‘sub-degree’ (i.e. higher 
technical Level 4 and 5) courses.16 Foundation 
Degrees (Level 5) were launched in 2001 and were 
intended to provide courses closely linked to 
employer needs, yet enrolments in England have 
been falling steadily in recent years, from a high 
of over 81,000 in all years of study in 2009/10 to 
approximately 30,000 in 2017/18.17 
The missing middle is the result of current 
incentives for learners and providers 
At present, both on the supply and demand side, 
incentives are stacked in favour of the provision 
and take-up of three-year full-time undergraduate 
degrees and against the provision and take-up 
of Level 4/5 courses – or, indeed, of part-time 
and adult study generally, both of which are in 
decline. Although the quality of courses and of 
information, advice and guidance are important, 
and are discussed below, financial issues are the 
fundamental cause of this. They explain why there 
has been a decline in higher technician provision 
at a time when the labour market provides clear 
evidence of skill gaps, and are critically important 
in explaining why our skills system supplies so little 
part-time and flexible provision at a time of rapid 
economic change and lengthening work lives. 
The current structure of higher education is driven 
in very large part by two important policy changes. 
The first introduced income-contingent loans for 
home students studying for specified HE courses 
up to Level 6 in 1998. The second was the lifting of 
the numbers cap on HE admissions in 2015. These 
are explained in full in chapter 3. Briefly, they 
mean that today, any home student accepted for 
an approved course within English HE – Levels 4 
through 6 – can borrow for fees for up to four years 
of study (full-time equivalent). However, there are 
restrictions. A complex system of ‘Equivalent or 
Lower Qualification’ (ELQ) rules effectively prevent 
anyone from receiving direct financial support 
for any HE (Level 4-6) qualification18 at a level at 
which they have already studied. Restrictions apply 
even to those who previously followed a privately-
funded course. 
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Prescribed and non-prescribed Level 4/5 qualifications
Currently, Level 4/5 qualifications are either ‘prescribed’ or ‘non-prescribed’. Those qualifications 
deemed to be ‘prescribed’ HE Level 4/5 provision are part of the HE system. Students taking these 
courses get full access to HE loans for fees and maintenance, and these are regulated by the Office for 
Students (OfS). These include Foundation Degrees, Higher Nationals (HNDs and HNCs) and Certificates/
Diplomas of Higher Education.
‘Non-prescribed’ Level 4/5 provision is part of the FE system, funded by Advanced Learner Loans 
(ALLs) which vary in amount depending on the size of the qualification. This provision is regulated by 
Ofqual. These include professional Certificates, Diplomas and Awards such as those awarded by City 
and Guilds. There is no maintenance offer for non-prescribed courses but students can access limited 
financial support through a provider-administered bursary fund.
This dual system is complex for institutions, students and employers and militates against the 
emergence of a clearly understood higher technical pathway. 
The distinction between these types of qualification is sometimes explained using the terms 
designated and non-designated. For the purpose of this report, the panel will refer to ‘prescribed’ and 
‘non-prescribed’ qualifications at Levels 4 and 5. 
So, with a number of subject-specific exceptions, 
someone who has taken a prescribed HE Level 
5 cannot get support for a prescribed HE Level 
4 or a different prescribed HE Level 5 or for the 
equivalent parts of a full degree; and someone who 
has completed a degree cannot normally get any 
further undergraduate-level support even if they did 
not take all, or any, of the loan entitlement. These 
ELQ restrictions are both complex and very unusual: 
they do not, for example, exist in Canada, Australia 
or New Zealand, whose HE systems are quite similar 
to England’s, as discussed further below. They make 
it difficult to change subject and difficult to retrain.
Since 2012/13, English HE students have also 
only been eligible for income-contingent loans if 
they are studying at an intensity of 25 per cent 
or greater of a full-time equivalent course and are 
following a full course for a specified qualification. 
Hence students studying individual institutional 
modules or short courses of less intensity are 
ineligible for loans. Academic research and 
evidence submitted to the panel both indicate that 
this has been an important factor in the decline of 
part-time adult learners, described in chapter 1.19
The Equivalent or Lower Level Qualification (ELQ) 
Funding for tuition fees or maintenance loans is not provided for students taking equivalent or lower 
qualifications in HE at Levels 4, 5 and 6, except for a number of exemption subjects, where some 
learners may continue to be eligible for maintenance support only. These exemptions, introduced 
over a number of years, include subjects related to medical and health care, architecture, social work, 
veterinary surgery, and teacher training. There are also further exemptions for certain qualifications 
related to teaching and health care, where students are still eligible for both tuition fee and 
maintenance loans. There are further exemptions when studying part-time.20
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The balance between courses at Levels 4/5 and 
full degrees at Level 6 has shifted following these 
policy changes. The latter became ever more 
dominant: higher technical awards by English HE 
institutions (HEIs) are not merely few in number 
but in continuing decline. Figure 2.3 illustrates 
this for one important Level 5 award, Foundation 
Degrees, where enrolments, following the lifting 
of the numbers cap, have fallen sharply. As we 
explained earlier, this is not because UK employers 
do not value higher technical qualifications: wage 
returns to higher technical qualifications are 
positive and significant,21 and in Scotland, with 
different post-18 arrangements, HNDs and HNCs 
remain numerous and important.22
Figure 2.3: Foundation Degree enrolments (all 
years of study) in England, 2001/02-2017/1823
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The reasons for the decline in Level 4/5 enrolments 
in England are that current arrangements set up 
an interconnected set of incentives which result in 
young people opting for full-time degrees (Level 
6) and in institutions marketing and supplying full 
degrees at maximum price to the near-exclusion of 
other options. 
Income-contingent loans mean that young people 
can and do take on debts in the knowledge that, 
if things go wrong and they earn little, the debt 
will be written off. In addition, any loan allowance 
not borrowed by pursuing a lower cost course 
cannot be used for anything else because the 
ELQ restrictions are, by design, pushing learners 
to always ‘advance’ in the sense of moving on 
to qualifications (of any sort and content) at a 
higher level. 
Compared to many other countries, our funding 
arrangements drive providers away from higher 
technical provision. Developing new courses 
is always risky, especially if they require large 
amounts of equipment or the hiring of very 
specialist staff; given current conditions, launching 
new high-cost provision at Level 4 or 5 is additionally 
risky and financially unattractive. As discussed in 
chapter 3, current teaching grant levels for technical 
subjects, which top up income from fees, are low 
by historical standards: one private alternative 
provider that we visited told us that provision of 
technical degrees was simply unaffordable for them. 
Funding incentives drive providers to Level 6 and 
disincentivise the provision of technical subjects at 
all levels. The support system makes a full Level 6 
the obvious choice for students. The contraction in 
higher technical education and the resultant skills 
gap are the consequences.24 
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The case for flexible learning at Level 4 
and above
The eighth and last of our principles as set out in 
chapter 1 states that ‘post 18 education needs to 
be forward looking’. This links to our belief that the 
system should support a ‘workforce able to respond 
to change and develop further skills throughout 
their lives’ as set out in Figure 1.1. Evidence 
submitted to us emphasised that in order to 
achieve this, there needs to be more flexibility and 
variety in the way people can access education. 
The CBI, for example, told us that:
“The post-18 system should become flexible 
enough to facilitate additional routes to higher 
skills be it through higher or further education 
providers. This will be essential to ensure 
individuals already in the workforce can learn 
on a more modular basis and not have to 
choose work or study.” 25
The CBI also expanded on this in a joint public 
paper with Universities UK:
“As the UK’s economy grows, in the context 
of global change, the needs of employers, 
employees and learners will also change. There 
is a strong economic imperative to improve 
flexible learning opportunities to improve 
the life chances and employment outcomes 
of those wishing to change or improve their 
careers, as well as increasing productivity of 
businesses through addressing skills shortages 
and upskilling existing employees.” 26
A related theme emerging from our call for evidence 
was the need to encourage shorter courses which 
could be used by adults to upskill and reskill. Mary 
Curnock Cook, a former Chief Executive of UCAS 
and an acknowledged expert in HE, noted:
“Funding based on credits, which could be 
built up over any stretch of time would make 
sense, not least for part-time providers like 
the OU and Birkbeck which need to be flexible 
to accommodate usually adult and therefore 
‘messy’ learners… A flexible funding system would 
encourage more innovative models which might 
mix full-time, part-time, distance and work-based 
provision over varying stretches of time.” 27
We invited leading academic experts on skill 
requirements and provision to contribute papers 
and discussion to a workshop. The consensus 
from these and other experts is that current 
arrangements are ill-suited to helping employees 
or companies upskill and that greater flexibility 
and access to shorter periods of learning are 
needed. The recent House of Lords enquiry into 
the economics of post-school education similarly 
recommended that the system should:
“Ensure flexibility between levels and types of 
study. This should include funding for modules 
or credit where a full degree is not required.” 28
We believe that equipping people with the skills to 
adapt to a constantly evolving employment market 
is key to a successful future. This is a government 
priority as set out in the Industrial Strategy which 
declares that:
“We will ensure that everyone can improve their 
skills throughout their lives, increasing their 
earning power and opportunities for better jobs. 
We will equip citizens for jobs shaped by next 
generation technology. As the economy adapts, 
we want everyone to access and enjoy good 
work”. 29
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Andrew Haldane, chair of the Industrial Strategy 
Council and Chief Economist at the Bank of 
England has argued in this context that:
“The future university may need to be a very 
different creature than in the past. It may need 
to cater for multiple entry points along the 
age distribution, rather than focussing on the 
young. And it may need to cater for multiple 
entry points along the skills spectrum…” 30
The following section proposes funding reforms 
that can help to deliver this flexibility, and also 
reverse the decline in Level 4/5 qualifications to 
address higher technical skills gaps.
Restructuring loan entitlements
We make three recommendations intended 
to promote both uptake of higher technical 
qualifications and flexible study. The core proposal 
is that individuals should be able to draw down 
their HE loan allowance over a lifetime. We 
also propose, secondly, the abolition of certain 
restrictions on equivalence and intensity. Learners 
should also, thirdly, be able to access funding for 
one module at a time, without having to sign up to 
a full qualification as they do at present. 
Maintenance should be drawn down on a pro-
rated basis as currently happens for part-time 
students. Learners should be able to build up to full 
qualifications over a number of years, should they 
wish. Learners should be able to access student 
finance for tuition fee and maintenance support 
for modules of prescribed HE qualifications at 
Level 4, 5 and 6, in order to maximise flexibility 
and enable providers to respond quickly to labour 
market demands. 
Qualifications eligible for funding under this 
recommended change should all be credit-based: 
credits are explained in the accompanying box. 
Modules eligible for individual funding should be 
for a minimum of 30 credits: as a reference point 
a single year’s full time Level 6 course brings 120 
credits.31 A 30 credit course, in our view, represents 
a significant amount of teaching and learning, 
and is an appropriate minimum for upskilling or 
reskilling. It is also short enough to be combined 
fairly easily with work and other commitments.32
Credit and modules33
• Credit is a means of quantifying and 
recognising learning. Individual modules and 
programmes may be assigned a credit value 
which indicates both the amount of learning 
expected (the number of credits) and its 
depth, complexity and intellectual demand 
(the credit level).
• ‘Module’ or ‘unit’ is a self-contained, 
formally structured, learning experience 
with a coherent and explicit set of learning 
outcomes and assessment criteria. Currently 
these comprise a variety of credit values, 
ranging from 10 to 60 credits, depending on 
the institution.
• If studied full time, a Level 4 usually takes 
one or two years depending on the type of 
qualification, a Level 5, two years and a Level 
6, three or four years, although there are 
a number of much longer courses such as 
medicine and architecture.
• ‘Course intensity’ measures how much of 
a course a learner is enrolled to complete 
each academic year compared to a full-time 
equivalent course. The minimum intensity 
is currently 25 per cent which equates to 30 
credits. 
• A Level 4 qualification usually equates to 120 
credits; Level 5 equates to 240 credits, and a 
Level 6, to 360 credits.
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Our proposal would not require any change in the 
total amount that an individual might borrow: as 
noted above, current arrangements entitle any 
home student to access loans for four years’ worth 
of full-time fees and universities can accept as many 
home students in total as they see fit. However, we 
do propose, for loans made under the new allowance, 
that both the restrictions currently associated with 
‘ELQ’ rules, and the ‘intensity’ requirements (which 
restrict loans to study towards full qualifications, at 
25 per cent intensity or more) should end. 
Recommendation 2.1 
The government should introduce a single 
lifelong learning loan allowance for tuition 
loans at Levels 4, 5 and 6, available for adults 
aged 18 or over, without a publicly funded 
degree. This should be set, as it is now, as a 
financial amount equivalent to four years’ full-
time undergraduate degree funding.
Recommendation 2.2
Learners should be able to access student 
finance for tuition fee and maintenance 
support for modules of credit-based Level 4, 5 
and 6 qualifications. 
Recommendation 2.3
ELQ rules should be scrapped for those taking 
out loans for Levels 4, 5 and 6.
In the longer term, when considering Level 4 and 5 
qualifications specifically, only those qualifications 
which meet the new employer-led standards, 
as outlined later in this chapter are in scope for 
these three recommendations. This is explained 
further below. 
We believe that these three recommendations 
should apply to those who do not already have 
a publicly-funded or publicly-supported degree. 
In line with present practice, the upper loan limit 
should be set as a financial amount equivalent to 
four years’ full-time undergraduate degree funding: 
£30,000, under the panel’s recommended fee cap 
of £7,500 per year. The system would need to flex 
to accommodate longer courses, such as medicine 
and architecture. There would be no change to the 
current rule that maintenance support is made 
available for the first HE qualification at each level. 
Figure 2.4 summarises the difference in the choices 
faced by individuals and by institutions under 
the current and our proposed system. Overall, we 
believe that introducing a flexible lifetime loan 
allowance would make a fundamental and positive 
difference to the relative attractions of part-time, 
adult, and Level 4/5 study, and would strongly 
encourage young people to think about their higher 
education in terms of a lifetime of employment. 
Individuals would be able, under these 
arrangements, to work, to move on or move up, and 
still have the opportunity to return to study later, 
using any outstanding loan allowance, and in the 
subjects, and at the levels, that suit their careers. 
A lifetime loan allowance would also ensure that 
there are new incentives for borrowers both to be 
price-sensitive, and to take a loan for only part of 
their current fees, thus retaining some entitlement 
for future years, should they need it. 
The incentives faced by higher education 
institutions would change and, therefore, so would 
their behaviour. Demand for Level 4/5 and for short 
courses should grow and be actively encouraged as 
demand from learners increased. 
Institutions would also have an incentive to revisit 
charging. Price may still be a signal of quality but 
increases in the price-sensitivity of students would 
mean that they would be looking for institutions 
which could demonstrate that quality remained 
high, but charged below the fee cap. Especially at 
higher technical levels, and for adult students who 
cannot study full-time, or relocate, we would expect 
our proposed reforms to strengthen demand for 
provision in further education colleges.
These changes would mark a major shift in the 
way individuals access funding and would require 
the Student Loans Company (SLC) to administer 
them. The overwhelming majority of students 
studying at Levels 4, 5 and 6 are already on courses 
which are credit-based. The SLC already deals, as a 
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matter of routine, with full-timers and part-timers, 
and with students who interrupt their course for 
personal or professional reasons, and then return. 
However, we are aware that a good number of our 
recommendations, in this chapter, but also in the 
chapters that follow, would mean changes in the 
terms and conditions for student loans. It may 
not be reasonable or desirable for them all to be 
implemented at once. Given the complexity of any 
new arrangements, government should assure 
itself that delivery partners have the capacity and 
capability to deliver a secure and stable platform 
before implementing these changes. 
Figure 2.4: Choices facing individuals and institutions under current funding rules, and with an 
individual lifelong learning loan allowance
Individuals entitled to one funded 
course per Level (the status quo)
Individual allowance to a loan amount which can be used at 
any time for any approved tuition at Levels 4, 5 and 6
Individuals Choose one full degree at the 
maximum fee level, since any unused 
loan cannot be used later.
Consider taking shorter courses, especially to start with and 
preserving the remaining entitlement for future use. Shop 
around for provision which is good but cheaper since this 
preserves loan entitlements for future flexible learning. 
Institutions Offer the longest courses at the 
highest fee level permitted. Target full-
time enrolments at age 18.
Offer more modular provision, as well as Level 4 and 5, which 
can be topped up later. Compete on price as well as reputation 
and entry requirements. Target older individuals who are 
retraining or changing occupation. 
We examined the operation of the more flexible 
finance systems in Australia and New Zealand. 
Both countries have operated successfully for some 
time with a flexible lifetime loan entitlement for 
tertiary study, similar to the one recommended 
here. Singapore also offers all adult citizens a ‘skills 
account’ and England has experience of relaxing 
ELQ rules for Level 6 study in STEM subjects. These 
examples indicate that, with careful planning, 
a lifetime loan allowance can be successfully 
introduced and operated. 
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Loan support in Australia
Since student number caps were lifted in 2012, Australia’s tertiary education sector has grown 
significantly, becoming more diverse and accessible, with multiple pathways to entry.34
Tuition fees vary between universities and the type of course. All University students can apply for 
Australia’s income-contingent Higher Education Loan Program (HELP) to pay tuition fees. The majority 
of undergraduates are eligible to access a subsidised place which comes with a subsidised HECS-HELP 
loan.35 Most undergraduates will be enrolled in a place where the government pays part of their fees, 
called a commonwealth supported place (CSP). This part is a subsidy, not a loan, and does not have to 
be paid back. This subsidy does not cover the entire cost of the study and students must pay the rest, 
called the ‘student contribution amount’, this amount differs with subjects being classified into three 
bands with different student contribution limits for each.
However, for those that are not eligible they can instead use the FEE-HELP program. This is a universal 
entitlement: it is available to all domestic students enrolled in approved HE providers, regardless of 
level of qualification or previous qualifications. Students can access up to a lifetime maximum of AUS 
$104,440;36 this is designed to allow students to re-train and re-skill throughout their lifetime.
Australia differs from England in that through this system almost every student will be able to access 
a loan to cover the cost of tuition fees (either subsidised or not) repayable on an income-contingent 
basis irrespective of previous equivalent level qualifications. The only students that are unable to 
access a loan would be those that had reached their FEE-HELP lifetime maximum loan allowance of 
AUS $104,440.
A report by HEPI in 2014 suggests the FEE-HELP system operated in Australia is especially beneficial 
for those students who are most likely to be averse to the upfront cost of studying and likely to want 
to reskill or retrain later in life, such as postgraduate, part-time and mature students.37
We also examined the failure of the Individual 
Learning Accounts (ILA) programme in England 
in the early 2000s.38 This was the result of poor 
design and hasty implementation: in particular, 
large numbers of providers were involved, without 
proper controls, and were incentivised to recruit 
learners at speed for low-level courses.39 Our 
recommendations are for a system implemented 
and overseen by the established Office for 
Students (OfS) and the SLC. We would also expect 
implementation to be gradual, for successive 
cohorts, rather than the whole population at once; 
and to be carefully monitored. 
There are important lessons to be learned from 
the ILA episode but equally, we emphasise that, 
without these changes, neither more flexible 
provision, nor a major increase in Level 4/5 uptake, 
is at all likely. On the contrary, the incentives which 
are driving HE towards ever more uniform provision 
of full-time Level 6 degrees would remain in place.
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Awarding qualifications at Level 4 and 5 
mid-points in a programme of degree study 
For many younger students, a single three-year, 
full-time degree is likely to remain the most popular 
option. However, sometimes students need to pause 
their learning, or may decide that they have made 
the wrong choice. Others may find themselves 
struggling: although English drop-out rates are 
low by international standards,40 many thousands 
of students drop out every year, and rates are 
significantly higher among disadvantaged students.41 
A change in the way universities award qualifications 
would, in our view, help students who have to 
interrupt their studies and also motivate students 
who are struggling to complete their current year 
successfully. One aspect of contemporary English 
provision which is little known to either students or 
the general public, is the possibility of exiting most 
undergraduate degree courses mid-way, with either 
a Certificate (Level 4: CertHE) or a Diploma (Level 
5: DipHE). Within degree courses, these awards are 
mostly used only for students who leave their course 
partway through: this means they are not only little 
known but also perceived as a ‘consolation prize’ or 
even a certificate of failure. 
We recommend that higher education institutions 
should award at least one interim qualification 
at either Level 4 or Level 5, to all students who 
are following a Level 6 course successfully. There 
are three reasons for this recommendation. First, 
creating a widely known accreditation point would 
motivate students who may be struggling or have 
decided to leave their current course. They would 
have an incentive to complete the current stage 
of their studies successfully, and acquire a formal, 
widely recognised certificate. Second, it would 
make credit transfer easier: students who wish to 
move institutions or courses, either immediately or, 
often, after a period, would have a completed award 
rather than a miscellaneous collection of credits. 
This would be easier and more straightforward for 
other institutions to process. Third, it would quickly 
make Levels 4 and 5 a central and visible part of HE 
and with minimal expense. 
Recommendation 2.4 
Institutions should award at least one 
interim qualification to all students who are 
following a Level 6 course successfully. 
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MODULE
21 25
Person A Person B Person C Person D Person E
Wants to  
improve their  
job prospects
Signs up for a 
Level 6 degree 
but has to step 
off after a year, 
when they are 
awarded a Level 4
They go back 
after a break and 
complete more 
modules and get 
a Level 5
They go back 
after a break and 
complete further 
modules over a 
few years and get 
a Level 6.
They access 
student finance 
for a one-off 
module to help 
them upskill or 
reskill or develop 
their career
Once finished 
they are able 
to show 
employers they 
have completed 
this module.
Takes one 30 
credit module at 
a time, adding 
further modules 
over time
Once they have 
gained 120 
credits they will 
be awarded a 
Level 4.
Attains a Level 6 
degree at the age 
of 21
At age 35, uses 
the remainder of 
their allowance 
to achieve 
another Level 4.
Achieves a Level 4 
by the age of 25
Using the 
remainder of 
their allowance, 
gets a Level 5 
A few years later 
takes another 
Level 4.
Degree
Combining the lifelong learning loan allowance and modular funding:
Example routes 
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Improving quality and streamlining provision 
at Levels 4 and 5 
There were over 3,000 separate qualifications at 
Levels 4 and 5 available to learners in 2016/17, 
many of which have few or no enrolled and active 
learners.42 Awareness of these qualifications among 
employers and potential learners is low and it is 
difficult for them to evaluate their potential worth.
If higher technical education is to fulfil its potential, 
the country needs a suite of qualifications whose 
quality is clear and assured, and which can be easily 
recognised by employers, as well as a change in the 
financial incentives to take such qualifications. 
The English government’s 2016 Post-16 Skills Plan 
said that “improving higher-level technical skills 
(Level 4 and above) is critical” and committed 
to reforms under which “only level 4 and 5 
qualifications which meet national standards…
will be eligible for public subsidy (via government-
backed loans) as technical qualifications”.43 
Following a DfE review, in December 2018, the 
Secretary of State for Education announced 
proposals to introduce employer-led national 
standards for higher technical education, 
through which qualifications will be badged and 
recognised.44 We welcome this initiative and the 
new kitemarked qualifications form the basis of our 
subsequent recommendations on fees and funding.45
To ensure high quality we recommend one 
regulator for all institution-based (non-
apprenticeship) provision at these levels to support 
consistent quality. The OfS should be that regulator.
Recommendation 2.5
Streamline the number and improve the status 
of Level 4/5 qualifications. 
Recommendation 2.6
The OfS should become the national regulator 
of all non-apprenticeship provision at Levels 4 
and above.
The case for a systematic approach to Level 
4 and 5 delivery
A growth in higher technical education also 
requires more high quality provision. The 
government has already begun to address this 
with the creation of four National Colleges and is 
now in the process of establishing 12 Institutes 
of Technology (IoTs).46 We support these policies 
in principle but note that, under current funding 
conditions, the National Colleges have struggled to 
thrive. We believe that a more systematic approach 
to provision is needed to ensure that a genuinely 
national and equitable system is established.
National Colleges
National Colleges are new institutions, created 
by employers to support high-level skills 
training in those sectors that are economically 
and strategically important to UK growth (i.e. 
High Speed Rail, Nuclear, Digital, Creative & 
Cultural). Courses are predominantly between 
Levels 4 to 6, with employers involved in 
developing the curriculum, and industry 
professionals teaching the content in simulated 
workplaces. The goal is for the colleges to 
develop a national reach by setting up ‘hub 
and spoke’ models with main campuses and 
satellite sites.
Institutes of Technology (IoTs)
IoTs form a key part of the government’s 
plans for a new technical education system. 
They are intended to be prestigious, high-
quality institutions created by existing FE 
and HE institutions with leading employers to 
specialise in meeting Level 4/5 technical skill 
needs in STEM-based subjects, with options for 
progression to degree level. In April 2019, 12 
IoTs were announced and the first are expected 
to open in September 2019.
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We note that countries with successful higher 
technical provision ensure that it is available 
nationally and is partly managed centrally. 
By contrast, England’s market-led approach is 
fragmented across three types of provider at 
Levels 4 and 5. Universities – for reasons we fully 
understand and have discussed above – have 
concentrated on degrees rather than standalone 
Level 4 and 5 awards. As we will discuss in chapter 
4, FECs offer 53 per cent of Level 4/5 provision but 
have experienced severe funding cuts, leaving them 
with no surpluses available for high cost higher 
technical provision and forcing them to focus on 
lower level awards.47 The third group of participants 
are independent training providers (ITPs), who offer 
about 2 per cent of Level 4/5 provision.48 Each has 
a role to play but there is no coherence to the way 
the three types of provider fit together.
Linked to the Industrial Strategy, we believe that 
the government should take a lead role in ensuring 
geographical coverage of Level 4 and 5 provision 
to ensure prosperous communities across the UK. 
They should identify recipient institutions within 
the FEC network and provide adequate means 
to ensure that learners have access, across the 
country, to high quality technical and professional 
education. The following recommendations are 
developed further in chapter 4. 
Recommendation 2.7
• Government should provide additional 
support and capital funding to specific 
FE colleges in order to ensure a national 
network of high quality technical provision is 
available.
• Government should work with the OfS to 
determine how best to allocate this using, for 
example, quality indicators and analysis of 
geographic coverage.
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Simplifying fees
Simplifying Levels 4 and 5 fees
We also recommend that in conjunction with the 
development of national standards, a structured 
approach to the delivery of higher technical 
education and the kitemarking of approved higher 
technical qualifications, the fee regime for Levels 4 
and 5 should be rationalised. 
At present, as discussed in the boxed explanation 
below, there are two quite separate systems. The first 
applies the standard HE fee and loan arrangements 
to any qualification prescribed by the OfS. The 
second, which applies to a very large number of Level 
4 and 5 vocational awards of varying lengths, uses 
a wide variety of prices and a different loan system, 
Advanced Learner Loans (ALLs). As discussed further 
below, the move to ALLs, which has taken place over 
the last few years for non-prescribed awards at Levels 
3 to 6, has been accompanied by an unpredicted 
and undesired fall in enrolments for these non-
prescribed awards; this is not a coincidence.
Current Level 4/5 fees
Student Loans Company (SLC) data show 
that there is a wide range of fees charged by 
universities and colleges for prescribed HE Level 
4 and 5 courses; this varies by level and type of 
provider. 
HEIs with OfS approved plans to widen access 
and participation can charge up to £9,250 at 
present for Levels 4 and 5, as can FECs which 
have such an access agreement: for colleges 
without an access agreement the cap is £6,165 
with a Teaching Excellence Framework award, 
and £6,000 without.49
The average headline fee charged for a 
Foundation Degree in a HEI in 2016/17 was 
£7,510 compared to £7,240 in FECs with an 
access agreement (£6,010 in FECs without an 
access agreement), suggesting there is some 
price competition below full degree level.50 
Tuition fees vary for Level 4 and 5 courses that 
are not prescribed for HE funding. These include 
certificates and diplomas in vocational subjects 
offered by FECs. The maximum ALL loan 
available is based on the size and subject of an 
individual qualification by the ESFA and serves 
as a proxy fee cap. Levels vary considerably 
among qualifications, in large part because of 
differences in the number of ‘guided learning 
hours’ needed for completion and whether 
these lead to a full qualification. In 2017/18, the 
average ALL loan amount for tuition fees was 
around £2,700 for Level 4 and above.51
From 2022/23 onwards, we recommend that the 
fee cap for all Level 4/5 qualifications should be 
linked to the new employer-led national standards 
for higher technical education. On a rolling basis, 
as these new standards are introduced, fee caps for 
those Level 4/5 qualifications that are kitemarked 
should be equivalent to the fee cap set for a full 
Level 6 degree. This would be £7,500 a year (120 
credits) under our recommendation. Other Level 4/5 
qualifications in that discipline should be subject 
to a lower fee cap within a simplified pricing 
structure.
We believe a fee cap for kitemarked Level 4/5 
qualifications equal to that set for degrees is 
important to level the playing field. Indeed, this is 
already the case for prescribed HE qualifications 
– which make up approximately 80 per cent of 
qualifications (and at least 70 per cent of learners) 
at Levels 4/5.52 We believe a fee differential 
between kitemarked and non-kitemarked awards 
is important to incentivise providers to deliver 
the former and establish the ‘higher technical’ 
brand. We also believe that the simplification of 
the fee system, and its application across HE and 
FE, would make higher technical provision much 
easier for learners to understand and thereby more 
attractive.
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Once the national standards are fully established, the 
cap for all other non-kitemarked Level 4/5 provision 
should be at a lower level. Moreover, again at this 
point, access to modular funding should be confined 
to kitemarked qualifications. Providers of kitemarked 
qualifications should receive a teaching grant 
top-up to reflect the extra cost of delivering that 
particular subject in line with that available for Level 
6 providers in that discipline. There should be a pro-
rata fee cap and teaching grant for courses at Levels 
4 and 5 that are credit-based but less than full-time. 
Until courses have been deemed kitemarked or 
non-kitemarked, arrangements would remain the 
same as at present; courses prescribed by the OfS 
would be eligible for the same fee caps as Level 
6, and other courses would have their maximum 
fee set by the ESFA. However, as noted above, 
we urge the government to move speedily to set 
national standards and kitemark higher technical 
qualifications. We believe these will be attractive 
to some young people, including those who might 
otherwise have stopped at Level 3 and to mature 
people wanting to upskill.
The current and intended long term positions are 
set out in the following table. 
Current position and long term proposals for L4/5 qualifications
Current position Longer term (~2024 onwards)
Prescribed HE Level 4/5 qualifications 
• Part of HE system and overseen by the OfS, but can also 
be delivered by FECs. These make up at least 70 per cent 
of Level 4/5 learners.
• Learners can access full HE student finance package, 
including maintenance support (equivalent to Level 6).
• Institutions with an access agreement (most universities) 
charge up to £9,250 per annum and those without an 
access agreement (most FECs and Alternative Provision) 
up to £6,165,53 as for full Level 6 degrees.
Kitemarked Level 4/5 qualifications
• Improve status of Level 4/5, in line with new employer-led 
national standards, against which qualifications will be 
kitemarked.
• Replace distinction between prescribed and non-prescribed 
courses with kitemarked and non-kitemarked qualifications.
• Same fee cap (£7,500 per year from 2021-22) and eligible 
for same teaching grant as Level 6 qualifications. 
• Maintenance support package equivalent to Level 6 
qualifications.
Non-prescribed Level 4/5 qualifications
• Part of FE system and regulated by Ofqual – not delivered 
by HEIs. These make up at least 20 per cent of Level 4/5 
learners. 
• Funded by direct payment or through Advanced Learner 
Loans (ALLs) for tuition (ALLs administered through the 
Student Loans Company (SLC)): carry small-scale support 
for costs of study through bursary funds. No access to 
maintenance support through the SLC.
• Tuition fees vary based on number of learning hours, 
as set by the ESFA. Most non-prescribed courses cost 
between £3,000 and £5,000.
Non-kitemarked Level 4/5 qualifications
• Qualifications that do not meet high-quality threshold 
(against national standards) will not be kitemarked.
• Lower fee cap and not eligible for teaching grant. 
• Eligible students receive ALL bursary fund.
• Once national standards are fully established, there is a 
case for government to review this group of qualifications.
Recommendation 2.8
From 2021-22 the fee cap for Level 4 and 5 qualifications currently prescribed by the OfS should be 
£7,500 – the same as that proposed for Level 6 qualifications and in line with current arrangements 
for prescribed HE qualifications. Longer term, only kitemarked Level 4 and 5 qualifications that 
meet the new employer-led national standards should be able to charge fees up to the Level 6 cap 
and be eligible for teaching grant. From that point, any other Level 4 and 5 courses should have a 
lower fee cap.
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Joined up at all levels
Although skill gaps and falling enrolments at 
Levels 4/5 are highly visible and have attracted 
growing attention, they are not the only part of 
post-18 provision where there are major reasons 
for concern. At both Level 2 and Level 3, there are 
growing gaps between current provision, labour 
market demand, and the ability of our system to 
offer people fair and equal chances of progression.
In 2016, the government established an 
Independent Panel on Technical Education, chaired 
by Lord Sainsbury of Turville. Early in 2017 that panel 
recommended a “coherent technical education 
option…which leads from Levels 2/3 to Levels 4/5 
and beyond” a common framework for Levels 2 to 
5 and “further work to examine how to ensure clear 
progression routes develop from Levels 4 and 5”.54
This vision was reflected in the Industrial Strategy 
which seeks a system in which “everyone can 
improve their skills throughout their lives, 
increasing their earning power and opportunities 
for better jobs”.55 At present, however, there is 
a huge divide between those who carry on into 
HE from a Level 3, usually at age 18 or 19, and 
those who do not. The latter very rarely progress 
to any higher level than they achieved at age 18, 
see Figure 2.1 above. A growing body of evidence 
documents how hard it is for low-paid workers, 
most of whom are also poorly qualified, to escape 
from low-paid work and progress occupationally 
or in income terms. For example, the Resolution 
Foundation finds “just one in six low-paid 
employees moving onto consistently higher wages 
over the course of a decade” and that when such 
employees change jobs it is usually for another 
equivalent position.56 Hence, “for most low-paid 
workers, poorly-paid positions are not acting as a 
first rung on the ladder – it is the only rung”.57
This is not because there is no demand for 
skilled employees. In the UK, Working Futures 
estimates that associate professional and technical 
occupations will experience over 10 per cent growth 
up to 2024 from 2014. Most roles in this occupation 
group – for example, science and engineering 
technicians – utilise higher technical skills.58 
Analysis conducted on behalf of EngineeringUK 
shows a net requirement of approximately 
400,000 associate professional occupations in the 
engineering sector over 2014 to 2024.59
Figure 2.5 below summarises the levels and 
recent changes in skill-shortage vacancies across 
the economy. While there have been some 
improvements (e.g. in transport and storage), 
levels remain high – notably in the vital sectors 
of construction and utilities. Here, there is 
strong unmet demand for craft-level skills. As 
discussed further below, both Level 2 and Level 
3 qualifications generally yield strong positive 
earnings returns. And yet the number of awards 
being made to post-18 learners has fallen steeply 
and is continuing to fall. The following sections 
explain how this has come about and we make 
proposals to reverse these trends and create a clear 
educational route for adults wishing to study and 
train at Levels 2 and 3.
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Figure 2.5: Number and density of skill shortage vacancies by sector, 2013-201760
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Retraining and funding for adults
Retraining and funding for adults at 
Level 3
Qualifications which are at Level 3 cover a wide 
range of content. Many are academic, including A 
level, BTEC Nationals, and Access courses for adults 
without the right formal qualifications to enter 
higher education. Many others are vocational, and 
cover specialised skills at a high level including T 
levels, a suite of qualifications created as a Level 3 
full-time technical option commencing in 2020.
The Employer Skills Survey 2017 found that some 
of the most persistent skills shortages were in 
skilled trades (such as electricians and vehicle 
technicians).61,62 Qualifications for skilled trades are 
typically ‘full’ Level 3s and require prolonged periods 
of study and training, whereas other courses at this 
level are much shorter (and so not ‘full’). 
Post-18 study at Level 3 is generally financially 
beneficial. A comparison between adult learners 
who do and do not complete a ‘full’ Level 3 
qualification shows a 9 percentage point earnings 
return and increases their chance of being in 
employment by 4 percentage points on average 
3-5 years after achievement.63 Analyses by the 
Centre for Vocational Education Research looked 
in detail at the returns to different qualifications 
achieved between ages 16 and 24, and found that 
for those people whose highest achieved award 
was at Level 3, returns at age 26 were high, with 
returns depending on the type of vocational 
award.64 Compared to individuals holding a Level 
2 qualification, those holding a vocational Level 3 
qualification all enjoyed an earnings premium. For 
example, Level 3 NVQs offered a 15 per cent return 
for men and 9 per cent return for women;65 these 
are typically occupationally competence based 
qualifications relevant for those working in the 
skilled trades.
Despite these benefits, participation by adults in 
Level 3 study has fallen in recent years as shown in 
Figure 2.6. These figures exclude apprenticeships 
(discussed in chapter 5) but cover all mainstream 
educational provision for adults (19+) and include 
both academic and vocational qualifications.
Figure 2.6: Numbers participating and achieving 
‘full’ Level 3 awards in adult (19+) education and 
training (excluding apprenticeships): 2011/12-
2017/1866
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We believe that this fall is mainly a consequence 
of changes in funding. Prior to 2013, there was 
full funding for any adult’s first ‘full’ Level 3 
qualification: in other words, if an adult who had 
not yet achieved a full Level 3 qualification decided 
to re-enter education, they were not liable for 
any tuition fees. This changed for the 2013/14 
academic year: since then anyone aged 24 or over 
and employed who wants to obtain a Level 3 award 
has had to either pay from their own resources or 
take out an Advanced Learner Loan (ALL) unless 
they can persuade their employer to contribute. 
From 2016/17, this has also been true for 19-23 year 
olds except for their first full Level 3 qualification. 
Enrolments at Level 3 dropped by 31 per cent in the 
first year (a fall from 142,500 in 2012/13 to just over 
98,000 in 2013/14), see Figure 2.7.67 More recent 
evidence shows that most of this fall in enrolments, 
around 26 per cent, is estimated to be attributable 
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to the withdrawal of funding, with the remainder 
likely to be the result of changes in learner demand 
in response to economic conditions (e.g. higher 
employment).68 Research for this review further 
highlighted how financial factors affect the choices 
people make about studying for Level 3 as an 
adult. This study found that cost issues were the 
most frequently cited reasons that put adults 
off studying.69 Non-prescribed qualifications at 
Levels 4 to 6, which were discussed in the previous 
section, are not funded and require students to 
take out an ALL. 
Figure 2.7: Advanced Learner Loans: overall 
volumes of take-up of eligible courses 2012/13 – 
2013/14 (ILR analysis)70
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ALLs are available for individuals aged 19 or 
above to undertake approved further education 
qualifications at Levels 3 to 6. ALLs provide 
financial support for tuition costs and are 
paid directly to the provider on behalf of the 
student by Student Finance England. They 
are income-contingent repayment loans with 
identical terms to post-2012 HE student loans, 
with repayment only commencing when 
income exceeds £25,000. The size of the loan 
varies depending on the course and subject 
undertaken.71 
Loans can be written off for Access to HE 
courses at the point where the student 
successfully completes a course of Higher 
Education. 
No maintenance loan is offered as part of 
the ALL system, but an ALL Bursary Fund is 
available to learners to cover specific costs 
associated with studying, such as travel, 
childcare and books, as outlined in chapter 7. 
In 2017/18, there were 109,000 FE learners 
funded by ALLs of which there were 99,500 at 
Level 3 and 9,900 at Level 4 and above.72
Unlike HE qualifications, qualifications supported 
by ALLs are not demand led. Instead, institutions 
have a funding agreement with the ESFA that 
enables them to provide a loans facility. The size of 
this facility is based on what was delivered through 
loans in previous years. As such it is difficult to 
increase the size of the facility even if the demand 
is there. This can be particularly problematic for 
small institutions which may lack the capability 
and capacity to meet minimum delivery 
expectations, yet these institutions are often very 
close to the labour market and its changing skills 
needs and are potentially the key to filling local 
skills shortages.
In its recent report on post-school education, 
the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee 
concluded that:
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“The current funding arrangements for Level 
3 qualifications provide a straitjacket: they 
prevent retraining and stifle attempts to create 
coherent pathways between higher and further 
education.”73 
We agree and endorse that committee’s 
recommendation of full funding at Level 3 for all 
adults undertaking a first ‘full’ Level 3. At present, 
the government makes large contributions to the 
cost of HE courses for students of all ages but 
does not do so for older students on lower level 
courses (notably Levels 2 and 3). We think this 
is both inequitable and economically misguided 
and recommend that this be corrected in 
recommendations 2.9 and 2.10. 
Recommendation 2.9
The current age cap should be removed so 
that a first ‘full’ Level 3 is available free to all 
learners whether they are in work or not. 
Retraining and funding for adults at 
Level 2 
There are around six million adults without a Level 2 
in this country, many of whom are likely to have the 
ability and appetite to achieve and progress.74 We 
also have an economy in which productivity growth 
is extremely low, and in which there is widespread 
potential for improvement. Level 2 qualifications 
(see box below) are an increasingly important 
precondition for progression at work and to higher 
levels of attainment. Achieving a ‘full’ Level 2 
qualification can increase an individual’s earnings by 
11 per cent and their chance of being in employment 
by 2 percentage points (based on 3-5 year averages 
after achievement), compared to those that do not 
achieve the qualification.75 This country is committed 
in principle to a fair and equitable education system, 
including support for the most disadvantaged and 
vulnerable people in society, such as prisoners and 
ex-offenders, but it is not currently delivering one.
Level 2 qualifications
These comprise a broad range of qualifications 
including GCSEs (5 good passes (grades 4-9 / 
A*-C in the old system) or Technical Certificates, 
and functional skills, and range from small, 
single unit qualifications to larger diplomas, 
comprising specific occupational job roles such 
as bricklaying, introductory vocational tasters, 
or broader employability qualifications. 
The need for reform is strengthened by economic 
change. The panel has heard a great deal of 
evidence about shorter job cycles and the need for 
employees to train mid-career as the nature of their 
employment changes. The government’s Industrial 
Strategy paper referred to a “growing challenge 
with lifelong learning: supporting people to up-
skill and re-skill across their working lives”and 
emphasised the need to increase opportunities to 
retrain.76 The government’s intention to trial and 
develop new ways of making retraining and lifelong 
learning available to adults, especially where 
their current industry faced decline or change has 
been reflected in the National Retraining Scheme, 
announced in the November 2017 Budget and 
currently under development.
National Retraining Scheme 
The National Retraining Scheme is the 
government’s new programme to drive 
adult retraining. It was announced in the 
Autumn 2017 Budget and is being developed 
by government in partnership with the 
CBI and TUC.
The scheme is being rolled out incrementally, 
but over time will include a new careers 
guidance service with expert advice to help 
people identify work opportunities in their 
area, courses combining online learning with 
traditional classroom teaching to develop key 
transferable skills, and job-specific retraining.
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We welcome the National Retraining Scheme 
and its focus on adults affected by imminent 
technological and economic change. We also 
believe that there are strong arguments for 
complementary reform focused on improving 
the opportunities and skills of the wider, low-
skilled adult population, including the role that 
qualifications can play.
English and Maths tuition up to and including 
GCSE is currently fully funded for all, and in our 
view, should continue to be so. However, England 
also used to provide full tuition funding for a 
first ‘full’ Level 2 qualification – a substantial 
qualification typically associated for adults with 
a clear occupational role – and continues to do 
so for the unemployed and for those aged 23 
and under. But from 2012/13 onwards, employed 
people aged 24 and over were required to pay half 
of their tuition costs and in addition, in 2016/17, 
government support for workplace training for 
this group was entirely removed. This means that 
employed people aged 24 and over needing to 
reskill or wishing to gain a first full Level 2 in order 
to progress further up the education and career 
ladder now have to pay half the tuition costs - this 
could typically be in the region of £50077 - unless 
their employer will pay. 
Not surprisingly, the total number of ‘full’ Level 2 
adult learners fell. It was over 400,000 in 2012/13 
and fell to just over 50,000 in 2017/18 as shown in 
Figure 2.8 below.78
Figure 2.8: Numbers participating and achieving 
‘full’ Level 2 awards in adult (19+) education and 
training (excluding apprenticeships): 2011/12-
2017/1879
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Some of this fall is because of reclassification of 
certain qualifications but it is beyond debate that 
the impact of the recent funding changes – at Level 
2 and as discussed above at Levels 3 to 5 – has 
led to a significant and highly undesirable fall in 
the number of learners.80 In fact, the total number 
of ‘full’ Level 2 learners aged 25+ fell from over 
500,000 in 2011/12 to under 50,000 in 2017/18.81
We believe that the funding changes created a 
barrier to both social mobility and productivity 
and recommend addressing this by providing 
funding to those adults who still need to take their 
first full Level 2 or 3. These qualifications should 
be employment and skills focused, appropriate 
for older adults and based on the quality of the 
course, not the number of hours studied. This 
change would enable many thousands of people 
to upskill and respond to the changing demands of 
the economy. 
Recommendation 2.10
Full funding for the first ‘full’ Level 2 
qualification, for those who are 24 and over and 
who are employed should be restored. 
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Information, advice and guidance to support 
informed choices
Good information, advice and guidance (IAG) is 
crucial for anyone seeking impartial advice about 
jobs, careers, routes of learning and qualifications. 
A young person who has four or more encounters 
with an employer is 86 per cent less likely to be not 
in education, employment or training (NEET) and 
can earn up to 22 per cent more during their career, 
compared to those who did not have any such 
encounters.82 The converse is also true: poor IAG 
can increase dissatisfaction with career and subject 
choices and result in individuals switching courses 
and careers.83
However, weaknesses in the provision of 
information, advice and guidance have been a 
recurring theme from both the call for evidence 
and our discussions with learners, employers 
and providers – particularly with regard to the 
visibility and quality of advice on technical routes. 
Many schools initially struggled with their new 
responsibilities to provide good IAG and Ofsted was 
critical of the quality and variation of provision in 
schools.84 
The government published a Careers Strategy in 
December 2017, backed by £16m investment for 
new activities.85 It retains a school- and college-
led approach, providing training and support for 
careers leaders in local ‘hubs’ of schools, colleges 
and businesses and increasing the number of 
employer encounters with young people. Whilst 
recognising the promising start, we believe that 
careers support is still underfunded and therefore 
recommend that the strategy is rolled out 
nationally so that every secondary school is able to 
be part of a careers hub, that training is available 
to all careers leaders and that more young people 
have access to meaningful careers activities and 
encounters with employers. We recognise that 
schools policy is outside the scope of our Terms of 
Reference. However, given that IAG influences post 
18 choices, and that schools are required by law 
to deliver impartial, high quality IAG, we believe 
it is in within our remit to recommend changes to 
improve this provision. 
We also believe that schools should be held to 
account for their statutory responsibility to provide 
IAG. We welcome the new requirement on schools 
(from January 2018) to allow technical education 
and apprenticeship providers to talk to pupils, but 
were disappointed to learn that there is evidence 
that schools still fail to tell pupils about the full 
range of post-18 options. We welcome Ofsted’s 
focus on schools’ provision of independent advice, 
careers guidance and opportunities for pupils to 
encounter the world of work, as part of judging 
pupils’ personal development. 
It is equally important that young people and 
adults have direct access to information, advice and 
guidance. We welcome the ongoing development of 
the Unistats website that will allow prospective HE 
students to better compare not only courses and 
institutions, but the outcomes students achieve. 
We also encourage better and more systematic use 
of outcome data for FE courses and apprenticeships 
which will help potential students to better 
understand the benefits of these qualifications. We 
note the role of UCAS as a central clearing point 
for HE and encourage government to consider the 
value of a comparable service for FE students at 
Levels 4 and above. Prospective students should also 
be advised of different and more flexible modes of 
learning including part time and modular learning, 
so that they are able to make more informed choices 
about how they can study. For adults seeking careers 
advice, the National Careers Service, set up in 2012, 
offers a range of approaches to support decision-
making including a website with information 
about jobs and the full range of routes to learning, 
access to phone, web chats, texts and emails with 
careers advisers and a face-to-face service offering 
personalised advice to priority groups. However, 
Chapter two: Skills 
56
despite evidence that this service has a positive 
impact on users, the budget is reducing, meaning 
the offer will also reduce. Given the clear demand 
for the National Careers Service website, we are keen 
that this service continues to provide vital impartial 
IAG. We welcome the continued development of 
the website so that it becomes the single, trusted 
source for people to find out about different careers, 
whatever their level of skills or qualifications. 
Recommendation 2.11 
The careers strategy should be rolled out 
nationally so that every secondary school is 
able to be part of a careers hub, that training 
is available to all careers leaders and that 
more young people have access to meaningful 
careers activities and encounters with 
employers. 
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Introduction
This chapter is about the role and funding of 
universities for undergraduate degree level 
provision. Postgraduate study accounts for a 
relatively small proportion of resources invested 
in higher education and is not the focus of the 
government review or indeed of this chapter. While 
universities are not the only providers of higher 
education (HE), they are the most significant, 
educating approximately 90 per cent of those 
taking an undergraduate degree.1 There are 141 HE 
institutions (HEIs) registered in England, of which 
over 100 are full-scale publicly funded universities, 
the remainder being specialist, postgraduate, or 
privately funded institutions.2 
The sector has grown considerably in recent years 
– at least for full-time students. The proportion of 
English young people entering HE has risen from 
below 20 per cent in 1990 to almost 50 per cent 
today.3 Apart from a dip in 20124 when £9,000 
fees were introduced, the number of domestic 
full-time entrants to HE has grown steadily over 
the last ten years, despite a decline in the English 
18 year-old population.5,6 Altogether 1.44 million 
undergraduates are studying at English HEIs – 
including 210,000 EU and international students – 
of which 1.24 million are full-time.7
The continuous expansion of HE has been the 
explicit aim of successive governments. The 
introduction of £1,000 fees in 1998 and their 
increase to £3,000 in 2006, accompanied by 
the availability of income-contingent tuition fee 
loans, created a demand-led system in which 
students are lent the money to make a choice 
between universities (or whether or not to go to 
university) and universities compete to recruit 
them. The intention was to create a market and 
the principle was taken a stage further in 2012, 
when fee caps were trebled to £9,000, and in 2015 
when student number caps were lifted. This was 
intended to encourage universities to expand and 
increase student choice. Undergraduate teaching 
after 2012 became a profitable activity and the 
sector responded as it was meant to by recruiting 
more students, improving student support and 
developing facilities.
The creation of a competitive market in HE required 
a different form of regulation. This came in 2017 
– see box below – with legislation for the Office 
for Students (OfS) to replace the old funding body, 
the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE), and the Office for Fair Access (OFFA). The 
replacement of a funding body with a regulator 
was an explicit acknowledgement that the market 
needs to be managed. The new regulator – which 
will become fully operational on 1 August 2019 
– has a wider remit and greater powers than its 
predecessors. HEFCE attached terms and conditions 
to grant funding but in practice its powers were 
limited to either continuing to fund a sub-standard 
provider, or not; there were no formal mechanisms 
for influencing individual HEIs. By contrast, the 
OfS has powers to intervene on a risk-based basis 
with the objective of promoting competition and 
choice and looking after the student interest. It is 
an important distinction and we believe it offers 
great potential to ensure that the market works in 
the interests of all stakeholders.
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HERA and the OfS
The 2017 Higher Education and Research Act 
replaced multiple overlapping HE regulatory 
systems with a new single regulator. The OfS was 
established on 1 January 2018, with full powers 
coming into effect on 1 August 2019. The Act 
introduced a new regulatory system based on 
voluntary registration subject to conditions. The 
new market regulator has competition, choice 
and student interest at its heart, with a statutory 
duty to assess quality and standards in the HE 
sector. The OfS has been given a wider range 
of powers to ensure that providers comply with 
their registration conditions and is using them. 
Of the 352 providers that the OfS have registered 
to date, 15 have been registered subject to a 
detailed regulatory condition requiring them 
to take action to address specific concerns by 
a deadline.8
In the words of Lord Willetts, one of the architects 
of the current system as Universities Minister from 
2010 to 2014, ‘Universities are one of the great 
forces shaping the modern world and driving 
human progress.’9 We agree and see great benefits 
from the decades-long expansion in the sector. 
This expansion and the improvements in student 
financial support have turned HE into a widely 
available opportunity for young people and a 
record proportion of 18 year-olds are now entering 
HE.10 We comment later that the experiences of 
some young people while at university and beyond 
give rise for concern, but the increase in entry 
rates for disadvantaged students in particular is a 
significant and long-awaited improvement. Since 
2009 the entry rate for disadvantaged 18-year-olds 
to full-time HE has increased by more than 50 per 
cent and the gap in entry rates between the most 
and least advantaged applicants is narrowing.11 We 
regard this as an important building block in the 
development of a fairer society. 
We also welcome the economic impact of HE. 
Nationally, the UK university sector contributed 
£21.5 billion to GDP in 2014-15, representing 1.2 per 
cent of the UK’s GDP.12 In 2017/18, the academic 
workforce totalled nearly 212,000 with a further 
218,000 employed as non-academic staff.13 In 
2016, total revenue from the 460,000 international 
HE students at UK HEIs totalled £11.9bn.14 
Moreover, recent analysis by London Economics 
suggests the international students from a single 
cohort who obtain good jobs and remain in the 
UK will generate over £3 billion in tax, over a ten-
year period.15 By any criterion, therefore, higher 
education is an important sector of the economy.
Many universities also make a considerable civic 
contribution. They are torch carriers for their 
community’s economic, cultural, social and 
environmental development, often in partnership 
with their local authorities and local businesses.16 
The recent Civic University Commission report 
stressed the importance of this role: “it is clear 
that universities are – alongside the NHS and local 
authorities – one of the key institutions in and for 
local society, and especially in many economically 
vulnerable places and this role will become more 
important”.17 This is difficult to quantify but 
estimates put the value of pro-bono work by HEIs 
through public initiatives, knowledge exchange 
and participation in science and cultural events, 
charitable endeavours and social enterprise at over 
£3 billion in 2017.18
The sector has an outstanding reputation for 
research and, in a knowledge economy such as 
ours, the importance of this is clear. In 2014, the 
UK represented less than 1 per cent of the global 
population, less than 3 per cent of R&D expenditure, 
and 4 per cent of researchers, yet accounted for 11 
per cent of downloads of research papers, 10 per 
cent of citations and 15 per cent of the world’s most 
highly-cited articles.19 A study by Elsevier in 2016 
ranked the UK first amongst its comparator countries 
by field-weighted citation impact, an indicator of 
research impact and quality.20 Earlier this year the 
QS World University Rankings gave UK universities 
the top ranking in 13 out of 48 subjects.21
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We acknowledge and celebrate these and the HE 
sector’s other considerable achievements and do 
not wish to understate them. Nonetheless our 
task, and one of the objectives of the government’s 
review, is to assess whether – to quote from our 
terms of reference – the sector “is accessible to 
all, supported by a funding system that provides 
value for money and works for students and 
taxpayers, incentivises choice and competition … 
and encourages the development of the skills that 
we need as a country.”22 
Our conclusion is that the HE sector broadly fulfils 
these objectives. By any reasonable measure, the 
expansion of England’s university sector should 
be considered a success, bringing benefits to 
graduates, employers and society at large. However, 
as is true of any market, there are deficiencies 
both at system-wide and at institutional level. We 
raise our concerns about ‘the other 50 per cent’ 
elsewhere in this report but believe that even 
amongst the 50 per cent attending university, the 
rising tide has not lifted all the boats. A minority – 
but a significant minority – of university students 
are left stranded with poor earnings and mounting 
“debt”. This has personal consequences for those 
whose expectations have been disappointed and 
economic consequences for the state that foots 
the bill. Lifting all the boats would bring significant 
benefits for students, taxpayers and employers 
alike and is the subject matter of this chapter. 
In making our recommendations, we have 
examined the financing of universities, how they 
use their resources and how the market works. We 
begin with a financial analysis.
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Section 1: University finances
The percentage increase in the resources 
flowing to the sector in recent years has 
outstripped public spending and the growth 
in GDP
The 2012 increase in the fee cap from £3,29023 
to £9,000 marked a major change in universities’ 
funding. It allowed government to increase 
per-student resources while reducing upfront 
grants. Sharing more of the costs of tuition and 
maintenance with students through the loan 
system made the lifting of the student number 
cap in 2015 affordable. Although the increase in 
resources was intended to address a lengthy period 
of underfunding for the sector, this radical move 
– once almost all universities had unexpectedly 
set fees at the maximum – boosted the money 
received by universities per student to its highest 
real-terms level in at least 25 years, as shown in 
Figures 3.1 and 3.3. Figure 3.2 shows that overall 
funding is now close to the highest international 
level, despite recent freezes. Scarcely noticed at 
the time was the implicit state subsidy which came 
from writing off the unpaid portion of student 
loans; this has turned out to be almost half of the 
additional fee income from UK and EU students. 
Figure 3.1: Estimate of university resources per student per publicly funded degree 1990-91 to 
2017-18 (in 2018-19 prices)24 (IFS)
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The effect on universities’ income was dramatic 
(see Figure 3.3) and in sharp contrast to what was 
happening in the rest of the economy. The increase 
in student numbers carried some extra cost but 
the combination of higher fees and more students 
led to sector income from publicly funded teaching 
rising by an average of 3 per cent per annum in real 
terms between 2010-11 and 2016-17.25 In contrast, 
total public spending fell by nearly 1 per cent per 
year in real terms,26 and spending for school aged 
pupils also fell slightly in real terms per pupil.27 
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of tertiary education spending in OECD countries, including public and 
private investment, 2016 or latest available.28 
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Figure 3.3: HE-related teaching income at English HEIs, in 2017/18 prices
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The sector is in reasonable financial health
In a report issued on 4 April 2019 the OfS 
concluded that “the sector overall is currently in 
reasonable financial health.”30 We concur with 
this view. Based on Higher Education Statistics 
Agency data, the operating surplus in 2017/18 
for the English HEI sector was 3.1 per cent of 
income, down from 3.6 per cent the previous year 
and 5.2 per cent in 2015/16.31 Sector projections 
submitted to the OfS indicate that the operating 
surplus is forecast to drop to 0.9 per cent in 2018-
19 before recovering to about 3 per cent in each of 
the following three years.32 The sector overall has 
operated with a surplus for all of the years in the 
past decade. 
At the sector level, total net assets, which provides 
an indicative measure of the underlying financial 
strength of providers, increased from £37.1bn at 
the end of July 2017 to £41.3bn at the end of July 
2018. They are forecast to continue rising to 2022, 
reaching £45.1bn.33
The OfS’s report of a sector in reasonable financial 
health is unsurprising, given the decade-long 
increase in income depicted in Figure 3.3. However, 
we note the regulator’s comments that the sector’s 
growth expectations are based on “ambitious 
assumptions about growth in student numbers” 
and we believe that performance against forecast 
should be monitored closely.34
Figure 3.4: Overall sector resources and spending (in 2017/18 prices) and surplus over time35
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Financial performance varies at 
institutional level
Within this healthy picture, performance at 
individual institutional level varies widely. In 
2017/18, HEIs in England reported surpluses as a 
proportion of income as high as 33.9 per cent, with 
13 providers reporting a surplus above 10 per cent, 
but 32 HEIs were in deficit, one by as much as 13.6 
per cent.37 We recognise that some of these deficits 
were planned but it is striking that while the overall 
sector is in good health, a quarter of universities 
are in deficit. 
Expansion comes with risk
Universities’ expansion has been partly funded 
through debt and financial arrangements 
known as ‘sale and leaseback’. The former 
includes bond issues and bank borrowing; 
the latter involves universities selling student 
accommodation for cash upfront, sometimes 
committing to provide specified numbers of 
rent-paying students to the new owner.38 
Borrowing exposes universities to risk if the 
expected student numbers do not materialise 
and the OfS has recently warned of over-
ambitious forecasts: despite a projected 5 per 
cent decline in the UK population of 18 year 
olds, the sector is expecting a 10 per cent 
growth in student numbers by 2022.39 
There are already some examples of this risk 
crystallising. One HEI recorded high debt levels 
following an over-optimistic view of home 
student recruitment and significant losses on 
an overseas campus expansion. This resulted 
in a sale of student housing to restore its 
balance sheet. Another faces serious financial 
difficulties following an over-ambitious 
expansion in London. The BBC revealed in 
late 2018 that one university had received a 
£900,000 temporary emergency loan from the 
OfS in the summer of 2018.40
Fee levels in England exceed the amount 
expected by government when the £9,000 
fee regime was introduced
When the fee cap was raised to £9,000, the 
expectation in government was that price 
competition would drive fees at most universities to 
below this level. Lord Willetts (the then Universities 
Minister) believed that the £9,000 fee would be for 
“exceptional circumstances” and that for many 
courses the level would be closer to £6,000 or 
£7,000.41 This is not what occurred: an estimated 98 
per cent of full-time students are now on a degree 
course with a fee cap at the maximum.42
The resulting high level of fees have led to 
mounting concerns about the level of student debt 
and a large part of the public discourse concerns 
this issue. Indeed, new research has found that 
for students, applicants, graduates and the public 
themselves, the main priority for changes to the 
student finance system was for fees to be lower.43 
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Fee levels in England are high by international standards
Tuition fees in England are at the upper end of the international scale, as shown by Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5: Fees charged to students for full-time degree level study in a selection of comparator 
countries44,45,46
Country 
Tuition fee charged to students per full-time year of degree level study
Local currency Converted to £
US (Private)
2016/17 figures
Private non-profit institutions $27,300 average £20,550 average
Private for-profit institutions $16,000 average £12,040 average
England
2018/19 figures
£9,250 maximum £9,250 maximum
Wales
2018/19 figures
£9,000 maximum £9,000 maximum
US (Public)
2016/17 figures
The average for in-state students at public universities was $8,200. 
(Students studying out of state are charged more).
£6,170 average
Australia
2018/19 figures
Band 1 (Law, Dentistry, Medicine) – maximum AUD$10,440 £5,870 maximum
Band 2 (Computing, Engineering, Maths) – maximum  AUD$8,920 £5,010 maximum
Band 3 (Humanities, Psychology and foreign languages) – 
maximum AUD$6,260
£3,510 maximum
Canada
2017/18 figures
CAN$6,570 average £3,750 average
New Zealand 
2015/16 figures
NZ$5,400 average £2,860 average
Scotland Not charged if Scotland domiciled student staying in Scotland to 
study at a public university.
£0
Germany Not charged if attending a public university. £0
Norway Not charged if attending a public university. £0
Trebling fees in 2012 led to increases in 
subject funding unrelated to teaching costs
Before 2012, every undergraduate course was 
funded by a mixture of fee income from the 
student and teaching grant income from the 
Funding Council. The subjects were grouped into 
price bands according to the estimated cost of 
providing them (labelled A, B , C1, C2, D, with band 
A being the highest) and a teaching grant rate 
was set for each band.47 When the fee cap was 
increased, it was set at a higher point than the total 
funding previously available for the lowest cost 
courses. Courses in price Bands C2 and D, such as 
English and History no longer received government 
grant funding, whereas higher cost courses, such as 
Medicine and STEM in Bands A, B and C1, did, albeit 
at a lower level than before 2012 in recognition of 
the increased maximum fee. With almost all HEIs 
setting fees at the maximum, the outcome was an 
increase in funding for some subjects at more than 
twice the rate of others, a differential for which we 
can find no basis in the cost of provision.
According to the IFS, between 2011/12 and 
2016/17 the lowest cost band D subjects received 
a 47 per cent increase compared to a 19 per cent 
increase for higher cost band B subjects (the 
laboratory sciences) and only a 6 per cent increase 
for the highest price Band A subjects (Clinical 
Medicine).48 Figure 3.6 shows this in detail. It was 
an unintended consequence and means that 
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funding for low cost subjects is now significantly 
higher in England than in some other countries: 
for example, the lowest funded subjects received 
up to AUD$12,34049 / £6,93050 in Australia in 2017-
18 and £5,34051 in Scotland in 2018-19. It has led 
to the apparent overfunding of low cost subjects 
and the underfunding of high cost subjects, with 
cross-subsidies within many institutions from the 
first to the second.
This is acknowledged by the sector. In their 
evidence to us, Universities UK said, while noting 
variations across institutions: “The average costs 
of providing undergraduate courses vary from 
£7,500 (Humanities and Social Studies) up to 
£22,000 (Veterinary Science)”.52 The £9,000 fee is 
well in excess of £7,500. The Russell Group told 
us: “Strategically important high cost subjects 
remain under-funded with an estimated £90 
million deficit across Russell Group universities in 
England for undergraduates in subjects in bands A 
and B (clinical and lab-based subjects). This is an 
area where the system could be refined to support 
innovative delivery of research-intensive STEM 
subjects which are critical to meeting the future 
skills needs of the UK.”53
Figure 3.6: Change in overall fee and grant funding per student, for different subject funding 
bands, between 2011/12 and 2016/17 (IFS) 54,55
Course price group
A B C1 C2 D
Share of students 2% 20% 18% 28% 33%
Funding under 2011-12 system
HEFCE funding 14,543 5,337 3,736 3,736 2,536
Fees 3,681 3,681 3,681 3,681 3,681
Total 18,224 9,018 7,417 7,417 6,217
Funding in 2016-17 under new system
HEFCE funding 10,180 1,527 255 0 0
Fees 9,162 9,162 9,162 9,162 9,162
Total 19,342 10,689 9,417 9,162 9,162
Change in funding +6% +19% +27% +24% +47%
Source: IFS 2017
Conclusion
The preceding financial analysis suggests that in 
aggregate the HE sector is in a reasonably solid 
financial position. However, despite this, a number 
of universities are in deficit with some potential 
risk to students and local economies. Funding of 
universities is high by historic and international 
standards but we judge that the distribution 
of funding between subjects is out of line with 
teaching costs causing over and under funding of 
many subjects.
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Section 2: Understanding university spending
University spending patterns are complex
It is important to recognise that the data on which 
analysis of university finances is usually based 
measures what they spend on their various activities, 
not their cost. The data do not and cannot measure 
the reasonable and efficient cost of high quality 
provision: that will vary according to HEIs’ resourcing 
decisions, priorities, efficiency and other factors.
Objective analysis is not straightforward. 
Universities are complex institutions with cross-
subsidy across various subjects and between 
income from international students and other 
teaching and research activities. Few universities 
publish a rigorous and informative breakdown 
of how they deploy tuition fees and government 
teaching grants. Data provided by the universities 
reveal both too much and too little; they are 
unnecessarily detailed in places but also contain 
notable gaps and rely on some contestable 
definitions. HESA data do not provide a breakdown 
of spending on teaching. The OfS holds TRAC 
(Transparent Approach to Costing) data but these 
are organised into sector-designed spending 
categories relating to teaching by subject rather 
than by sub-activity.56 We asked the Department 
for Education (DfE) to commission a separate 
study from the accountancy firm KPMG, which has 
universities amongst its clients, to establish a more 
detailed breakdown of teaching spend, and are 
grateful to the universities which took part. 
Understanding how teaching resource is used 
Developing a better understanding of spending is important in assessing value for money and 
institutional efficiency. We wanted to understand:
• the spend on undergraduate provision and how this varies by subject and level
• the activities this spend covers and the breakdown of spending between them
• the key factors that account for the variation in spend between institutions 
The DfE commissioned KPMG to carry out an extensive analysis of the costs of undergraduate 
provision.57 The work analysed what is termed the “full economic cost” of provision but we noted that 
in this context “cost” is in fact the spend and margin for investment determined by the provider. The 
study used established TRAC data combined with further data provided by 40 participating HEIs, to 
estimate this on a consistent basis by subject group; the breakdown between different activities; and 
what factors explained the variation between institutions. These 40 HEIs represent a third of sector 
institutions by number, and 40 per cent of the sector in terms of full time equivalent students.
We drew on findings from this work alongside other sources of evidence in shaping our analysis and 
we concluded that:
• Spend on a number of subjects in the lowest-cost subject group fell below the current fee cap: reported 
spend on English, Law and Modern Languages for non-London institutions was £8,635 on average.
• The margin allowed for sustainability by the 40 institutions in the study is substantial, at 
approximately 10%, typically around £1,000 per student per year.58
• The variation in spend between institutions within the different subject groups is extensive.59
• The spend on direct departmental teaching (around £4,300 per student) seems low. By contrast the 
spend on infrastructure and on corporate and central activities seems high: approximately £1,300 
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per student on estates; approximately £500 per student on each of IT, marketing and admissions 
and libraries; and a further £1,000 on corporate activities.60 
• Compared to England’s international counterparts, spend on teaching staff in UK universities is low, 
possibly reflecting a wider range of activities.61
Universities spend a large proportion of 
their income from student fees and teaching 
grants on non-teaching activities – more 
than their international comparators
The KPMG study showed that 42 per cent of 
reported costs went on direct departmental 
teaching costs.62 12 per cent went on maintaining 
the existing estates and 35 per cent on corporate 
services and student related central services.63 
The remaining 10 per cent of the unit cost is 
accounted for by the “margin for sustainability and 
investment” or MSI. This is an amount intended to 
protect the sustainability of provision according 
to the institution’s past performance and future 
plans. In effect it represents the amount deemed 
necessary on top of existing spend to maintain and 
improve infrastructure and provision and manage 
future risk.64 Comparisons are complicated by 
different reporting conventions but benchmarked 
against international comparators, UK universities 
spend proportionally less on teaching and more on 
non-teaching staff and non-staff costs than their 
counterparts overseas.65
The data require careful interpretation because 
some categories do not count as direct teaching 
but are nevertheless an essential part of provision 
for students. This includes spend on support 
services such as libraries, study skills and welfare, 
including mental health. It also includes the 
mandatory access and participation programme 
of activities for HEIs charging fees above £6,165,66 
and wider support for disadvantaged students. In 
addition, a good part of estates and IT spending 
relates to teaching.
However, good governance requires constant 
scrutiny of such expenditure and benchmarking 
against peers. We encourage the senior 
management and governing bodies of universities 
to find and emulate examples of best practice and 
to work together to develop more consistent data 
for benchmarking. We are particularly concerned 
about the MSI adjustment. We understand that 
universities need to generate a surplus to reinvest 
in their facilities and provision, particularly as they 
receive limited capital grant from government. 
But we question the size of the MSI – £1,000 per 
student on average for the 40 institutions studied, 
more than is spent on access and participation – 
and its transparency.
University spending has risen in line with 
income but lower-cost courses have seen 
bigger spending increases than more 
resource-intensive subjects
Since the increase in the fee cap, what universities 
report as the cost of teaching has risen year-on-
year at almost exactly the same rate as the funding 
and fees received.67 But as figure 3.7 shows, 
because funding increased at a much faster rate 
for lower cost subjects due to the near universal 
setting of fees at the fee cap, lower cost subjects 
have seen a larger percentage increase in spending 
than higher cost subjects. 
It is difficult to explain why spend on, for example, 
Humanities, such as History, and Social Studies 
should have increased at more than twice the rate 
of Physics and Engineering, for any other reason 
than that the additional income became available 
attached to these subjects. It is improbable that 
the reasonable costs of teaching English or History 
have risen at two and a half times the rate for 
the reasonable costs of teaching Chemistry and 
Engineering. Either HEIs are indeed spending their 
additional income for these subjects in order to 
demonstrate value for the higher fee level charged, 
or the allocation of costs to different subjects in the 
TRAC data is relatively loose. Neither explanation 
is satisfactory, a point reinforced by the following 
paragraphs.
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Figure 3.7: Percentage change in real terms Subject FACTS from 2011/12 to 2016/1768,69
% change in Subject FACTS
Education 41.1
Architecture, built environment and planning 39.7
Sports science and leisure studies 33.9
Media studies 33.6
Design and creative arts 32.9
Humanities and language-based studies 31.4
Social studies 30.3
Continuing education 30.1
Catering and hospitality management 29.8
Civil engineering 29.5
Geography and environmental studies 29.3
Mathematics 28.8
Business and management studies 26.8
Pharmacy and pharmacology 25.5
Modern languages 25.2
Information technology, systems sciences and 
computer software engineering
24.6
Health and community studies 24.5
Agriculture, forestry and food science 22.8
Psychology and behavioural sciences 21.7
Chemistry 20.2
Clinical dentistry 20.2
Earth, marine and environmental sciences 20.0
Mineral, metallurgy and materials engineering 20.0
Electrical, electronic and computer engineering 19.5
Nursing and allied health professions 17.0
Mechanical, aero and production engineering 16.3
Anatomy and physiology 16.0
Archaeology 15.9
Biosciences 14.1
General engineering 13.8
Clinical medicine 8.8
Chemical engineering 8.7
Physics 6.4
Veterinary science 6.2
Source: DfE analysis of OFS Subject FACTS data. ‘FACTS’: Full Average annual subject-related  
Cost of Teaching an OFS fundable FTE Student.
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There is a wide variation in what different 
HEIs spend on different activities, and on 
subjects grouped in similar cost categories
We recognise that every institution is different 
but there is a wide variation in spend on subjects 
grouped in the same funding categories, at 
apparently similar institutions, with no known 
correlation to outcomes. On the lowest-cost band 
of subjects, the reported full economic cost is 
less than £8,000 per student in 23 per cent of the 
courses at participating institutions, but greater 
than £10,000 on 27 per cent of these courses. 
Direct teaching costs range from just over £2,000 
to over £5,500. Central costs, as defined in the 
study, appear to vary by a similar margin. While 
we recognise that HEIs vary in their approaches to 
teaching, this wide dispersion reinforces our belief 
that the application of best practice would yield 
significant efficiency savings. 
We expect this assessment to be contested within 
the sector. Typically, it has been resistant to 
measures of performance based on inputs (contact 
hours), outputs (student satisfaction) and outcomes 
(graduate salaries). There are undoubtedly 
weaknesses in all of these metrics, including the 
TEF framework which brings them together, but 
they give universities important information about 
their own performance and we encourage the 
sector to use them constructively.
Vice chancellor pay across the sector
The remuneration of some Vice-Chancellors has 
attracted media and public attention and has 
been portrayed as an indication of profligacy 
within the sector. The panel’s past and present 
vice chancellors recused themselves from 
this part of the discussion but the remainder 
of us noted that while the sum total of vice-
chancellor pay is small in the context of a 
sector spending £35.6 billion a year70, it is 
understandable that senior pay levels are seen 
as visible indicators of the sector’s attitude 
to resource, accountability and governance. 
We welcome the OfS’s recent publication on 
senior pay and its role in pressing the sector 
to give greater consideration to senior pay and 
governance.71 Government should take a close 
interest in the progress of OfS initiatives in 
this area.
TEF: The Teaching Excellence and Student 
Outcomes Framework 
The Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes 
Framework (TEF) is a national exercise, 
introduced for England by the government 
in 2016. It assesses excellence in teaching at 
universities and colleges, and how well they 
ensure excellent outcomes for their students in 
terms of graduate-level employment or further 
study. We found some anecdotal evidence 
that initiatives such as TEF have driven HEIs 
to renew their focus on teaching and learning 
practices. This encourages us to believe that 
there is further potential for a focus on quality 
and value. We welcome attempts to consistently 
measure the quality of teaching and outcomes. 
However, the use of metrics in the TEF process 
must be robust and command confidence. The 
Royal Statistical Society has raised concerns 
about the statistical validity of the current 
approach and the risk of the system being 
“gamed”.72 We await the outcome of the on-
going independent review of the TEF, led by 
Dame Shirley Pearce, which is examining this 
and other issues.73
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Over £1 billion annually is spent to support 
access and participation 
Currently more than £1bn is spent annually on 
widening access and participation and supporting 
disadvantaged students. This comes through two 
main mechanisms:
• Institutions that charge more than the basic 
fee of £6,16574 – in effect nearly all universities, 
and some FECs and ITPs – are required to 
agree with the OfS their plans and expenditure 
for supporting disadvantaged students and 
underrepresented groups. These are known as 
Access and Participation Plans which must be 
approved by the OfS for permission to charge 
up to the higher level fee, currently £9,250. 
Across the sector in 2019/20, an estimated 
£740 per full-time student of the £3,000 
fee income above the basic fee cap will be 
deployed to support these groups of students.75 
This funding pays for a range of activities to 
encourage access and increase the numbers of 
disadvantaged students attending university, in 
particular through outreach to areas and groups 
with low participation rates. It also supports 
disadvantaged students during their studies by 
various means, including bursaries, and helps 
prepare them for employment. Universities with 
relatively small proportions of disadvantaged 
students are required to undertake more 
outreach activity. The sector in total expects 
to spend around £860m of fee income through 
Access and Participation Plans in 2018/19.
• Institutions also receive additional funding 
directly from government through the Student 
Premium element of the teaching grant, which 
provides additional resource for students at the 
highest risk of dropping out.76 In 2018/19, £277m 
was allocated for this purpose, with £72m of 
it specifically earmarked to support part-time 
students and a further £40m to support disabled 
students. The allocation to each university 
depends on the numbers of such students 
enrolled and on their characteristics, with low 
prior attainment and POLAR background being 
the main factors.
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What do we mean by disadvantaged 
students?
There are a range of characteristics – such as 
family background, income, sex and ethnicity 
– that can affect an individual’s opportunity 
to participate and succeed in post-18 
education. In HE however, the main measures 
used to report on access and progression of 
disadvantaged students are POLAR,77 which 
measures the likelihood of HE participation 
based on residential location, and, to a lesser 
extent, eligibility for free school meals (FSM), 
a direct socio-economic indicator based on 
parental income.78
POLAR focuses on areas with low HE 
participation. As a result it does not provide a 
good direct measure of an individual student’s 
disadvantaged circumstances. For example, 
two-thirds of FSM key stage 4 pupils do not live 
in the most disadvantaged POLAR quintile and 
one-quarter of FSM pupils live in the two least 
disadvantaged POLAR quintiles.79 
We believe that individual socio-economic 
indicators, such as FSM or household income, 
are a better measure of an individual’s 
disadvantage and need for extra support 
and that these should be used within the 
sector more widely to report progress on 
social mobility.
Whilst we support the overall approach to access, 
participation and success for disadvantaged 
students we note with surprise the absence of 
any over-arching assessment of the impact of 
different approaches to widening participation 
and success. There has been some evaluation at 
institutional level, and some national evaluation of 
specific programmes, but despite the substantial 
investment of resources, no comprehensive 
national evaluation. We therefore welcome the 
OfS’s forthcoming Evidence and Impact Exchange, 
which will collate, share and commission research 
and evaluation, and establish which institutions or 
initiatives are the most effective.80
Conclusion: Wide variation in spend raises 
some questions
It has not been easy for us to form an objective 
view of university spending and we believe that the 
regulator will want to do further work to improve 
the quality of information coming from the 
sector. Nonetheless, we observe the relatively low 
proportion of spending on direct teaching and the 
correspondingly high spend on other items. 
We are concerned by the larger increase in spend 
on low cost subjects than on high-cost subjects 
and by the wide variation in spend on similar 
subjects and activities with no known correlation to 
teaching costs or outcomes. 
We are surprised that there has been no overall 
assessment of the effectiveness of spend on 
different approaches to recruiting and supporting 
disadvantaged students.
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Section 3. Market competition
Our seventh principle as set out at the beginning 
of this report is that ‘post-18 education cannot 
be left entirely to market forces’.81 We have 
already established that England’s market in 
HE has produced substantial social, economic 
and personal benefits but have noted that price 
competition has not developed as was originally 
expected. This is rational behaviour in a market 
where price is taken as a signal of quality. In 
this short section we examine the other forms of 
market competition that have emerged.
The strongest form of competition – bringing many 
benefits to students – is rooted in improving the 
student experience in terms of campus facilities, 
teaching and welfare support. This is reflected 
in continuing high levels of student satisfaction 
discussed later in this chapter. Naturally, 
universities want to convey the quality of their offer 
to young people across the ever increasing range of 
multi-media channels and this material plays a role 
in informing the decisions taken by applicants. 
However, since the opening up of the sector, 
universities have increased and professionalised 
their marketing. Responding to an article in The 
Guardian which used freedom of information 
requests to highlight one university spending over 
£3 million a year on marketing and others spending 
in excess of £1 million, Universities UK stated: 
“Recent government policy... has had the intention 
of creating a more vibrant market and a focus on 
student choice, so it’s not surprising that we have 
seen changes in behaviour and different marketing 
strategies across the sector.”82 We understand this but 
nonetheless urge universities to maintain a sense of 
proportion in their marketing strategies and budgets. 
It is of concern to us that these marketing 
approaches sometimes include cash and in-kind 
inducements to prospective students to accept a 
place. It would be an unacceptable use of public 
funds for universities to recycle tuition fees, funded 
by state-subsidised income contingent loans, as 
gifts over which the state has no recourse. 
A recent study for Universities UK found “…
perceptions that universities are becoming more 
like commercial businesses, driven by profit”83 
and we would not be surprised if over-enthusiastic 
marketing had contributed to this perception. 
We further note three aspects of academic practice 
that could be interpreted as being a consequence 
of market competition.
• Grade inflation. The growth in the proportion of 
first and upper second-class degrees awarded 
(see box) has been too great to suggest plausibly 
that it can be entirely attributed to a genuine 
improvement in the quality of students’ 
academic performance. It is not unreasonable 
to assume that part of the explanation is that 
academic assessment has become a means of 
reputational enhancement, albeit how this has 
happened is unclear.84 We note the intervention 
in March 2018 on this matter by the Secretary of 
State for Education.85
• Lower entry requirements. An increasing 
proportion of students with lower prior 
attainment are now attending university. We 
welcome this but not at any price. Low prior 
attainment, measured by A level and BTEC 
grades, is associated with dropping out from 
university studies, to the financial and often 
emotional cost of the student. From the 2016/17 
cohort, as many as 12.8 per cent of students 
with UCAS tariff points between 0 and 100 
(equivalent to D and E at A-level in the old tariff 
scheme), and 11.6 per cent of students with 
BTECs at any level, did not progress past their 
first year of a degree. This is about double the 
6.3 per cent drop out rate for students as a 
whole. For the lowest attaining BTEC students 
the drop-out rates are well above 15 per cent. 
At fourteen UK universities, projections of the 
number of students likely to obtain a degree 
is below 70 per cent; the lowest has a degree 
projection rate of 51.7 per cent with 28.1 per 
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cent of its students dropping out entirely rather 
than transferring or obtaining another award 
such as a Level 4 or Level 5 qualification.86 
• Unconditional offers. Responsibly used, 
unconditional offers can have benefits, 
particularly in attracting students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds – but the emphasis 
has to be on ‘responsible’. We agree with the OfS 
that “Universities must not resort to pressure 
selling tactics in promoting unconditional 
offers”87 and we note the intervention in April 
2018 on this matter by the Secretary of State for 
Education.88 
Grade inflation
HESA data shows that the proportion of students receiving higher degree classifications is 
increasing, while lower classifications is decreasing.
Figure 3.8: Percentage of first degree qualifiers obtaining each classification at English HEIs89
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Unconditional offers
An unconditional offer guarantees a prospective student a place on a HE course without any 
condition relating to the results of their final school or college exams. The number of offers with 
an unconditional component rose from 3,000 in 2013 to 117,000 in 2018, just over 12 per cent of all 
offers.90 Some of these offers require acceptance by a date ahead of the national deadline and/or carry 
inducements such as early access to accommodation choices or cash benefits.91
Applicants most likely to receive an unconditional offer are those with predicted A level points 
equivalent to BBC (down from AAA a few years ago).92 The highest proportions of unconditional offers 
are made by medium and low tariff institutions where in 2018 the proportion of offers which were 
unconditional were 20 per cent and 32 per cent respectively.93
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Increasing rate of offers and acceptances for low-attaining students
The majority of people applying to university do so via the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service (UCAS), where their qualifications are allocated tariff points; universities then make offers 
based on applicants’ predicted or actual tariff point scores. The figures below show notable increases 
in the acceptance rates for those with the lowest predicted grades, for those taking A levels and BTECs. 
Figure 3.9a – Acceptance rates of UK 18 year-
old applicants by A level profile points94
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Figure 3.9b – Acceptance rates of UK 18 year-
old applicants by BTEC grade95
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Conclusion: Market competition exists but 
not on the terms intended
The removal of number controls combined with 
a high fee cap created the conditions for a very 
competitive market. This has taken the form of 
extremely limited competition on price but intense 
competition for students through quality of offer, 
extensive marketing, and other inducements. 
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Section 4: The case for change
(i) The case for change: Taxpayers
The exchequer has a complicated relationship 
with HE. It provides much of the upfront cash to 
fund students and universities through subsidised 
loans and grants and then reaps the benefits from 
interest on loans and higher tax receipts during 
graduates’ working lives. Most of the taxpayer 
contribution comes from writing off unpaid student 
debt, which until recently would not be visible in 
the government’s headline deficit measure (Public 
Sector Net Borrowing) for thirty years, the point at 
which most write-offs will take place. Although some 
commentators raised the consequences this might 
have for government decision making when the new 
system was introduced in 1998 and subsequently, 
the matter only took on significance at the end of 
2018 when a change in the accounting treatment 
was announced by the independent Office for 
National Statistics.96 The predicted public subsidy 
will soon be recognised upfront when the loans 
are issued and the Office for Budget Responsibility 
estimates the impact of this on the deficit to be 
£10.5bn in 2018-19 rising to £13.7bn by 2023-24.97
It is for the government to decide whether this 
sum – equivalent in 2018-19 to 42.5 per cent of 
the deficit and 12 per cent of the total education 
budget – is too small or too great relative to other 
priorities but it is significant enough to require 
careful analysis of where this subsidy lands.98 
The preceding section showed that the replacement 
of most of the teaching grant by tuition fees in 2012 
has unintentionally led to the over-funding of some 
degree courses relative to their reasonable cost of 
provision, and to the under-funding of others. This 
has a number of adverse effects:
• Many of the under-funded high-cost subjects 
– Engineering, Science, Technology, Medicine 
and health-related subjects – are central to the 
government’s Industrial Strategy. They produce 
some of the highest returns in earnings for 
graduates and therefore incur a low taxpayer 
subsidy on their student loans.99 We believe that 
providers should be encouraged to offer these 
subjects, not – as they are now – financially 
penalised for putting them on. 
• Over-funding other courses relative to their 
reasonable cost of provision potentially 
incentivises institutions to prioritise them 
because they provide a higher margin. Some 
lower cost courses have seen very big increases 
in student numbers: for example in England 
between 2013/14 and 2017/18 there has been 
a 20 per cent increase in the number studying 
Social Sciences and a growth of almost 17 
per cent in the number taking courses in 
Business and Administration.100 These increases 
compare with a 10 per cent increase in full-time 
undergraduate enrolments over the same period. 
Figure 3.10 below shows the IFS’s estimates of 
the average cost to government per student per 
subject of direct teaching grants and loan write-
offs for tuition fee and maintenance loans. These 
are inevitably broad estimates, given the inherent 
difficulty of forecasting future earnings, but in our 
view shine a valuable and necessary light on the 
potential scale of taxpayer investment in a sector 
that appears at face value to be largely funded by 
individuals. This reveals some anomalies in both 
the amount of, and trends in, taxpayer funding. 
The IFS estimates that the public subsidy amounts 
to about £30,000 per student for those studying 
Arts and Humanities subjects such as English and 
Communications and Media and as much as £37,000 
for those taking courses in the Creative Arts. The 
equivalent public subsidy is £28,000 for Engineering 
students and £24,000 for those studying Maths 
and Computer Science. The IFS estimates that the 
government’s investment in providing Engineering 
degrees has fallen by about £9,000 per student 
since 2011, but has risen by more than £6,000 for 
Creative Arts degrees, illustrated in Figure 3.11. The 
government is estimated to now spend over 30 per 
cent more per student for Creative Arts degrees 
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than it does for Engineering degrees.101 We make no 
judgements about the merits or demerits of these 
disciplines, but question whether this changing 
pattern of public subsidy is strategically desirable. 
 Figure 3.10 Estimated Government spending  
by subject per student (IFS)102
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Figure 3.10 Note: All figures have been discounted using the 
government rate of discounting and are in 2018 prices. See 
Table A2 for subject classifications.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative data sets
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Figure 3.11 Estimated Government spending per borrower over time, by subject (IFS)103
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Figure 3.11 Note: All figures have been discounted using the government rate of discounting and are in 2018 prices.For the 
2017 cohort, grants are made up only of teaching grants; in 2011 and 2005, they also include maintenance grants; and in 
1999; they also include fee support.
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative data sets
.
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Figure 3.12 Estimated Government spending 
by subject (IFS)104
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Combining the estimated loan write-offs and 
student numbers provides an estimate of the scale 
of taxpayer investment in each of the main subject 
areas for the whole student population. Figure 3.12 
reveals this by subject: it is over £1.1 billion for the 
Creative Arts, nearly £1 billion for Business degrees 
and over £800m for Social Studies, but much lower 
for medicine (about £300m), the Physical Sciences 
(£420m) and Engineering (£480m). Government will 
want to review these estimates as improved data 
on lifetime returns become available, discussed 
further on in this chapter 
We recognise that a significant number of graduates 
in the Creative Arts make a strong contribution to 
the economy through work in the dynamic creative 
industries sector and to society through careers 
in the arts and design.105 But we question whether 
the sheer number of students taking subjects such 
as Creative Arts and Design and Social Studies, 
the current grant top-up, and the large likely debt 
write-off given these graduates’ predicted earnings, 
constitute good value for taxpayers’ money.
Conclusion
We judge that the current method of university 
funding has resulted in an accidental over-investment 
in some subjects and an under-investment in others 
that is at odds with the government’s Industrial 
Strategy and with taxpayers’ interests. 
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(ii) The case for change: Students
The persisting gap between advantaged and 
disadvantaged students 
As outlined in the first paragraph of this report, 
and reinforced in our first two principles, we are 
clear that the system must support economically 
disadvantaged students - people disadvantaged 
by their family background or income, which may 
affect their opportunity to participate and succeed 
in post-18 education. This is central to achieving a 
post-18 system that fully plays its part in improving 
social mobility and is core to the panel’s principle 
that ‘everyone should have the opportunity to be 
educated after the age of 18’.
Disadvantaged 18-year-olds are more likely 
to enter HE than ever before but there remain 
significant gaps between their access, participation 
and success at university compared to those of 
their advantaged peers:
• Advantaged 18 year-olds were more than twice 
as likely to enter full-time HE in 2018 as their 
disadvantaged peers.106
• Only around 4 per cent of disadvantaged 18 
year-olds go to the highest tariff universities, 
and advantaged applicants are more than 
5.7 times more likely to do so than their 
disadvantaged peers.107
• Disadvantaged entrants have higher drop 
out rates than expected after accounting for 
factors such as age, subject studied, and entry 
qualifications. 9.7 per cent of disadvantaged 
full-time first-degree UK-domiciled entrants 
in 2016/17 were no longer in HE the following 
year, compared with 5.3 per cent of advantaged 
entrants.108
• In 2016/17 the most advantaged students were 
more likely to achieve an upper second or first 
class degree than their disadvantaged peers 
even after accounting for prior attainment and 
other factors.109 
• Accounting for all other characteristics, degree 
subject and institution at age 29, graduates 
from households in the top socio-economic 
status (SES) quintile earn between 8 and 9 per 
cent (£2,300-£2,400) more than those graduates 
from households in the lowest SES quintile.110 
Rising participation rates suggest that high fees 
have not put off many students but research by the 
academics Callender and Mason found “lower-class 
students are still far more likely to be deterred 
from planning to enter higher education because 
of fear of debt”.111 They also report that lower-
family income students were more debt-averse 
in 2015 than in 2002. Moreover, disadvantaged 
students are likely to graduate with a larger debt 
than advantaged students because they will have 
needed to take out a larger loan to meet their 
living costs - the difference in debt compared with 
their more privileged peers can be as much as 
£15,000.112 We consider that higher fees may also 
act as a disincentive to this particular group.
As set out above, funding for disadvantaged 
students comes from two sources: through fees 
via Access and Participation Plans and direct from 
government through the Student Premium. We 
believe that the current resourcing of Access and 
Participation Plans through fee income does not 
reflect the additional costs faced by HEIs with large 
numbers of disadvantaged students. These HEIs 
are likely to use a greater proportion of their overall 
fee income to support disadvantaged students, 
leaving a lower level of core funding for other 
purposes. In effect, the current funding system 
penalises those institutions which do the most to 
support social mobility.
Student Premium funding is principally allocated 
according to the number of students with low 
prior attainment and from a low POLAR area, as 
a proxy for their degree of disadvantage. This 
means that HEIs admitting students with a higher 
prior attainment but from socio-economically 
disadvantaged backgrounds do not receive 
additional funding. 
We recommend a different approach, which is set 
out in the final part of this chapter.
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Value for money for students
Measures of student satisfaction rely on short-term 
judgements of an experience that is intended to 
bring lifetime benefits. They are also likely to be 
influenced by the fact that students are paying 
higher fees and taking on greater amounts of 
debt than ever before: three-year degree students 
with average maintenance loans graduate with a 
loan debt of around £57,800.113 Nonetheless, the 
National Student Survey, managed by the OfS, has 
reported continuing high levels of satisfaction over 
the past decade.114 The overall satisfaction level of 
students in England, as measured by the NSS, was 
82 per cent in 2008, rose slightly to a peak of 86 
per cent in 2015, before falling back slightly to 83 
per cent in 2018. 
But students are much less positive when asked 
about value for money. A Higher Education Policy 
Institute (HEPI) survey in 2018 reported that only 
38 per cent of students felt they had received ‘good 
or very good’ value from their course, whereas 32 
per cent felt they had received ‘poor or very poor’ 
value – a slight improvement on the previous year 
but still worryingly high.115
The Education Select Committee Chair Robert 
Halfon MP said in November 2018, on publishing 
that Committee’s inquiry into value for money in 
higher education: “The blunt reality is that too many 
universities are not providing value for money and 
that students are not getting good outcomes from 
the degrees for which so many of them rack up debt. 
Too many institutions are neither meeting our skills 
needs or providing the means for the disadvantaged 
to climb the ladder of opportunity.”116
Value can, of course, be measured in many 
different ways. How much do students enjoy their 
experience day-to-day? What do they think of the 
available teaching and student support? What are 
the culturally enriching benefits of student life? 
These are all important considerations but for 
many graduates the critical consideration is career 
benefit and in particular the premium in earnings 
for having a degree. What do the data show about 
this important aspect of value?
Information and guidance
One key to helping students in making the 
best choice of university and subject is to 
provide timely and accurate information. It also 
continues to be important – though is seldom 
mentioned – that students should continue to 
have good information once they are studying, in 
order that they may change course or institution 
if that would be the best option for them. There 
are many sources of information including the 
Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes 
Framework rating system from OfS, the Unistats 
website, the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service, many guides from newspapers and the 
consumer review company Which?, advice from 
the Student Loans Company, MoneySavingExpert 
and many others. Students have a complex 
choice to make, but until recently, no clear 
evidence of the likely outcome. The estimates of 
the earnings returns to graduates from studying 
specific subjects at specific institutions provide 
valuable information for deciding what and 
where to study and we encourage government 
to ensure these data are publicly available in an 
accessible format.
Earnings data vary widely between 
different courses and institutions
New data collected by government and analysed 
by the IFS has revealed the impact of undertaking 
a degree on early-career earnings and further 
analysis will examine full lifetime returns. Only the 
early career results were available to us at the time 
of writing but these include the returns for different 
subjects and institutions and take into account 
prior attainment and other student characteristics.
The data allow us to compare the earnings of 
graduates with those of their peers with a similar 
background and prior attainment who chose not to 
embark on or complete a degree (‘non-graduates’). 
Across all HEIs and subjects the graduate premium 
for men at age 29 varies from minus 16 per cent 
to plus 58 per cent; the median is 10 per cent. The 
graduate premium for women varies from minus 11 
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per cent to plus 94 per cent and the median is 24 
per cent. The data therefore confirm that the labour 
market places a significant value on graduate skills 
even at the early age of 29.117
Limitations of the IFS early-career 
earnings analysis
There are some limitations to the analysis. The 
data do not distinguish between full and part-
time work, which is likely to affect comparisons 
of earnings between men and women, and they 
also do not cover the self-employed. The results 
we discuss are for earnings up to the age of 29 
whereas the principal benefit in earnings for 
graduates tends to arrive in the following decade 
and thus we would expect full lifetime earnings 
for most graduates to generate higher premiums 
than those shown. However, the current data 
excludes the cost of foregone earnings during 
study and loan repayments after graduation 
which need to be taken into account for a 
full assessment of lifetime returns. Earnings 
are largely a product of the labour market for 
particular skills and qualifications and should 
not be regarded as a measure of teaching 
quality. They also vary according to location: a 
graduate working in an economic cold spot is 
likely to earn less than her or his counterpart 
working in a hot spot. However, if analysed with 
care, the data provide an insight into the early 
career financial consequences of degree study 
and will be a useful source of information for 
students, government and HEIs alike.
Value to society
We have used the available data to consider the 
economic value for students and the economy of 
different higher educational routes, for different 
people. However, we are clear that successful 
outcomes for both students and society are 
about more than pay. Higher levels of education 
are associated with wider participation in 
politics and civic affairs, and better physical and 
mental health. We also understand the social 
value of some lower-earning professions such as 
nursing and social care, and the cultural value of 
studying the Arts and Humanities. The earnings 
data enable us to make economically defined 
value calculations, not value judgements. 
Assessing this wider value is very difficult 
but government should continue to work to 
ensure that wider considerations are taken into 
account in its policy and funding decisions.
A graduate earnings premium is usual but 
not universal
While most graduates can expect a significant 
lifetime premium in earnings, at age 29 graduates 
in some subjects from some universities earn 
less than their peers who did not embark upon or 
complete study for a degree. We also note that on 
average the returns (the earnings benefit compared 
to similar students) for students with lower prior 
attainment are lower than for those with higher 
prior attainment. 
Variations in the graduate premium 
by subject
Even after taking account of differences in prior 
academic attainment, and other background 
characteristics of students, the impact of different 
degree subjects on earnings varies considerably. 
The extremes are far apart. Among men, the 
earnings premium for an Economics graduate 
at age 29 is 33 per cent on average, whereas a 
graduate in the Creative Arts will, on average, earn 
14 per cent less than his peers who did not attend 
university. Among women, the earnings premium 
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for a medical graduate is 75 per cent, but only 9 
per cent for those graduated in the Creative Arts. 
The graduate premium for men is low or negative 
at age 29 for a sizeable minority of subjects. In 
addition to the Creative Arts, these include English 
and Philosophy, for which the premium is negative, 
and Agriculture, Communications, Psychology, 
Languages, History, Biosciences and Physical 
Sciences for which it is zero or very small. Women, 
by contrast, enjoy a graduate premium at age 29 
irrespective of the subject they studied, but the 
premium is small for the Creative Arts, Agriculture, 
Social Care and Psychology. We expect that the 
graduate premium will increase after age 29 and 
so getting a full picture of the lifetime returns 
and how these vary by subject will be key for the 
government in concluding this review.
Variations in the graduate premium 
between institutions
The returns in earnings to graduates at age 29 
also vary considerably according to the institution 
they attended. The typical Russell Group graduate 
enjoys a very high earnings premium, once results 
are controlled for background characteristics 
and prior attainment. The graduates of pre-1992 
universities generally benefit from an earnings 
premium, but there are exceptions. Some post-
1992 universities for some subjects generate a high 
graduate premium but most of the institutions 
and courses associated with a negative return in 
earnings are found within this group. For several 
subjects, the returns for men are higher for those 
studying for Level 4/5 qualifications than for those 
undertaking a degree in a similar field at a non-
Russell group institution.118 These results will need 
to be considered in the light of the forthcoming 
lifetime earnings analysis. 
A small minority of institutions produce graduates 
who on average earn significantly less at age 29 
than their comparators who did not attend higher 
education. The IFS estimate that 33 per cent of 
male students, and 1 per cent of female students 
- together making 15 per cent of all students - 
attended universities that had either significantly 
negative or statistically negligible earnings returns 
when these are averaged across all students 
at age 29.
The research also allows us to drill down further 
and look at the earnings returns for combinations 
of subjects and institutions, shown in Figure 3.13. 
The majority of courses produce graduates who on 
average enjoy a positive wage return but there is a 
wide variation. For men, the lowest 10 per cent of 
courses result in negative returns of below minus 
21 per cent while at the other end 10 per cent of 
the highest return courses result in average returns 
of above 46 per cent. Altogether 34 per cent of 
courses119 – accounting for 29 per cent of male 
students – were shown to have negative returns for 
men at age 29 (without taking foregone earnings 
and interest loan repayments into account), 
suggesting that one in three male students who 
took these courses could have earned more if they 
had chosen a different course of study or not gone 
to university at all. We expect these outturns for 
graduates to be improved once the analysis is 
extended to estimate lifetime returns. 
Chapter three: Higher education 
89
Figure 3.13: Estimated returns at age 29 by course, men (IFS)120
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Variations by prior academic attainment 
Many of the students who arrived at their university 
with relatively poor qualifications but completed 
their degree course then go on to earn less than 
those who entered with higher qualifications. 
Analysis in Figure 3.14 presents the median 
earnings for different levels of prior attainment five 
years after graduation. We noted that the median 
earnings of those entering university with BTECs 
was £21,700 five years after graduation and of 
those entering with A level grades of DDE or below 
£23,200, which compared with £28,900 or more for 
those admitted to university with BBB grades or 
better.121 This is compared to those with the very 
highest tariff points who are likely to earn closer to 
or above £40,000.
Separate analysis at age 29 also shows that the 
earnings of those with lower prior attainment can 
be much closer, and in some cases below, the 
earnings of those with similar prior attainment who 
chose not to attend university.122
Figure 3.14: Earnings (£) for 2010/11 graduates in the 2016/17 tax year by qualifications on entry 
(interquartile range for each prior attainment group)123
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More students are entering university with non-academic qualifications
As noted earlier, applicants with lower prior attainment are now more likely to be accepted to 
university as the sector has expanded. Since 2012 the number of students going to university with 
BTECs and other vocational qualifications has increased by 24 per cent; they make up one in four of all 
English domiciled entrants, and in 2017, two thirds studied at a lower tariff university. 124,125,126
BTECs are a vocationally-designed Level 3 qualification with a large element of continuous 
assessment. The percentage of BTEC diploma students achieving a distinction or distinction star 
rose by 40 per cent between 2006 and 2016.127 We are concerned about this, particularly since 
achievement in BTECs is inflated when it comes to allocating tariff points: there can be no other 
reasonable explanation for BTEC students earning more UCAS points than A level students with the 
same level of GCSE attainment.128
BTEC reforms in 2018 produced a tightening of standards. In summer 2018, 4 per cent of applicants 
achieved D*D*D* in the new reformed BTECs, compared to 34 per cent achieving the same grades in 
the non-reformed BTECs. However, the new standards are optional for schools and colleges and the 
panel has heard that many of the latter are choosing to stay with the old standards. We draw this 
anomaly to the attention of the relevant regulators. 
While the biggest growth has been in applicants with BTECs, a similar trend has emerged for other 
vocational Level 3 qualifications. UCAS data from 2018 shows that 15.7 per cent of university 
applicants held ‘other qualifications’, up 2.6 percentage points from 2017. This increase is attributable 
to more applicants holding Cambridge Technical Qualifications, either alone, or alongside A levels and 
BTECs. There have also been increases in applicants holding Cambridge Pre-University  
qualifications, Extended Projects, and alternative vocational qualifications alongside one or two A 
levels or BTECs.129
We welcome the recently announced review of qualifications at Level 3 to consider which of these 
qualifications the government should fund.130 The review should help ensure that qualifications are 
judged appropriately in terms of allocation of tariff points. We consider it an urgent priority for Ofqual, 
the OfS and UCAS to ensure that standards across vocational and non-vocational Level 3 qualifications 
are robust and comparable.
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(iii) The case for change: Conclusion
The steady and marked expansion of HE over the 
last three decades has brought significant social 
and economic benefits to the nation and a real 
financial return to most graduates. Since the 
funding reforms of 2012, which largely replaced 
the government’s teaching grant to universities 
with tuition fees paid by the student by means of 
an income-contingent loan, most of the taxpayer 
subsidy for HE has shifted from the teaching grant 
to unpaid loans. This taxpayer subsidy has been 
hidden from view by the accounting treatment 
such that it has not been considered in the context 
of investment in other parts of post-18 education 
and education more generally or in other public 
services. This funding methodology has also led 
to unintended consequences for subject provision 
that are not aligned with the government’s 
Industrial Strategy.
The principal cause of unpaid loans is that many 
graduates earn too little in the course of their 
employment to repay the loan in full under existing 
terms. The analysis of graduate earnings at age 29 
outlined above shows that a significant minority of 
graduates, concentrated in some institutions and 
some subjects, as well as among those with low 
educational attainment on embarking on degree 
study, are likely to earn too little to repay any or 
more than a small part of their loan; they would 
have been better off financially if they had not 
embarked on a university course in the first place, 
or had chosen a different course. This pattern 
of graduate earnings, loan repayments and tax-
payer subsidy raises concerns about the value of 
some Level 6 provision, which are addressed in the 
next section.
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Section 5: Recommendations
Per-student resource levels
Our earlier analysis showed that:
• The increase in the resources flowing to the 
sector in recent years has outstripped wider 
public spending and GDP growth.
• Funding levels are high internationally.
• While some English HEIs reported operating 
deficits in 2017/18, the sector’s overall financial 
position is reasonably sound, with a strong 
balance sheet and operating surplus.
• The variation in universities’ spending by subject 
suggests that it largely reflects available income 
rather than essential costs of provision. 
• There is wide variation in what different 
institutions spend on different subjects and 
activities, with no established evidence of 
whether there is any link between levels of 
funding and outcomes. 
• By international standards English universities 
spend a lower proportion of their total 
expenditure on teaching staff.
These observations lead us to conclude that the 
sector could and should absorb a further freeze on 
per student resources to help fund investment in 
other parts of post-18 education. 
We acknowledge that efficiency initiatives are 
already underway and have no wish to recommend 
specific targets, which should be left to individual 
institutions. We believe that the best way to 
encourage the sector to achieve further efficiencies 
is to extend the 2018/19 and 2019/20 freeze of the 
average per-student resource for a further three 
years. Based on current inflation forecasts, this 
would mean a real terms reduction of 8 per cent 
between 2019/20 and 2022/23, and a reduction of 
11 per cent compared to 2018/19 funding levels.131 
This freeze aligns with the current plan for a 
government spending review covering the years in 
the current parliament, up to 2022/23.
We recognise that a continuous freeze in resource 
presents a challenge to the sector. We have 
considered the risks of a potential reduction 
in the number of EU students – currently over 
100,000 across all HE routes – after EU exit.132 We 
understand that the sector is reliant on overseas 
students for a significant portion of its income 
(see Figure 3.3) and that competition from other 
countries is intensifying. 
We have also considered the potential costs of a 
revaluation of sector pension schemes. Changes 
resulting from the 2017 valuation of the Universities 
Superannuation Scheme (USS) could add 6 
percentage points to the employer contribution 
rate compared with the 2018/19 rate - equivalent to 
a 3 per cent increase in universities’ overall costs133 
- over the next five years.134 Although the emerging 
findings from the 2018 valuation suggest a lower 
increase.135 There are two other main pension 
schemes in HE: the Teachers’ Pension Scheme (TPS) 
and the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS). 
Changes to the TPS have been estimated to cost 
affected HE providers a total of around £80 million 
in 2019/20.136 The next triennial valuation of the 
LGPS will be as at 31 March 2019.
However, we believe that these pressures can be 
offset by a growth in the number of UK students. 
Following a decline in the total number of 18 year-
olds in the UK from a peak of 830,000 in 2009 to 
766,000 in 2017137 the number will start to increase 
again in 2020 and surpass 2009 levels by 2025. 
At current levels of participation and resource per 
student, these numbers will bring in approximately 
£500 million of annual extra income for universities 
by 2025 over current levels.138 Indeed universities 
themselves are expecting an increase in student 
numbers of 10 per cent.139 While higher numbers 
of students do bring an increase in costs, they also 
provide scope for greater ‘operational gearing’, 
which, as explained in the box below, leads to 
higher margins and a funding ‘cushion’ against 
the financial pressures outlined above. This is 
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consistent with universities’ own forecasts of 
increased income exceeding increased expenditure 
as student numbers rise.140
Operational gearing.
Operational gearing is a term used by 
business analysts to describe economies and 
diseconomies of scale. Once fixed costs have 
been covered, the marginal profitability on 
incremental sales is much higher than average. 
The same principle applies to universities: the 
surplus on each additional student should rise, 
up to the level at which more staff and facilities 
have to be added. The golden zone between 
covering fixed costs and needing to add costs to 
cope with extra demand is very profitable; the 
reverse is true when numbers decrease.
We believe that the gradual effects of a funding 
freeze would give HEIs time to rise to the challenge 
of greater efficiency and redesigned business 
models, whilst maintaining the quality of provision. 
However, on current evidence we believe that 
attempts to generate further savings over this 
proposed funding freeze would jeopardise the 
quality of provision.
We make no recommendations about research 
funding, which is outside the scope of this review, 
and is for government to consider separately.
Recommendation 3.1
The average per-student resource should be 
frozen for three further years from 2020/21 
until 2022/23. On current evidence, inflation 
based increases to the average per-student 
unit of resource should resume in 2023/24.
Research Funding
The government has set the objective of raising 
the overall R&D spend in the UK economy 
from 1.7 per cent to 2.4 per cent as part of the 
Industrial Strategy. 
Universities in the UK educate the graduates, 
especially in STEM fields, needed to achieve this 
target. Our proposals on rebalancing funding 
towards high-cost and high-value subjects, 
discussed below, are intended to encourage this 
and are likely to result in more funding going to 
institutions with a strong research base. We also 
make recommendations to protect high quality 
specialist institutions.
We recognise that there will be concerns about 
the impact of the resource freeze on some 
institutions with pockets of research excellence. 
We are of the view that it is for government, 
business and other interested bodies to fund 
research adequately and directly.
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Examples of differentiated provider offers
Some institutions have launched innovative degree programmes at reasonable fee levels and as a 
result widened the choice for students. Others have, for example, focused on offering a different pace 
of study, or links with industry. We strongly support further differentiation in the market of this kind.
Lower cost degrees
Coventry University owns and runs a group of HEIs in Coventry, Scarborough and London. The CU 
Group offers lower-cost access to degree and sub-degree study; typically courses cost £6,200 per 
year. Courses are offered flexibly: students can begin their courses at six different times in the year, 
and attend teaching at either morning or afternoon sessions to allow them to combine study with 
work. Modules are taught in six-week blocks, allowing students to ‘roll on / roll off’. The group offers a 
wide range of vocational programmes at each location covering Finance, Business, Tourism, Policing, 
Nursing, Engineering, Education and Counselling. Since opening in 2012, CU Group has admitted 
3,570 students, of whom a relatively high proportion are mature students and come from low 
participation areas.
Accelerated degrees
The government is promoting lower cost degrees with the recent introduction of accelerated – usually 
two-year – degrees, whereby students undertake a normal three-year degree in two years. The 
government has recently announced that it will provide a 20 per cent uplift in annual funding for 
accelerated degree providers, and an overall 20 per cent saving in total fee cost for the student.141 
This system will be in place for September 2019. The private University of Buckingham works entirely 
with a two-year, 40-week-per-year model, for bachelor’s degrees, and the University of Staffordshire is 
offering much of their provision in this way. 
Focus on employability
The University of Sheffield is one of many universities that prepare students for work by forging 
connections with communities and external partners. The University offers academic and vocational 
courses, as well as degree-level apprenticeships. Through cutting-edge research and strong 
partnerships with industry leaders such as Boeing, Siemens, Rolls-Royce and McLaren, the University 
takes a collaborative and multidisciplinary approach. The Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre 
attracts significant research income for engineering, through its strong industrial partnerships. The 
RISE scheme is run in partnership with Sheffield City Council and other partners across the City, 
including Sheffield Hallam University. It introduces graduates to the region’s businesses through a 
6-month paid placement with an employer in the region.
Working with industry
Amongst several good examples, the National Automotive Innovation Centre at Warwick, co-
developed by Warwick university with Jaguar Land Rover, is a centre of automotive excellence and 
innovation, providing opportunities for industry experience and employment for students as well as 
access to the latest learning and technology. 
Chapter three: Higher education 
95
The fee level
We base our recommendations on fee levels on 
three observations:
• England’s fees are amongst the highest 
internationally.
• £9,250 appears to be more than the reasonable 
cost of providing the lowest cost courses.
• Government should have more say in how the 
state subsidy for higher education is spent. 
We have concluded that the headline fee should 
be cut to a reasonable base cost of providing the 
lowest-cost courses and that the additional costs 
of providing higher-cost subjects should be funded 
directly by grant. The assessment of this base cost 
will inevitably rely on judgement: there is no “right” 
answer for the “true” cost of university provision. 
We have drawn on the KPMG report and TRAC 
data; on our analysis of changes in spending over 
time; on international comparisons and on broader 
considerations of student debt and spending 
priorities in making our recommendations. 
We judge that a fee cap of £7,500 is fair. It 
ensures that no student pays more than what 
could be considered the reasonable cost of their 
course and allows better targeting of taxpayer 
investment. It would also reduce overall student 
debt and lower one deterrent to participation. 
Although commentators stress that the level of 
debt is irrelevant given the income-contingent 
character of the loan system, perception is reality 
for many prospective students, particularly those 
from a disadvantaged background with larger 
maintenance loans who are currently likely to 
graduate with debt of over £60,000 once in-study 
interest is factored in. 
We firmly believe that the total reduction in 
resources from the fee cut must be matched with 
an equivalent increase in average per-student grant 
funding from government, so that the average per 
student resource to the sector stays level in cash 
terms (in line with Recommendation 3.3).
We do not recommend any changes to the lower 
fee cap, currently set at £6,000 or £6,165 for 
providers with a TEF rating. We propose that fee 
caps which are currently set in proportion to the 
higher fee cap – namely the accelerated degree 
fee cap and the part time fee cap – should be 
changed in proportion to our proposed change in 
the headline cap.
Recommendation 3.2
The cap on the fee chargeable to HE students 
should be reduced to £7,500 per year.142 
We consider that this could be introduced 
by 2021/22.
Recommendation 3.3
Government should replace in full the lost 
fee income by increasing the teaching grant, 
leaving the average unit of funding unchanged 
at sector level in cash terms.
Recommendation 3.4
The fee cap should be frozen until 2022/23, 
then increased in line with inflation 
from 2023/24
Per-subject funding levels
The increased level of grant resulting from the 
reduction in fee needs to be directed effectively. 
Our recommendations are based on evidence 
showing that:
• The current funding system under-funds 
certain high-cost subjects to the detriment of 
the economy in general and the government’s 
Industrial Strategy. 
• The current long-term taxpayer subsidy is 
poorly directed.
• Government currently has very limited control 
over the substantial taxpayer investment in 
higher education. 
We recommend that the OfS carry out a review 
of the funding rates for different subjects, to 
include an examination of the reasonable costs 
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of provision in the light of sector best practice, 
historical levels and international comparisons. 
We recommend that the OfS should have regard to 
economic and social value and consider support 
for socially-desirable professions such as nursing 
and teaching which do not command a significant 
earnings premium. We expect that this study 
should rebalance funding towards high-cost and 
strategically important subjects and to subjects 
that add social as well as economic value. We 
would expect some subjects to receive little 
or no subject specific teaching grant over the 
£7,500 base rate but that the OfS would consider 
separate arrangements to support those specialist 
institutions offering the highest quality provision 
that might otherwise be adversely affected by 
these recommendations. 
We also considered carefully a wide range of 
alternatives to recommendations 3.2 – 3.5. The 
details of these options, and why the panel 
preferred recommendations 3.2 – 3.5, are included 
in the box at the end of this chapter.
Recommendation 3.5 
Government should adjust the teaching grant 
attached to each subject to reflect more 
accurately the subject’s reasonable costs and 
its social and economic value to students and 
taxpayers.
Support for high-quality specialist institutions 
that could be adversely affected should be 
reviewed and if necessary increased.
Figure 3.15: How the panel’s proposals to reduce fees could enable greater differences of funding 
between subjects
Grant Fee
432143214321
Subject Groups Subject Groups Subject Groups
£3,000
Pre-2012 £3k fee Post 2012 £9k fee Proposed £7.5k fee
£9,000
£7,500
Funding differentiated 
through differing 
grant levels over fee 
according to relative 
assessment of cost
Differentiation 
weakened because 
of higher universally 
applied fee
Lower fee allows 
return to more 
differentiated 
approach
Note: this chart is illustrative to show the potential for greater funding differences between subject groups – the future grant 
levels (and indeed the number of groups and subjects in each group) would need to be considered by government.
Chapter three: Higher education 
97
Distance Learning 
The Complete University Guide (CUG) defines 
distance learning as ‘a way of learning remotely 
without being in regular face-to-face contact 
with a teacher in the classroom’. More than 
270,000 UK undergraduate students are taking 
their first degrees via distance learning, together 
with some 108,000 postgraduate students. In the 
UK, the majority of these are studying with the 
Open University. As noted elsewhere, there has 
been a decline in HE student numbers on these 
programmes in recent years. Many learners are 
studying for professional qualifications through 
this method and online learning is a major 
plank of the National Retraining Scheme.
Distance learning continues a tradition 
of non-campus learning that began with 
correspondence courses. Many campus 
providers incorporate elements of online 
provision into their courses and programmes 
and we note with interest the use of distance 
teaching, sometimes at very low cost, through 
mobile and other devices at degree level and as 
part of continuous professional development.
It may be necessary in terms of fees and 
funding to maintain a distinction between those 
programmes which are designed, advertised and 
delivered as campus based – notwithstanding 
they may have on-line components – and those 
which are predominantly intended to be studied 
remotely. This matter should be kept under 
review by the OfS.
Funding to support disadvantaged students
Our assessment of the current system is that it fails 
to fully support social mobility because it: 
• Over-emphasises entry into higher education 
rather than successful participation.
• Fails to resource adequately those institutions 
that admit a large proportion of their students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
• Relies on too limited an evidence base of what 
works best.
We propose that a portion of the increased teaching 
grant be used to target government funding more 
effectively to support access, participation and 
success for those students who have experienced 
socio-economic disadvantage, including part-time 
and mature students. Discarding measures of prior 
academic attainment and area-based measures of 
participation in HE in favour of individual measures 
of socio-economic disadvantage would help to 
ensure that funding is directed at those institutions 
that do most to support social mobility, and that 
disadvantaged students are better supported. We 
recommend that government should specify a 
minimum sum for each such student, as it does in 
the Pupil Premium Grant for schools.
Access and Participation Plans should clearly 
specify intended outcomes. We support the 
OfS’s focus on evidence-based interventions and 
encourage the regulator to hold providers to 
account for the results. We believe that Access 
and Participation Plans should cover part-time 
students, mature students and commuter students.
Our recommendations to reduce the fee cap and 
replace lost income with teaching grant should 
not lead to any reduction in the overall levels of 
spend on disadvantaged students at sector level 
because lost fee income would be replaced in full by 
additional teaching grant, and we are recommending 
an increase in the amount of teaching grant that 
is focused on disadvantage. Universities should 
continue to use both fee and grant income to 
support their disadvantaged students. We are 
also making substantial recommendations on 
maintenance support, including the reintroduction 
of maintenance grants. These changes mean a more 
explicit and generous form of support in the system 
for disadvantaged students. It would also reduce the 
need for institutions to provide additional financial 
assistance within their Access and Participation 
Plan. Institutions would need to ensure that their 
funding is recycled appropriately and directed 
towards further supporting their disadvantaged 
students. Institutions should use the Evidence 
and Impact Exchange to help ensure that all their 
expenditure is used in the most effective way. 
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Recommendation 3.6
Government should take further steps to ensure disadvantaged students have sufficient support to 
access, participate and succeed in higher education. It should do this by:
• Increasing the amount of teaching grant funding that follows disadvantaged students, so 
that funding flows to those institutions educating the students that are most likely to need 
additional support.
• Changing the measure of disadvantage used in the Student Premium to capture individual-level 
socio-economic disadvantage, so that funding closely follows the students who need support. 
• Requiring providers to be accountable for their use of Student Premium grant, alongside Access 
and Participation Plans for the spend of tuition fee income, to enable joined up scrutiny.
Maximising value
The role of the OfS
The OfS has a key role to play as the market regulator, acting on behalf of all students and taxpayers 
in pushing up quality and bearing down on provision of dubious value. We strongly support the 
regulator’s remit. The OfS sets the lead indicators used to monitor HEIs, including continuation rates, 
NSS results, degree attainment, student and staff complaints, graduate employment, reports from 
the Designated Data Body, and employer feedback. The OfS has the power to address poor quality 
provision and outcomes and we encourage it to intervene where it sees instances of poor value. 
The OfS is also responsible for the resolution of failing institutions. Its chairman, Sir Michael Barber, 
has stated that the OfS will not rescue financially-bereft institutions beyond the provision of 
temporary funding: to do so would risk moral hazard.
“The OfS will not bail out providers in financial difficulty. This kind of thinking – not unlike the 
‘too big to fail’ idea among the banks – will lead to poor decision making and a lack of financial 
discipline, is inconsistent with the principle of university autonomy and is not in students’ longer 
term interests……Good governance and financial sustainability are conditions of registration and we 
expect universities to develop realistic plans for the future which reflect likely student demand for 
their courses and how best they can meet that demand. Should a university or other higher education 
provider find themselves at risk of closure, our role will be to protect students’ interests, and we will 
not hesitate to intervene to do so. We will not step in to prop up a failing provider.” 
Sir Michael Barber, OfS Chair143
We note that in addition to risking moral hazard, the cost of bailing out a failing institution would be 
prohibitively expensive. Providers should have robust resolution plans in place and these should be 
agreed with and regularly tested by the OfS, as required through their student protection plans.
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The proposals outlined above are intended to build 
more balanced incentives into the funding system 
and, alongside greater scrutiny of university data, 
recruiting practices and earnings returns, reduce 
the volume of low value provision. However, there 
is still a risk that some HEIs will continue to recruit 
too many students who will not benefit from a 
degree and so we have considered harder-edged 
options. These would undoubtedly be unpopular 
in the sector, where the connection between 
going to university and achieving social mobility 
has become something of an unquestioned – 
although we believe questionable – mantra. We 
are conscious that any move to restrict entry 
to HE after years of expansion could be seen 
as a retrograde step. Reintroducing a universal 
student number cap is out of scope of our terms 
of reference and one we consider to be a very 
blunt instrument. However, restricting entry to 
degree-level study on the basis of prior academic 
attainment could be less blunt provided that there 
was sufficient protection for disadvantaged groups. 
The following section explains how this could work.
A minimum entry threshold
We have considered the introduction at some 
future date of a contextualised minimum entry 
threshold for access to Level 6 student finance 
for students under the age of 25, to be used if the 
measures outlined above did not deliver the scale 
and pace of change needed. Students under 25 
with tariff points below a certain level would be 
ineligible for student loans for tuition at Level 6. To 
repeat, this policy would need to be implemented 
such that disadvantaged students were not unfairly 
penalised.
The choice of threshold would be critical. As Figure 
3.14 shows, there is no clear drop-off point in 
graduate earnings by attainment. To be effective, 
a threshold would need to be both high enough 
to address the issues of drop-out and lower wage 
returns set out earlier; and low enough to ensure 
that the impact could be managed across the 
sector and would avoid disproportionate impact 
on disadvantaged groups. The box below – which 
is purely illustrative – shows that contextualisation 
could be applied to a minimum entry threshold 
that would address most of the concerns expressed 
about the proposal. 
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Contextualisation with a minimum entry threshold
We commissioned UCAS to explore the effect of introducing a minimum entry threshold, and to 
identify the extent of any contextualisation required to mitigate any adverse impact on equality of 
access to higher education.
Previous research has shown that students with lower levels of Level 3 attainment are more likely 
to be from disadvantaged backgrounds.144 For the purpose of this analysis, we have used a specific 
version of UCAS’s Multiple Equality Measure (MEM) – an equality metric for HE – to assess the impact 
of a minimum entry threshold145  and calculated a contextualised tariff point score for all 18 year-old 
English full-time undergraduate students with A level and BTEC qualifications. This analysis shows 
how a moderated threshold could work, and estimates the impact on disadvantaged students. It is an 
illustration to demonstrate that contextualisation is possible, not a recommendation.
The UCAS MEM used here brings together information on several equality dimensions that are 
associated with the probability of progression into HE. These include sex, where applicants live (POLAR3 
and Index of Multiple Deprivation) and secondary school sector. The probability of entry to HE aged 18 
is calculated on the basis of these characteristics and their combinations. These probabilities are then 
used to aggregate applicants into groups, where group 1 contains those least likely to enter HE (the 
“most disadvantaged”), and group 5 contains those most likely to enter HE (the “most advantaged”). 
We considered the impact of a minimum entry requirement at different A level and BTEC thresholds. 
The underlying assumption is that an applicant with a lower likelihood of entering HE is likely to 
have experienced educational disadvantage meaning their qualifications potentially understate their 
potential and so should have their A level/BTEC grades adjusted upwards for the purpose of judging 
their suitability for admission to a Level 6 course.146 The analysis indicated that the 20 per cent most 
disadvantaged applicants (MEM group 1) would need an average adjustment of three grades (e.g. from 
EEE to DDD) to bring their attainment in line with more advantaged peers.
For illustrative purposes, the impact of two thresholds and this approach to contextualisation are 
described here: 
• At a threshold of DDD, 72 tariff points, around 19,000 English 18 year-old students – about 10 
per cent of all those accepted – would not have been accepted in the absence of any form of 
contextualisation. Without appropriate contextualisation, this threshold would disproportionately 
affect the most disadvantaged students. For example, in MEM group 1, 14.9 per cent of A level 
students fall below the threshold compared to 4.5 percent of MEM group 5. After applying the 
contextualisation metric, 6,000 – about 3 per cent - would remain below the threshold. Of these, 
only 300 are from groups 1-3 i.e. the most disadvantaged applicants. (This assumes BTEC grade 
MMP (merit, merit, pass) is equivalent to DDD at A level.)  
• At a threshold of CCD, 88 tariff points, around 38,000 English 18 year-olds would not have been 
accepted without some form of contextualisation. That is around 20 per cent of all those accepted 
into HE. After applying the contextualisation metric, about 19,000 students would remain below 
the threshold, of whom approximately 3,000 are from groups 1-3. (This assumes BTEC grade MMM 
(merit, merit, merit) is equivalent to CCD at A level.) 
These figures have been calculated using a specific method to illustrate how a contextualisation 
process could work. Such a measure would directly impact individual applicants, so it would 
be essential to apply robust measures of individual disadvantage in combination with area-
based measures.
Chapter three: Higher education 
101
UCAS noted the risks and issues inherent in such large adjustments of grades and the importance of 
clearly setting out the assumptions that underpin the contextualisation. UCAS also noted that this 
method is focused entirely on 18 year-olds, and would be inappropriate for mature applicants, or 
applicants with other characteristics that make them eligible for contextualised admissions, such as 
having been in care. 
The UCAS Tariff is a metric based on qualification size and grading structure. Differences in 
qualification structures mean that it is not possible to infer absolute equivalence between all 
grades across all qualifications (and one of the panel’s observations is that this lack of equivalence 
needs resolving as qualifications are reformed and as T levels are introduced). The data are also 
based on acceptances, not enrolments, and thus over-represent the numbers of students entering 
university in 2018.
Were a minimum entry requirement introduced, it 
should apply only to students under the age of 25, 
after which work experience, rather than Level 3 
qualifications alone, would be the appropriate entry 
criterion. The policy should apply only to Level 6 
courses: any young person with Level 3 attainment 
below the threshold would still be eligible for 
student finance to study at Levels 4/5, and could 
then use their qualification at those higher levels 
to progress on to, and therefore receive finance 
for, Level 6 in the future. Introducing high-quality 
alternatives to degree study will be crucial to 
addressing the problems of low-value degrees set 
out above. Students recognise the value of higher-
level study but they must have these alternatives 
available to them or they will continue to enrol for 
poor-value degrees. 
We are aware that even with contextualisation the 
impact on some HEIs would be significant. Some 
of them might wish to focus on the new higher 
technical provision discussed in the previous 
chapter; if they chose to do so, this would be a 
positive outcome. 
We consider a minimum entry threshold 
contextualised for socio-economic background 
to be feasible and that it could address the 
problems of low returns for graduates in a socially 
progressive way. However, such a threshold would 
be a significant intervention into what has been 
designed as a competitive autonomous market. 
It could be seen as a reversal of the principle of 
allowing all who are able to benefit from HE to 
attend, a principle that has underpinned HE policy 
in recent years and was first pronounced in the 
1963 Robbins Report. It might be objected that 
the contextualisation process breaks the clear 
link between attainment and entry established 
by a minimum entry threshold. For example, it 
could result in a position where two students at 
the same school with the same grades holding the 
same offer from the same university would have 
different outcomes; one would be moderated over 
the threshold and attend university while the other 
would not. In so doing, it could be presented as 
an example of social engineering – and breach of 
concepts of fairness – that do not fit comfortably 
within a meritocratic education system. However, 
universities already take account of a range of 
factors – including circumstances and potential – 
alongside a prospective student’s prior attainment; 
a more systematic national approach would 
simply increase the extent and transparency of 
contextualised admissions. 
Targeted number caps on courses offering 
poor value for money
If recruitment practice has not improved by 
2022/23, discussed further below, an alternative or 
complementary option for the government and OfS 
is the imposition of a cap on the numbers admitted 
to courses that persistently manifest poor value for 
money for students and the public. The existing 
regulations give OfS the power to implement such 
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caps where that is justified in accordance with their 
regulatory aims, at institutional or subject level.147
The government has made it clear that it will not 
re-impose a cap on student numbers at national 
level. It would be out of scope for us to propose 
this and we would not wish to do so, even if it were 
within our terms of reference. However, we are 
mindful that the government does exceptionally 
place a cap on numbers, notably on university 
places for Medicine, because of the very high cost 
of a medical degree and of the professional training 
that follows it, and have considered whether this 
practice could be extended. 
We therefore invite the government to consider 
the case for encouraging the OfS to stipulate in 
exceptional circumstances a limit to the numbers 
an HEI could enrol on a specific course, or group 
of courses. It would be critical for the OfS to be 
transparent about the grounds and process for 
such an intervention and we can offer no more than 
a broad indication of what these circumstances 
might be. Where there is persistent evidence of 
poor value for students in terms of employment 
and earnings and for the public in terms of loan 
repayments, the OfS would have the regulatory 
authority to place a limit, for a fixed period, on the 
numbers eligible for financial support who could be 
admitted to the course. The institution in question 
would remain free to recruit to all other courses 
without restriction. Such a cap system would 
clearly target the institutions that are offering poor 
value, rather than altering the entry criteria for 
individual students.
The sector should reform its student 
recruitment practices
Our preference is for the HE sector, through the 
OfS, to resolve the problem of students being 
inappropriately recruited onto low value courses. 
This is a matter of responsible recruitment practice 
which puts the long-term interests of individual 
students over and above the short-term interests of 
providers.
We believe that the sector should have three years 
– until the start of academic year 2022/23 – to 
put its house in order. This timescale would have 
a number of benefits. It would enable universities 
to have two recruitment rounds – 2020/21 and 
2021/22 – in which to demonstrate sufficient 
progress. The impact on universities would be 
mitigated by the predicted upturn in 18 year-
old applicants from 2021 onwards. If adopted 
by government, by then our recommendations 
would have created an attractive higher technical 
alternative to Level 6 degrees. 
These reforms would take time to bed in but during 
the intervening period government and the OfS 
should monitor the practices that concern the 
panel. Universities themselves, as well as schools 
and colleges, have a key role to play in responding 
to these issues. But we are clear that if there is 
no evidence of progress in recruitment practice 
or outcomes of students on low value courses 
then government should intervene either with a 
minimum entry threshold or a selective cap on 
numbers, or a combination of both. We envisage 
the OfS monitoring progress in terms of: the 
average entry tariff; the use of unconditional offers 
and pressure selling tactics; and non-continuation 
rates, on lower value courses. 
We have considered the case for an institutional 
number cap but rejected it because the very 
public imposition of such a cap on a named 
institution would risk triggering a spiral of decline. 
We would not rule out imposing more than one 
subject number cap on the same institution if the 
circumstances justified it. 
Recommendation 3.7
Unless the sector has moved to address 
the problem of recruitment to courses 
which have poor retention, poor graduate 
employability and poor long term earnings 
benefits by 2022/23, the government should 
intervene. This intervention should take the 
form of a contextualised minimum entry 
threshold, a selective numbers cap or a 
combination of both.
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Foundation Years
Foundation years attached to degree courses are 
not to be confused with foundation degrees. They 
are one-year courses offered by universities for 
students who do not have the prior attainment 
in the right subjects to enter the course of their 
choice, to teach them the knowledge they need 
to progress on to the first year of their chosen 
course. Providing the course with which the 
foundation year is integrated is itself eligible for 
student finance, students enrolling can access the 
normal package of tuition fee and maintenance 
loans for the full duration of the extended course; 
providers, normally universities, can charge up to 
the maximum tuition fee cap of £9,250. 
An alternative route into HE for students without 
the necessary prior attainment is provided by 
Access to HE Diplomas. These are discrete courses 
of further education (FE) at Level 3, designed to 
equip students with a good foundation in the 
knowledge and skills required for studying a 
specific subject at university level. They are mostly 
provided by FE colleges (FECs), predominantly 
undertaken by mature learners, and are widely 
accepted as an entry qualification to HE. Students 
can access an Advanced Learner Loan (ALL) to 
meet tuition costs, and on successful completion 
of a subsequent HE course, are eligible to have their 
outstanding ALL balance written off. The maximum 
ALL amounts available for Access Diplomas – which 
effectively act as a fee cap – range from £3,022 to 
£5,197, depending on subject. It is a cheaper way 
for students with low prior attainment to access HE. 
To our surprise, the number of UK-domiciled 
students entering integrated foundation years 
in England almost tripled between 2012/13 and 
2017/18, from 10,430 to 30,030, whereas the 
number of entrants to Access Diplomas declined 
from 36,880 to 30,410, a drop of 18 per cent, over 
the same period.148 The vast majority of Access 
Diploma entrants (90 per cent in 2017/18) are 
taught at FECs, whereas the majority of integrated 
foundation year students (77 per cent in 2017/18) 
are taught at HEIs.149 
There may be compelling reasons why HE courses 
with subject-specific entry requirements – for 
example, Medicine – should offer foundation years 
as an entry route for students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, but this does not seem to be how 
these courses are, in the main, being deployed. The 
largest number of registrations onto foundation 
years by subject group in 2017/18 was for Business 
and Administrative Studies150, for which there are 
generally no special entry requirements. 
It is hard not to conclude that universities are using 
foundation years to create four-year degrees in 
order to entice students who do not otherwise meet 
their standard entry criteria. Most recruiters to 
these programmes are medium or lower entry tariff 
institutions151, typically universities with a high 
proportion of students from poorer backgrounds. 
These students are obliged to take out an additional 
fourth year of higher and non-cancellable fee loans. 
We question whether this is in their best interests. 
The taxpayer is entitled to ask why universities 
are not collaborating with FECs on enrolling these 
students onto Access Diplomas with lower fees, 
more advantageous loan terms, and a standalone 
qualification, or, if necessary, running such courses 
themselves, as a few universities already do.
It is our view that the inequity in funding and 
support available for Access Diplomas compared 
to the package available for foundation years 
is resulting in poor value for money for both 
government and some students. We recommend 
that student finance is no longer offered for 
foundation years, unless agreed with the OfS in 
exceptional cases.
In recognition of the potential impact on widening 
participation, we recommend this should not 
be implemented without notice of at least two 
academic years. Over this period, those universities 
that do not already offer them may wish to 
develop their own Access Diplomas or collaborate 
with FECs in their creation. Given the substantially 
lower fee levels for this type of provision, this will 
represent better value for money for students and 
taxpayers.
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Recommendation 3.8
We recommend withdrawing financial support for foundation years attached to degree courses after 
an appropriate notice period. Exemptions for specific courses such as Medicine may be granted 
by the OfS.
Options considered and discarded relating to the fee level
We received a variety of representations on options for different fee levels, and considered carefully a 
wide range of alternatives to Recommendation 3.2. Because of the public interest and the differences 
of opinion, often debated in the media, around university fees, we will set out here the case for our 
recommendation as opposed to alternatives. The options considered included:
• Retaining the current fee cap. The case against this – and for a lower cap – is set out above.
• A lower fee cap of £6,500. At this level, there would no longer be any additional benefit in terms 
of redistributing funding between subjects, because it does not look reasonable from the reported 
levels of cost and KPMG work to expect any subject to be taught to a high standard for under £7,500 
per year. Also, the cost – in the form of additional teaching grant – of this further fee reduction 
would be more expensive for the taxpayer than the cost of the £7,500 proposal.
• Differential fees: variable fee caps for different subjects on the basis of cost, expected value, 
or a combination of the two. Government grants would make up the remaining costs for each 
course, in the way the current grant does for high-cost subjects. The Australian system operates 
in much this way. We felt that setting different subject fees based on cost would be counter-
productive; some of the most expensive subjects are those that provide skills the economy most 
needs – such as Science, Engineering and Medicine – where higher fees could act as a deterrent 
to students when making their choices. Our view is that whilst overall funding should be more 
differentiated between subjects, fees for the student should not. The panel noted that the vast 
majority of commentators and call for evidence respondents were also of the view that fees should 
not be differentiated. 
• A ‘negative’ grant for low cost subjects. As an alternate way to achieve a uniform fee cap but 
funding differentiated by subject, the panel explored in detail what was termed a ‘negative’ grant. 
This would allow the fee to remain at £9,250 but the total amount of government teaching grant 
allocated to an HEI would be reduced on the basis of the number of Band D students it admitted, 
effectively reducing the unit of resource for students (in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences). 
This option had merits but was judged to be complicated to explain and administer and would serve 
to highlight and embed the subsidy that students of some subjects make to students of others. 
• Differential fees: variable fee caps depending on course or institution quality and/or 
outcomes. We heard calls for fees to be differentiated on the basis of course quality or institutional 
quality. We looked at the option of allowing high quality institutions to charge fees above £9,250 
for all or some of their courses in return for sharing responsibility for student finance. In this 
scheme, institutions would take on some of the risk of their graduates not repaying their loans, in 
return for charging a higher fee. Government teaching grants would not be provided to make up 
the difference between the fee the institution charged and the cost of provision, because the HEI 
would be rewarded or penalised for performance. The critical drawback of such a scheme is that the 
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differentiation in fees would lead to spirals of improvement or decline, depending on a provider’s 
reputation and quality. High tariff institutions could confidently charge higher fees and invest 
to improve, while lower tariff institutions would be forced to manage with lower fees and lower 
resources and be less able to invest, improve and compete. This could further create a two (or multi) 
tier system, where fee prices would push more debt-averse poorer students towards lower quality 
provision. In practice differential fees would be near impossible to implement given the inevitable 
data lags in assessing quality and the potential for differences between overall institutional quality 
rating and subject rating.
We concluded that a system of differential fees is undesirable at subject level, and unworkable at 
institutional level, and would not bring overall benefits to the individual, economy or society.
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Introduction
This chapter focuses on the institutional structure of 
the further education (FE) sector, and recommends 
interlocking changes to its financial and regulatory 
framework. These are necessary if the country is to 
deliver high quality technical and higher technical 
education, and tackle the huge gulf in opportunities 
which currently opens up at the end of secondary 
schooling. The statistics which demonstrate that 
gulf have been discussed earlier, but bear repeating. 
Of the young people who have not achieved a Level 
3 by the age of 19, almost none will ever do so.1 A 
substantial 14 per cent of people in England have 
not achieved a Level 2 qualification by age 25, and a 
further 23 per cent have done so but not progressed 
beyond it.2 We also compare quite poorly with 
other OECD countries in the volume of people with 
intermediate (Level 2 and 3) skills in the workforce.3 
And, as noted in the third of the principles 
underpinning this report, the total number of people 
involved in post-18 education has in fact declined 
since 2010/11,4,5 in spite of rising participation 
amongst young people in higher education (HE).
Major skill shortages persist, as discussed in 
chapter 2. Higher technical skills are in great 
demand6 and yet only 4 per cent of 25 year-olds 
hold qualifications at Levels 4 and 5 as their 
highest achievement, compared to nearly 30 per 
cent for Level 6.7 Qualifications at these levels form 
a much smaller part of our HE system than in the 
past8 and numbers have been falling. Enrolments 
on foundation degrees (a Level 5 qualification) in 
England, for example, have been falling steadily 
in recent years, from a high of over 81,000 in all 
years of study in 2009/10 to approximately 30,000 
in 2017/18.9
Skill shortages and gaps are also evident at Level 
3,10 yet here too, numbers of adult learners have 
been falling rather than rising (see Figure 4.2). A 
Level 2 qualification is regarded, increasingly, as 
a prerequisite for successful entry into the labour 
market, and is strongly associated with higher 
earnings and lower chances of unemployment.11 
Although rising proportions of young people now 
achieve this, through GCSEs, at age 16, 17 or 18, 
many do not and the total number of full Level 2 
learners aged 19 and above has been falling (see 
Figure 4.2).
These statistics underpin the recommendations 
made in chapter 2, notably to restore adults’ 
entitlements to free tuition for their first full Level 
2 and 3 qualifications, and greatly increase the 
flexibility with which adults can access learning, 
using a lifelong learning loan allowance for 
Levels 4 to 6. However, these changes cannot 
transform opportunities or close skill gaps in and 
of themselves. The institutional capability must be 
there: education must be available which is of high 
quality, provided by institutions which can respond 
effectively to changing labour markets, and serve a 
highly diverse population. 
Although we hope and expect that, in the future, 
the HE sector will provide far more higher technical 
education than at present, FE will be key. The 
much needed increase in higher technical and 
intermediate skills provision will only occur if FE 
is equipped and able to provide it; moreover, for 
adults at all skill levels, opportunities will only 
open up through high quality locally accessible 
institutions.
At present, FE (at 18+) in England is provided 
by a network of 20012 general and specialist FE 
colleges (referred to here collectively as FECs or 
colleges for simplicity unless otherwise stated), 
independent training providers (ITPs), local 
authorities and charitable organisations (who are 
particularly involved with community learning), 
and offender learning providers. Sixth form colleges 
predominantly teach learners aged 16-19. Figure 
4.1 shows the volume of learners at Level 3 and 
below, including apprentices, at different types of 
FE provider, and also makes it clear how much they 
differ from each other in their core activities. 
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Figure 4.1: FE and skills funded learners at 
Level 3 and below by provider type and level (all 
ages)*13
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Note that these figures count learners multiple times if they 
are studying at more than one level or type of provision, for 
example an apprenticeship at the same time as some other 
qualification.
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are studying at more than one level or type of provision, for 
example an apprenticeship at the same time as some other 
qualification
As noted in chapter 1, ITPs are a very distinctive 
feature of English (and indeed UK) education. 
Many are for-profit companies: they are also highly 
diverse, and numbers fluctuate a great deal, due 
to openings, closures and mergers. While a few 
ITPs are very large, the vast majority are small in 
size: in 2017/18 the median size of an ITP was 150 
funded learners (excluding ITPs with fewer than 
five learners, of which there were 45 in 2017/18), 
compared to 5,745 learners at the median general 
FEC. Only 23 ITPs had more than 5,745 funded 
learners (i.e. more than the college median).14 Large 
ITPs have been particularly involved in providing 
national coverage for large employers.
The growth in the number of ITPs noted in chapter 
1 has been a function of successive government 
policies which emphasised workplace provision 
and competitive contracting. Today, ITPs are 
largely involved in apprenticeships, and, as shown 
in Figure 4.1, have become the major providers 
of apprenticeship training; this is the subject of 
chapter 5. However, some ITPs are also funded 
via the Adult Education Budget (AEB), which is 
described in detail below; some have an Advanced 
Learner Loans (ALL) facility (as described in chapter 
2), and some receive funding via the 16-19 budget.
This chapter will have relatively little to say about 
ITPs, or about other community learning and 
training providers. This is partly because there 
is remarkably little information available about 
them: even obtaining provider numbers is difficult. 
It is partly because we deal separately with 
apprenticeships, and it is within apprenticeships 
that ITPs have been successful in responding 
to government and employer demands: in this 
context, chapter 5 also discusses some major 
issues relating to financial failures and quality 
control. But the balance of discussion in this 
chapter is mostly because we believe that 
England’s network of FECs must play the core 
role in addressing skills gaps and providing 
opportunities for people to progress. They are the 
only institutions which can in principle achieve this 
at a national level, and in a stable and enduring 
way. To do so, colleges must now be equipped, 
funded and structured to deliver. 
We begin with an overview of England’s FECs 
and why they are the focus for our proposals in 
FE, followed by a description of the FE funding 
system. Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter then set 
out the case for change and our recommendations 
for reform. 
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Section 1: FE colleges – a national network
Almost all developed countries have a network of 
institutions that are not universities, but which 
offer vocational and technical education, training 
and apprenticeship training to adults, at both 
higher levels (equivalent to Level 4 and above in 
England) and levels below this. These institutions 
commonly structure courses around regulated 
qualifications, but also offer uncertificated 
training for individuals and businesses. Their 
precise structure is enormously variable, but what 
they share is a very direct relationship with the 
contemporary labour market and with employers.
The same is true of England. Its FECs are often very 
long established and deeply embedded in their 
communities. They are essentially educational, 
and essentially community focused: they have 
corporate independence but also, and crucially, the 
status of exempt charities.
FECs also have been and continue to be economy 
and work-focused, although they have acquired 
other tasks – including 16-18 provision – not 
commonly part of similar institutions’ offer in 
other countries. The traditional mission of FECs, 
as focused on the world of work, was endorsed 
and re-emphasised by the Foster report – a 
major independent review of the future of further 
education in England commissioned by government 
and published in 2005 – and by the government-
appointed Commission on Adult Vocational 
Teaching and Learning. More recently this view was 
also powerfully expressed by the Association of 
Colleges in their response to our call for evidence. 
Foster review: “The FE college of the future must 
be absolutely clear about its primary purpose: 
to improve employability and skills in its local 
area contributing to economic growth and 
social inclusion.” 15
Association of Colleges’ response to our call 
for evidence: “Since they were established in 
the 1890s, colleges have been focused on the 
skills needs of the economy […] In the words 
of a recent official report, ‘the sector is all 
about work’16.” 17
FECs in England are highly diverse, reflecting 
the different areas they serve. However, they all 
are involved in three main areas of adult skills 
provision which are comprehensively different to 
anything offered by schools or higher education 
institutions (HEIs):
1) initial vocational education (i.e. pre-labour 
market entry and early vocational training, 
including apprenticeship training at 
lower levels); 
2) higher vocationally oriented and technician 
level training; 
3) opportunities to re-train and re-skill.
In addition, FECs offer a range of general education 
that provide adults with second, or third chances: 
these include basic skills and English for speakers 
of other languages (ESOL) courses, academic 
qualifications, technically focused reskilling and 
upskilling programmes, and Access to HE Diplomas 
that enable adults to progress to higher vocational, 
technical and degree-level provision. Some colleges 
specialise in particular sectors, notably arts and 
design or agriculture and land-based subjects. 
Some also offer the opportunity to take degrees. 
They cater for a diverse student body, and cover 
a very wide age range: in 2016/17, there were 
1.4 million adults aged 19 and over studying in 
England’s college network18 of whom 149,000 were 
studying for HE qualifications.19 There is also a 
substantial number of students in general FECs 
who are under 19 – around 530,000 in 2017/18.20 
England’s existing network of 200 general and 
specialist FECs collectively represents a substantial, 
widely distributed physical estate, built up over 
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many decades through public investment. In 
practice, this means that colleges already possess 
a good deal of the infrastructure – and expertise – 
needed to deliver on the government’s ambitions. 
Indeed, over half of Level 4 and 5 qualifications 
undertaken in 2016/17 (excluding apprenticeships) 
were in FECs.21 Many successful FECs are also 
already key contributors to local economies in 
various parts of England, possessing wide reaching 
employer relationships and working to meet local 
skills needs. 
FECs are mission-driven, and we believe this 
is a significant and valuable aspect of these 
organisations. Their charitable status is also 
important: any surplus they generate will be 
reinvested in provision. FECs are, for the most part, 
large enough for sizeable, high-cost programmes 
to be feasible. They are focused on their local areas 
by history, and also by mission. Their existing, 
national coverage means that they can and should 
be the cornerstone provider for the rejuvenation of 
higher and intermediate technical and professional 
education.
The government has recently announced 
considerable investment in the development of 
T levels – the technical alternative to A levels 
– and the embryonic Institutes of Technology 
(IoT) programme, as detailed in chapter 2. These 
developments are very welcome. Much of this 
funding will go to FECs, and there are obvious 
potential synergies with the reforms proposed 
in this report. However, further reforms of a 
comprehensive nature, along with much more 
investment, will be needed if post-18 education is 
to achieve its purpose fully.
We support a vision for FECs as core contributors 
to employment, productivity and growth, as set 
out in the box below. The remainder of this chapter 
addresses the changes needed to achieve it.
A vision for England’s FE colleges in the 
future
A national network of collaborative FECs that 
provide high quality technical and professional 
education with a clear focus on Levels 3, 4 and 
5, delivered flexibly and aligned to the needs 
of local economies. FECs will maintain strong 
relationships with employers and assist in 
driving productivity.
As engines of social mobility and inclusion, 
FECs will also provide community learning, 
reskilling and upskilling opportunities for adults 
leading to sustainable career opportunities.
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Section 2: FE finances
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee: 
“Further education is the poor relation to higher education and its position has been weakened 
and undermined by reductions to its budgets and a complex funding architecture. The separate 
funding mechanisms create educational silos that prevent innovation. The system accentuates the 
perception that routes into higher education that begin in further education are inferior to the A-Level/
undergraduate degree option.” 22
Funding is a fundamental challenge in FE. 
Funding for adult learners in FE is fragmented, 
unpredictable and sits at a much lower level per 
learner than both HE and 16-18 funding, at about 
£1,000 per year23 (although many adult FE learners 
are part time). Largely reflecting the collapse in 
learner numbers, total spending on adult skills has 
fallen by approximately 45 per cent in real terms 
between 2009/10 and 2017/18.24 This is one of the 
most important statistics in this entire report and 
cannot be justified in terms of either economics or 
social equity.
The impact of lower funding and other factors 
outlined below on adult student numbers is shown 
in Figure 4.2: there have been falls in every single 
category of study funded from the main adult 
education budget. 
Figure 4.2: Adult (19+) FE and skills participation by level – learner volumes (excluding 
apprenticeships and community learning)25
Academic year
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18
% change 
12/13 to 17/18
Total Learners 1,782,200 1,603,700 1,355,000 1,098,500 1,080,400 1,131,700 -36%
of
 w
hi
ch
…
Below Level 2 (excl. 
English & Maths) 745,300 713,800 544,600 410,400 377,200 399,000 -46%
English & Maths 439,000 447,700 431,500 370,300 358,400 364,000 -17%
Full Level 2 418,900 412,800 322,500 252,800 78,300 56,300 -87%
Full Level 3 147,400 138,100 131,400 144,100 141,400 120,100 -19%
Level 2 677,500 672,700 581,800 450,000 465,800 512,100 -24%
Level 3 238,900 179,600 155,700 157,500 158,700 143,300 -40%
Level 4+ 34,500 15,600 11,900 11,900 16,100 16,900 -51%
No Level Assigned 209,900 47,000 43,800 38,400 34,100 29,300 -86%
The effect of this reduction on total FEC income has been severe: a 23 per cent decrease between 2009/10 
and 2016/17 as shown in the chart below.
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Figure 4.3: FE college sector total income 2007/8 to 2016/17 (2016/17 prices)26
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The largest single source of adult funding in FE is 
the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA) 
AEB. This provided approximately £800m to FECs 
in 2016/17, and its real-term decline can be seen 
clearly in Figure 4.3.27 The AEB funds a wide range 
of entitlements at lower levels, including basic 
English and Maths, ESOL, vocational learning and 
employability skills. However, demand for many 
established qualifications has slumped due to 
recent changes in these entitlements as discussed 
in chapter 2. 
The Adult Education Budget
The AEB covers funding for adult education (excluding apprenticeships), community learning, and 
learner support. It focuses on funding certain groups of learners with low skills, such as young adults, 
unemployed individuals who are actively seeking work, employed individuals in receipt of a low wage, 
and certain subjects, such as English and Maths. 
From its AEB allocation, an FEC must offer learners provision based on a number of legal and policy-
based entitlements. Eligibility for funding is based on an individual’s age, their prior attainment and 
personal circumstances. This means that some adults are eligible for full funding, and others are 
eligible for co-funding: in other words, they or their employers have to pay part of the costs. The legal 
entitlements to full funding for eligible adult learners are set out in the Apprenticeships, Skills and 
Children’s Learning Act 2009 and cover: 
• English and Maths up to and including Level 2, for individuals aged 19 and over, who have not 
previously attained a GCSE grade A*-C, or grade 4 or higher; 
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• First full qualification at Level 2 for individuals aged 19 to 23; 
• First full qualification at Level 3 for individuals aged 19 to 23.
• From 2020 the AEB will also support a fourth entitlement – for learners aged 19 and over to be fully 
funded to achieve in basic digital skills.
The AEB is also used to support a number of ‘policy entitlements’ for full or co-funding. Currently 
these include:
• Full funding for learners aged 19 to 23, and for unemployed people aged 24 and over, to undertake 
learning to progress to Level 2; 
• Full funding for ESOL learning up to and including Level 2;
• Full funding for unemployed people aged 19 and over to undertake a second Level 2 qualification 
(co-funding for others aged 19 and over). 
Elements of the AEB are also designated for community learning and learner support funding 
to enable providers to meet the additional needs of learners. Community learning activities are 
intended to help disadvantaged and hard-to-reach learners re-engage in learning, build confidence, 
and enhance their wellbeing. This learning may lead towards progression into further learning or 
employment rather than achievement of a qualification. Learner support, unlike HE maintenance, 
is allocated by providers according to financial need, and can cover things like course material and 
equipment costs, childcare, travel and accommodation. The financial support is limited and subject to 
strict eligibility criteria. 
Although outside the scope of this review, it is also 
important to note that grant funding for 16-18 
provision amounted to over 40 per cent of total FEC 
income for 2017/18 – totalling £2.5bn28 for 530,000 
learners29 – and is one of colleges’ most predictable 
and stable revenue sources. As is clear in Figure 
4.3, however, this too has declined: overall spending 
on 16-18 year-olds in FE has fallen by 15 per cent 
in real terms between 2009/10 and 2017/18, and 
spending per learner fell by 12 per cent between 
2011/12 and 2017/18.30 Moreover, whilst 16 and 
17 year olds on full-time study programmes are 
funded at a base rate of £4,000 a year, the rate for 
18 year-olds was cut in 2014, and now stands 17.5 
per cent lower at £3,300 a year.31
The combination of falling numbers, reduced 
entitlements and pressure on funding rates has 
been predictably dire for FECs’ financial position. 
In 2015, the National Audit Office (NAO) reported 
that the financial health of the FEC sector had 
been declining since 2010/11, and that the number 
of colleges under strain was likely to increase 
rapidly.32 This duly occurred. In a recent report on 
college finances, the Association of Colleges noted 
that 40 per cent of FECs were in deficit in 2016/17.33 
We too heard from senior college managers and 
sector organisations that total current funding 
levels are inadequate to sustain viable institutions 
across the country, and that growth in the 16-19 
cohort size (from 2019/20, after years of decline) 
will not on current per-student funding levels be 
enough to change the situation. 
Our proposals in chapter 2 would help reverse 
the decline in adult learners and increase FEC 
income. However, they would not in themselves 
be enough to ensure that FECs fulfilled the vision 
outlined above. The rest of this chapter examines 
in more detail the need for such change and makes 
corresponding recommendations. 
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Section 3: The case for change
Overview
One of the principles underpinning this report, 
principle 7, is that ‘post-18 education cannot be 
left entirely to market forces’ but over the past two 
decades, government policy has been to increase 
competition in post-school skills provision by wider 
use of competitive tendering, and by putting more 
funding into the hands of employers and students. 
As a result, FECs now compete in multiple different 
markets. For example, in apprenticeships, they 
compete with ITPs to offer the off-the-job learning 
component. In HE, FECs are mostly in competition 
with so called ‘post ’92 universities’, that is to say 
the newer universities many of which were formerly 
polytechnics. In community learning FECs might 
compete with local authority providers, and in 16-
19 provision they compete with local schools and/
or sixth form colleges for students.
In chapter 3 we said of HE that competition has 
an important role to play in creating student 
choice, but, with no steer from government, 
the social, economic and cultural outcomes are 
likely to be suboptimal. In FE the situation is 
somewhat different; there are plenty of steers 
from government, but often in very specific and 
changeable ways with a succession of overlapping 
and at times conflicting reforms to what is taught, 
and how, and a gradual shift in the level and focus 
of funding. In its most recent annual report on 
education spending in England, the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies aptly describes a “near-permanent 
state of revolution in the further education 
sector”34 and we set out the multiple funding, 
policy, regulatory and external factors shaping FEC 
behaviour and the outcomes they deliver in Figure 
4.4. The following sub-sections then examine these 
in more detail.
England displays more policy volatility than most other countries 
“Norris and Adam (2017)35 have described how further education has been unusually subject to 
policy churn, with, since the 1980s, 28 major pieces of legislation bearing on FE, 48 secretaries of 
state with responsibility for the sector and many agencies, such as the Further Education Funding 
Council, the Learning and Skills Council and the UK Commission for Employment and Skills coming 
and going. Norris and Adam argue that while all Ministers want to visibly ‘do something’ in their area 
of responsibility, in the FE sector it is easier because the stakeholder institutions are relatively weak 
and therefore find it harder to oppose change. This degree of churn has damaged higher technical 
education, particularly in the context of competition with the more stable environment of university 
institutions and bachelor’s degrees.”36
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Figure 4.4 External forces operating on FE colleges 
1 There has been a slow and 
steady decline in the number 
of people studying higher 
technical and technical 
provision, partly caused by the growth 
in undergraduate degrees and partly by 
changes in funding rates and rules.
2 The number of  
16-18 year-olds 
staying in full-time 
education has 
increased, with colleges  
becoming the ‘default’ institutions.
3 Competition in some 
types of provision and in 
some geographic areas 
takes counter-productive 
forms and new money 
in apprenticeships has 
largely gone outside the  
college sector.
4 There has been 
insufficient capital funding 
to maintain the college 
estate. Declining revenue 
funding has further prevented colleges 
from investing in advanced equipment and 
facilities, and also affected their ability to 
recruit and retain a high quality workforce.
5 Frequent and 
sustained cuts to college 
budgets require colleges 
to focus on a sub-set of 
activity which covers 
costs in the immediate and short term.
6 Funding rules are  
complex, inflexible and  
encourage certain types  
of provision for financial  
reasons, rather than those in the 
interests of students or the local 
economy. They do not allow  
colleges to respond to local labour 
market needs. The regulatory regime  
is also complex and burdensome.
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The drivers of high volume, low value further 
education
FECs have become providers of everything to 
everyone. They make a major contribution to 
technical and professional education for young 
people and adults. They play an essential role 
in serving those without basic qualifications, 
and remain crucial to apprenticeship training, 
especially in high-skill technical trades. Some FECs 
provide specialised, full-cost provision for local and 
national employers; some offer higher technical 
qualifications linked to the local economy. Some 
have degree awarding powers, and many put on 
programmes for unemployed adults, including 
ex-offenders, which have a very high success rate 
in leading on to employment. They also educate a 
significant proportion of our 16-18 year-olds.
These are all valuable functions but incentives in 
the current system encourage colleges to deliver 
high volumes of learning at low levels to the partial 
exclusion of the higher level qualifications wanted 
by the labour market and offering the best return 
to individuals.
As Figure 4.5 below shows, the highest number of 
FE learners are studying either qualifications below 
Level 2 or single Level 2 qualifications, which – as 
illustrated by the net present value (NPV) column 
(essentially the return on public investment) – can 
yield lower earnings returns compared to other 
options. It also shows that full Level 2 qualifications 
yield some of the highest increases in earnings, but 
as is shown in Figure 4.2, the number of learners 
undertaking these qualifications declined 87 per 
cent between 2012/13 and 2017/18 (the reasons 
for this decline are explored in detail in chapter 2). 
While lower level qualifications are undoubtedly 
an important pipeline to higher level courses, it is 
evident that, in general, higher level qualifications 
offer a greater NPV. Our conclusion is that the 
current weighting towards low level FE is not 
advantageous to either the student or the state.
Figure 4.5: Wage returns for different levels of adult study and FE learner numbers at Level 3 and below37
Level of qualification
Increased 
earnings in 
employment
Increased chance of 
being in employment 
NPV per £ of government 
funding (£)
No. of 19+ FE 
learners 2017/18
Below Level 2 2% 0 percentage points (pp) 10 399,000
English and Maths 5% 1 pp 17 364,000
Level 2 1% 1 pp Not available 512,100
Full Level 2 11% 2 pp 21 56,300
Apprenticeship Level 2 11% 0 pp 26 263,200
Level 3 3% 1 pp Not available 143,300
Full Level 3 9% 4 pp 16-21 120,100
Apprenticeship Level 3 16% 0 pp 28 304,700
The principal drivers to such high volume, low value 
provision are as follows:
• The mechanism by which lower level courses and 
qualifications become eligible for AEB funding 
encourage colleges to focus on low value, low risk, 
easy to deliver programmes. 
• Entitlements for full tuition funding to enable 
learners over age 23 to gain a first full Level 
2 or 3 have been removed and replaced with 
co-funding at Level 2 and ALLs at Level 3 (as 
described in chapter 2).
• Funding rules discourage providers from seeking 
to stretch learners to move to the next level, as 
AEB learners’ payments are related to whether 
learners complete qualifications, rather than 
simply to enrolments.
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Funding rules encourage FE colleges 
to focus on certain types of lower level 
provision
Within the AEB there is an open-ended policy 
entitlement to support learners to progress to 
Level 2. This entitlement means that learners 
who are 19 to 23 years old, or 24 plus and 
unemployed, may be fully funded to undertake 
multiple qualifications and/or non-regulated 
provision up to and including Level 1. There is 
no approval process for bringing qualifications 
at entry level and Level 1 in scope for these 
entitlements for funding, provided they meet 
some broad prerequisites set by the ESFA. 
As a consequence, a great many qualifications 
(as well as individual units of study linked to 
these qualifications) are available through these 
AEB entitlements. Many of these qualifications 
are small in size, broad in nature and many are 
assessed through coursework and portfolios. 
The range can be confusing and duplicative: 
there are often different sizes of the same 
qualification at the same level available to 
study, for example an award, certificate and 
diploma in the same subject, at the same level, 
offered by the same awarding organisation. 
However, in many cases, these qualifications 
are economical and relatively easy for FECs 
to deliver. 
The funding rules managed by the ESFA further 
encourage a focus on low cost provision. The 
ESFA use ‘programme weighting factors’ to 
differentiate funding according to relative 
costs of delivery, based on the sector subject 
area classifications (SSAC) that awarding 
organisations attach to their qualifications. The 
SSAC are a good guide to which sector and/or 
broad occupational area a qualification may 
fall within, but anomalies exist. For example, it 
is possible for a lower level qualification, with 
minimal engineering content, to be assigned 
an engineering SSAC. This results in that 
qualification being funded at a higher rate and 
so incentivises the provider to deliver it. 
Funding rules are complex and inflexible. 
They impose short time horizons and do not 
allow FE colleges to respond to local labour 
market needs
The AEB operates quite differently to funding for 
schools and universities. All of the latter operate 
on an uncapped payment per-student basis. These 
funding streams are therefore relatively consistent 
year-on-year (with any annual variation a result of 
fluctuation in learner numbers), more so because 
most of their learners are on courses longer than 
one year, and may be expected to remain with the 
institution for some time. They also incentivise 
recruitment, and avoid the multiplicity of 
complex incentives of the sort discussed above for 
qualifications at Level 1 and below. 
By contrast, the AEB is not based directly on 
learner volumes; rather, providers receive a capped 
annual contract from the ESFA that they ‘earn’ 
as and when qualifications or learning aims are 
achieved, each of which have an individual price 
tag. An FEC’s allocation is determined annually 
by the ESFA based on historic performance (in 
terms of how much of their allocation they earned 
in previous years) and represents the maximum 
amount of funding they can receive. Because the 
allocation is a cap, AEB funding for a college cannot 
automatically grow with the volume of learners; 
in fact, as we have seen, in recent years, both AEB 
budgets and learner numbers have shrunk in part 
because FECs cannot afford to gamble on receiving 
an increased contract the following year by 
teaching adults for free.
Payments against an FEC’s AEB agreement are 
made on a profiled monthly basis, and then 
reconciled by the ESFA at the end of the year. The 
reconciliation exercise determines how much of 
their allocation a college should keep; if they earn 
97 per cent or more of their allocation, it is funded 
in full. From 2018/19, the ESFA has announced 
that it will also fund up to 3 per cent above a 
college’s allocation if it over-delivers. We welcome 
this development, but we believe that funding 
rules remain far from ideal. FECs need to spend 
all of their allocation in the year it is provided: if a 
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college delivers outside of the 3 per cent tolerance 
window, perhaps in response to local labour market 
demand and conditions, funds will be clawed back 
or additional provision will go unfunded. 
These rules mean FECs are under pressure to 
fill their courses early in the year, leaving little 
opportunity for long term planning and little 
alternative but to offer whatever will fill places 
quickly. We have heard consistently from colleges 
and principals that responding to mid-year 
requests from employers is difficult as a result 
of this funding mechanism and that enrolling to 
maximum or near-maximum at the start of the 
year has become a necessity for survival. Because 
the AEB operates on a year-by-year basis, it is 
very difficult for colleges to enter multi-year 
arrangements with employers or to provide flexible, 
tailored training at short notice.
This inflexibility is greatly increased by 
the complex set of eligibility and charging 
requirements which has developed and which 
means that an FEC’s AEB contract operates more 
as a collection of separate contracts or funding 
pots rather than as one. This creates very large 
administrative costs which reduce the funds 
available for front-line teaching and student 
services. It also means that, paradoxically, a good 
number of FECs have been unable to spend their 
full AEB in recent years because the demand from 
their local population and employers is so ill-
matched with the eligibility categories and funding 
rules which have been set at national level.
Budget administration in a FE college
A large tertiary college we contacted has an 
annual turnover of just over £40m, enrolling 
over 10,000 students per year. The college 
has 49 full-time equivalent staff fulfilling 
the functions associated with enrolling and 
administering student data, including the many 
returns required by regulators, such as the ESFA 
and the Office for Students (OfS). In a typical 
year the college will make up to 30 separate 
funding and information returns to the ESFA 
and OfS, typically covering varied information 
from student data to space utilisation.
This administrative cost reduces the budget for 
frontline teaching staff. It also makes student 
recruitment time consuming and expensive. 
It is possible for one classroom to contain 
students studying the same qualification, 
who are funded in four different ways, with 
four different funding rates and four different 
criteria for funding. This materially affects 
the quality of the offer the college can make 
to students and employers, and the flexibility 
it has to put on new provision responding 
to demand. 
From academic year 2019/20, central government 
will devolve control of the AEB to six Mayoral 
Combined Authorities and through a delegation 
agreement to the Mayor of London for the Greater 
London Authority.38 Approximately 50 per cent 
of the national AEB will be controlled by these 
devolved areas; central government, via the ESFA, 
will continue to administer the AEB across the rest 
of England.39 Devolution may create opportunities 
to tailor the AEB to meet local needs in devolved 
areas but devolved budgets will remain subject to 
constraints in terms of the statutory entitlements 
set at national level and we question whether there 
is enough money within the AEB for devolution to 
make a significant difference.
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Access to high quality FE college provision 
is not uniform across England and access to 
specialist higher technical provision is patchy
A core belief as set out in our second principle is 
that everyone should have the opportunity to be 
educated after the age of 18, an ambition that 
amongst other things requires a national network 
of high quality universities and FECs. Such a 
network already exists in HE but although we have 
the potential components of such a comprehensive 
network in FE, it does not presently exist in a fully 
functioning form.
The government’s FE ‘area review’ programme 
from 2015 to 2019 led to rationalisation in the FE 
sector through mergers and closures, and over 
sixty mergers have taken place with more planned 
for 2019.40 However, we believe that there remain 
problems with the way the sector is organised, over 
and above the system-wide challenges created by 
inadequate funding levels.
Creating a well-resourced college network will 
require both investment and rationalisation. We 
believe that there are some areas, particularly 
large urban areas, where the number of FECs is still 
too high. This can result in colleges competing for 
learners in an inefficient and very unproductive 
way. A certain amount of over-capacity encourages 
innovation and competition on quality, and allows 
learners to move away from poor performers: but 
too much over-capacity makes it very hard for 
institutions to build or maintain the critical mass 
required to invest in high-cost subjects, to risk new 
ventures, or to deliver a well-rounded and high 
quality offer. 
Manchester, for instance, saw its provider base 
shrink little after the area reviews: there are still 
nine separate FECs in the Greater Manchester area. 
Similarly, in London, there are 40 independent 
colleges,41 many of them within overlapping travel-
to-learn distances. A recent report from the King’s 
Commission on London described the FEC market 
in the capital as ‘dysfunctional’: explaining how 
too much competition between colleges ultimately 
results in a narrower, not broader, range of courses 
for learners.
 
“A London college has very little idea about 
what new courses its numerous and sometimes 
distant rivals may be about to introduce, or 
where the latter are likely to pull out of an area. 
It is therefore likely to be extremely cautious 
about new ventures, and far more likely than 
most non-London colleges to find that student 
enrolments which would make courses viable in 
a few locations have been spread over so many 
that all or most of them do not run.”42 
A different problem exists in less densely populated 
areas. Access to FECs remains limited in more rural 
areas of England, and the availability of quality 
higher technical provision within reasonable travel 
distances is far from comprehensive: there are 
far too many places where learners have limited 
access to ‘high return’ courses at Levels 3, 4 or 5.
The government has started to address the higher 
technical gap with its IoT programme. This is a 
welcome development but it is clear from the 
limited number of IoTs announced that these will 
not give full geographic or subject coverage at 
Levels 4 and 5 across England. If England is to 
provide high quality technical and professional 
education for all, within a context of continuing 
and inevitable financial constraints, specialist 
provision needs to be examined and managed 
from a national perspective – at Levels 4 and 5 
but also Level 3 – to ensure both that provision 
is fully utilised, and that learners in more 
isolated communities have access to a range of 
opportunities.
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The FE college estate is in poor condition 
with limited capacity in the sector to 
address it and no resource to invest in high-
cost, yet high value provision
Further consolidation and more managed provision 
would help increase opportunities for learners. 
However, without more capital expenditure, it will 
be impossible to secure high quality provision. 
FECs have little capital to maintain their estates, or 
to invest in the new equipment needed to provide 
high quality technical education. The previous 
chapter describes the very large increases in capital 
investment seen in the HE sector over the past five 
years that have enabled universities to teach in fit-
for-purpose buildings and with modern equipment; 
the contrast with FE could scarcely be greater. 
According to the Association of Colleges, annual 
capital spending in the FEC sector has reduced 
from almost £1 billion a year between 2010 and 
2015 to less than half of that – £404 million – in 
2016/17.43 Capital funding for the FE sector from 
government has fallen from a peak in 2009/10 of 
over £940 million per year44 to just £130 million per 
year, delegated to Local Enterprise Partnerships via 
the Local Growth Fund (LGF).45 The LGF is awarded 
according to locally determined priorities via a 
mechanism that is focused on the promotion of 
local growth. This may be appropriate given the 
purpose of the LGF, but national priorities can 
be missed as a result: for example, the NAO has 
reported that issues accessing capital via the LGF 
have disincentivised some providers from taking 
on the financial risk involved in running STEM 
courses.46 The absence of dedicated government 
funding for capital projects by the FE sector 
outside the LGF, or of specific funding for capital 
maintenance, is a serious weakness given the 
sector’s current financial condition. 
Following their drop in revenue described above, 
many FECs are unable to fund maintenance, let 
alone undertake significant new investment, from 
operating surpluses and instead have had to rely 
on private sector borrowing. FECs’ parlous financial 
condition and the unintended consequence of 
a new insolvency regime introduced in January 
201947 that brings colleges within the remit of 
company insolvency law and so cuts their credit 
score, has increased the cost of private sector debt. 
Recruitment of a high quality workforce is 
challenging for many FE colleges
High quality FE, which is close to the labour 
market and employers, needs to offer teaching 
by vocational experts with up to date experience 
and knowledge and it must recruit people who did 
not make teaching a lifetime career. Recruitment 
of high quality teachers and leaders is made 
challenging by direct competition from schools, 
HEIs and business, all of which typically offer more 
attractive rates of pay for comparable roles. Full-
time FE teaching professionals in the UK earn, on 
average, around £2,500 less than secondary school 
teachers and approximately £13,000 less than HE 
lecturers.48 
The 2018 college staff survey conducted by the 
Department for Education (DfE) substantiated 
the scale of the teacher recruitment challenge 
in colleges: over half of principals responding to 
the survey indicated that teacher recruitment is 
“difficult”, with 20 per cent describing it as “very 
difficult”.49 The survey also illustrated that the 
level of challenge varies significantly depending 
on subject/sector; three-quarters of principals 
report that the most difficult subject to recruit 
to is Engineering and Manufacturing, with 
Construction, Maths and Digital/IT also posing 
significant challenges. Nationally, teacher vacancy 
rates in FECs were estimated at 3 per cent with 
higher levels in some subjects (e.g. 5 per cent in 
Engineering and Manufacturing; Construction; and 
Legal, Finance and Accounting).50 This compares to 
an average national vacancy rate of 1.1 per cent for 
the secondary school workforce.51 Staff retention in 
FE is similarly challenging: 42 per cent of FE tutors 
and 33 per cent of FE leaders say they are likely to 
leave the sector in the next 12 months.52 
The government’s decision in 2013 to revoke 
regulations relating to FE teachers’ qualifications53 
was designed to make it easier for FE to recruit 
industry professionals (part time or full time), and 
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there are now no prescribed levels of qualification 
or professional status required to teach in the 
sector - as is also the case in the university 
sector. However, this has had some negative 
consequences: there is a lack of clarity about what 
level and type of training is appropriate for new 
teachers, and significant variation in the quality of 
teacher training. The fragmentation of FE teacher 
training also makes it extremely difficult to 
articulate a clear ‘value proposition’ for those who 
might be attracted to teaching in the sector, and to 
build a strong teacher supply pipeline. 
Complex regulatory regime
FECs are subject to multiple regulatory regimes, as 
a result of the broad curriculum they provide. The 
ESFA regulates provision from Levels 1 to 3 and 
non-prescribed Level 4/5 provision, and the OfS 
regulates prescribed HE provision at Level 4 and 
above. Separate bodies conduct quality assessment 
and inspection, with Ofsted being responsible for 
inspecting all ESFA-funded provision up to Level 
6, and the OfS (via the Quality Assurance Agency) 
responsible for quality assessment of HE-funded 
provision. With regards to the content and design 
of qualifications, assessments and standards, 
organisations with their own degree-awarding powers 
hold this responsibility themselves. Ofqual are 
responsible for most regulated qualifications in FE 
and the Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical 
Education (IfATE) for apprenticeship standards.
A degree of complexity in overseeing post-18 
education is inevitable given the broad range of 
provider and qualification types and the varying 
levels of risk that they pose. However, some 
simplification is possible: we have recommended 
changes with respect to all non-apprenticeship 
provision at Levels 4, 5 and 6 (see recommendation 
2.6 in chapter 2) and to apprenticeship provision 
(see chapter 5). It is also clear that the presence of 
multiple regulators results in duplicate demands 
being placed on providers in areas such as data 
collection and oversight of governance and finance. 
This is a view shared by the Lords Economic Affairs 
Committee, who, in their report on the economics 
of post-school education, observed that:
 
“At least 15 different agencies are involved 
in the delivery, funding and regulation of 
further education, HE and apprenticeships. The 
complexity is compounded by differences in 
policy priorities and regulatory philosophies 
between—and sometimes within—sectors. This 
impedes integration of post-school education 
and innovation by providers.”54
The Association of Colleges highlight the particular 
tensions for FECs in greater detail: 
“The OfS has legal duties and powers with 
respect to all forms of publicly funded HE, but 
this overlaps with the existing regulation and 
inspection of FE. The overlaps and borders of 
the new regime can be duplicative and onerous 
for the many colleges which operate in both 
the FE and HE sectors. This inhibits the growth 
of college HE, with some colleges for instance 
facing prohibitive cost barriers to achieving 
degree awarding powers. Similar issues arise 
from having two separate quality assurance 
regimes for colleges and HE.”55 
Conclusions
FECs are educational institutions, with the status 
of exempt charities. Every college is overseen by 
a governing body, almost always in the form of 
a ‘further education corporation’. The Education 
Act 2011 relaxed the regulatory environment 
affecting college corporations, making it easier 
for them to take their own decisions. This process, 
known as ‘reclassification’ (as it led to the Office 
for National Statistics reclassifying FE and sixth 
form college corporations as autonomous bodies) 
enabled college corporations to borrow money 
without needing permission from the government. 
It removed the Secretary of State for Education’s 
right to modify, revoke or replace the instruments 
and articles of England’s FE corporations (with 
this power given to the corporations themselves). 
The Secretary of State’s right to dissolve an FEC 
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was also removed, as was the power of the Chief 
Executive of Skills Funding to appoint additional 
members of the governing body. 
The governance arrangements set out above 
give FECs in principle, the ability to innovate, to 
respond to changing labour market conditions, and 
to operate as the centre of economic, social and 
educational activity for their localities: all functions 
which we identified in chapter 1 as core purposes 
of post-18 education. However, in practice FECs 
are severely restricted in what they can do. They 
have no protected title. Very few have the power 
to award their own qualifications. Their budgets 
are closely regulated and subject to inflexible and 
administratively costly rules. More than 90 per 
cent of their teaching income is provided by grant 
and contract, a situation which is very different 
from the funding arrangements in HE. Moreover, 
in recent years the funding regime has severely 
restricted their operations and ability to either 
innovate or plan for the long term. We therefore 
believe that there is a powerful case for change. 
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Section 4: Recommendations
We propose a number of reforms intended to 
improve the quality, capability and capacity of the 
FE college network. This final section of the chapter 
details these proposals.
Focusing on the most economically valuable 
provision
The recommendations in chapter 2 to restore 
funding for economically valuable Level 2 and 3 
provision for adults and to promote the supply and 
demand of Level 4 and 5 courses are about offering 
financial and other support for the most valuable 
training. In addition, we recommend an increase in 
the funding rates for the most economically valuable 
courses – based on Industrial Strategy priorities – 
so that their funding rates cover the full economic 
costs of delivery. The Foster review made similar 
recommendations in 2005 and went on to explain 
that an explicit focus on skills is not necessarily in 
tension with delivering other social objectives:
“A focus on vocational skills building is not a 
residual choice, but a vital building block in the 
UK’s platform for future prosperity. It gives FE 
colleges an unequivocal mission and the basis of 
a renewed and powerful brand image.”
 
“It is not suggested that skills development 
is the only thing that FE colleges should 
pursue. The other pillars of social inclusion and 
advancement, and academic progress, are not 
invalid. The important thing is to recognise and 
focus on the core purpose and have declared, 
clear priorities. In any event it is absolutely 
clear that an emphasis on skills development 
will itself turn out to be a huge driver for social 
inclusion and improved personal self esteem, 
achieving a valuable synergy between societal 
and personal need.”56
We believe that this should be achieved by a 
rebalancing of funding from less economically 
valuable parts of the AEB, and possibly other 
funding streams such as the European Social Fund 
or its replacement. This would make adult skills 
provision more sustainable and encourage colleges 
to direct their focus there, rather than on low cost 
and low level training. The government’s planned 
reviews of Level 3 qualifications and Level 2 and 
below qualifications57 should help to define where 
such funding should be prioritised. 
Recommendation 4.1
The unit funding rate for economically valuable 
adult education courses should be increased.
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Increasing the funding rate for 18 year-olds
We can find no evidence to justify the lower base 
rate set for 18 years-olds in colleges compared 
to that for 16-17 year-olds. We are not persuaded 
by the suggestion that 18 year-olds require less 
teaching, indeed many have had difficulties in their 
previous education and may need even more hours 
to successfully complete their course. As discussed 
in chapters 1 and 2, one of the most disturbing 
aspects of England’s current 18+ provision is the 
number of adults who do not progress beyond 
the low levels they achieved by age 18 and we 
believe that addressing this is a matter of some 
importance to the individuals concerned, to social 
progression and to the needs of the economy.
Recommendation 4.2
The reduction in the core funding rate for 18 
year-olds should be reversed.
More flexible funding
The current post-18 funding regime creates major 
inefficiencies through the administrative costs it 
imposes on colleges, and makes it very difficult 
for them to respond to the demands of their local 
labour markets. At present, although an FEC has a 
single total AEB allocation, the complexity of the 
rules around learner entitlements and the limits on 
learners’ eligibility for funding mean that spending 
is highly constrained by the extent to which 
demand in their area fits with those rules. This 
explains why, in a number of well-run and Ofsted-
rated ‘outstanding’ FECs, despite strong local 
demand, the budget is underspent – there might 
be, for example, significant local demand for Level 
3, but not a great deal of demand for provision at 
lower levels. In Scotland, which operates a different, 
more integrated system, such underspends do 
not occur. Current funding arrangements also 
mean that a great deal of the budget is spent on 
administration; determining and documenting 
what each individual learner can or cannot access. 
Some of the constraints on spending can only be 
removed through primary legislation, which has 
mandated (typically) universal free provision in a 
number of ‘basic skills’. But a good many are policy 
priorities rather than embedded in legislation. The 
ESFA has informed us that it could, if instructed, 
reduce the extent to which its procedures focus 
on the ring-fencing of funds, and allow greater 
freedom to FECs. We believe this should be done at 
the earliest opportunity. 
We note that the AEB has been protected in cash 
terms until the end of the current parliament. 
We welcome the certainty this affords the sector 
overall but it does not provide individual colleges 
with any guarantee of stability.
We described above the negative effects of 
annual budgets on FECs’ ability to respond to 
emerging local needs. Because they are under 
pressure to spend all their budget, many colleges 
try to commit it early in the year (and also are 
incentivised to steer learners towards courses 
which they will complete successfully, and fast). 
This means they have no unspent budget with 
which to respond to and work with employers who 
have emerging needs and, in the current climate, 
no reserves to draw on for that purpose either. 
We note with interest a new ‘corridor’ system of 
funding being introduced in Ontario, Canada, that 
will provide their colleges with increased stability 
in their budgets between years. 
We recommend that government should commit 
to providing an indicative AEB that allows 
individual FECs to plan and budget over a three-
year period. We believe more is also needed, and 
that government should explore providing FECs 
with increased flexibility to transfer their budgets 
– provided they are earned through sufficient 
enrolments - between years. 
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Predictable college funding in Ontario, 
Canada
Funding for Ontario’s 24 colleges is moving 
in 2019/20 to a new ‘corridor approach’. This 
shift is at the heart of a set of reforms that aim 
to improve financial sustainability, support 
differentiation, enhance the quality of the 
student experience and improve transparency 
and accountability. It will be part of a funding 
model that, as announced in Ontario Budget 
2019, increasingly focuses on outcomes.
Under the present system, Ontario colleges’ 
‘core operating’ funding fluctuates year to year, 
reflecting changes in lagged student enrolment 
numbers. Under the new approach, these 
colleges will not see any increase or decrease 
in their core operating grant, provided that 
changes in their moving average enrolments 
(measured as ‘weighted funding units’) fall 
within a fixed range (up to 3 per cent above, 
or 7 per cent below) surrounding the college’s 
enrolment ‘midpoint’. Ontario’s Ministry of 
Training, Colleges and Universities implemented 
midpoints as part of the current Strategic 
Mandate Agreements with colleges; beginning 
in 2020/21, new agreements (and the midpoints 
identified in them) will have a duration of 
five years.
In practice, this new approach means that 
colleges will not be penalised for unplanned 
decreases in enrolment – and that the 
Government of Ontario will not be obliged to 
automatically fund enrolment increases. Should 
a decision be made to invest in enrolment in the 
future, the Ministry would work with institutions 
to adjust funding.
Recommendation 4.3
ESFA funding rules should be simplified for FE 
colleges, allowing colleges to respond more 
flexibly and immediately to the particular 
needs of their local labour market.
Recommendation 4.4
Government should commit to providing an 
indicative AEB that enables individual FE 
colleges to plan on the basis of income over 
a three-year period. Government should also 
explore introducing additional flexibility 
to transfer a proportion of AEB allocations 
between years on the same basis. 
Investing in the FE college estate
It is our view that the FE capital budget is too 
small relative to the needs of the sector, the size 
of the overall LGF that it has been absorbed into, 
and the potential that FECs have to enhance local 
growth. Having met with some representatives of 
Local Enterprise Partnership groups, we discovered 
some good examples of co-ordination between 
employers and colleges, but too often funding 
was aspirational and bore little relation to pressing 
short term needs. Much of the skills capital budget 
has gone on new buildings at a time when much 
of the existing estate is in dire need of repair. 
We question whether working through a wholly 
localised mechanism has been strategically 
successful. It is certainly unclear how such a 
mechanism can deliver the ‘managed market’ and 
national network of FECs which we advocate.
Given the substantial capital requirements needed 
to meet the shortfall in FECs’ maintenance budgets 
set out earlier in this chapter, and also provide 
the targeted investment required for technical 
and higher technical provision, we suggest that 
government should initially commit to making 
an investment of at least £1 billion over the next 
Spending Review period. The DfE should improve 
its understanding of the capital needs of the sector, 
and use this to inform allocation of funds primarily 
on a strategic, national basis. Funding should come 
with an expectation that FECs will supplement 
government investment by leveraging in additional 
funds from elsewhere. 
In addition to an investment in the overall FEC 
estate, additional capital is needed to support 
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specialisation of some of our colleges in higher 
technical areas. England needs a national network 
of high quality FECs with the expertise and 
resources to deliver higher technical provision in 
the volumes and quality necessary to address this 
country’s skills gaps at Levels 4 and 5. The network 
must have comprehensive geographical coverage, 
based on reasonable travel-to-learn distances, so 
that all prospective students have access to quality 
higher technical provision wherever they live.
We recommend that the OfS (as the regulator for 
all prescribed HE Level 4 and 5 provision as set 
out in chapter 2) works with government to find 
an appropriate way of deciding how to allocate 
additional capital to grow capacity for higher 
technical provision in specific FECs. We expect 
this would include looking across geographical 
coverage, the presence or absence of local HEIs, 
provider quality and the strength of industry 
relationships. Capital funding should also be 
used to encourage excellent specialist provision 
for high-cost specialised Level 3 provision. This 
extra capital would be part of the £1 billion we are 
recommending government to allocate to FECs over 
the next three years.
Recommendation 4.5
4.5.1 Government should provide FE colleges 
with a dedicated capital investment of at 
least £1 billion over the next Spending Review 
period. This should be in addition to funding for 
T levels and should be allocated primarily on a 
strategic national basis in-line with Industrial 
Strategy priorities. 
4.5.2 Government should use the additional 
capital funding primarily to augment existing 
FE colleges to create a strong national network 
of high quality provision of technical and 
professional education, including growing 
capacity for higher technical provision in 
specific FE colleges. 
4.5.3 Government should also consider 
redirecting the HE capital grant to further 
education.
Consolidation and specialisation
As discussed earlier in this chapter, government 
embarked on a programme of FE area reviews in 
2015 that has recently concluded. The aim of these 
reviews was to support a restructure of England’s 
network of sixth form and FE colleges “to ensure 
we have the right capacity to meet the needs of 
students and employers in each area, provided by 
institutions which are financially stable and able 
to deliver high quality provision.”58 As discussed 
above, there has been considerable change as a 
result of the reviews, but issues remain. There is 
evidence of over-capacity in some areas while in 
others, learners do not have access to good quality 
specialised provision. 
We recognise that different models can work 
for different local contexts and do not want 
to be prescriptive on the form that further 
consolidation and collaboration should take. 
We do, however, believe that the government 
should actively promote partnerships, group 
structures, and specialisation, in order to deliver a 
national network of colleges that puts all learners 
within reach of high quality provision. The most 
effective mechanism for achieving this ‘managed 
market’ will be the capital budget. In the box 
below we explain two very different models of 
partnership, both of which work well for their local 
circumstances. 
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Warwickshire College Group (WCG)
WCG is a group of seven colleges across Warwickshire and Worcestershire. With around 16,000 
students and an annual turnover of £56 million, it is one of the largest college groups in the UK, and 
provides academic, vocational and technical education in a broad range of subjects to students aged 
16 and over. The group has foundation degree awarding powers, and partners with several universities 
across the Midlands to award degrees at Level 6. 
WCG originated in 1996 with the merger of Mid-Warwickshire College in Royal Leamington Spa and 
Moreton Morrell College, the first equine college in Britain. Further expansion took place in 2003 
through a merger with Rugby College and the acquisition of an independent school’s site in Henley-
in-Arden; in 2004 with the opening of a specialist engineering college in Warwick; in 2007 through a 
merger with Pershore College; and, most recently, South Worcestershire College joined the group in 
2016. Member colleges have retained their individual identities, and some have retained long-standing 
specialisms including land-based subjects and arts and crafts, while others have been positioned to 
specialise in areas such as power industry engineering, computer games and sports-related studies. 
The group provides a positive example of how smaller colleges can come together to make a 
successful, sustainable entity that not only brings financial benefits (by cutting central overheads, 
creating economies of scale etc.), but also benefits learners across the region. Central coordination 
and planning of the colleges’ offer mean learners have a wide range of high quality provision to 
choose from in reasonable travel-to-learn distances, which the group can invest in developing further 
without the risk of counterproductive competition between independent colleges.
Lambeth College and London South Bank University
Lambeth College has around 7,200 full- and part-time students, across campuses in Clapham, Brixton 
and (by 2020/21) Vauxhall, with a focus on technical and vocational education to meet the needs 
of local employers and the community. Around 70% of its students are resident in Lambeth and 
surrounding London boroughs, with 1,200 students aged 16-18 and around 6,000 adults. During the 
central London area review process, and in light of financial difficulties and an FE Commissioner-led 
structural appraisal, the college developed plans to merge with London South Bank University (LSBU) 
in 2016. After consulting with its students, staff, wider stakeholders and the general public in 2018, 
Lambeth joined LSBU in February 2019. Its property, rights and liabilities transferred to a wholly 
owned subsidiary of LSBU, where it joined an 11-19 engineering academy and a university technical 
college in the LSBU ‘family’ of educational providers. The family utilises a group structure, within 
which each institution remains a distinct body focused on providing high quality education in its field, 
whilst sharing common governance arrangements as well as administrative and back-office functions.
Leaders in both Lambeth College and LSBU recognised that other forms of FE-HE partnership can 
work well, but agreed that merging would enable deeper, long-term structural integration. The legal 
process took longer than anticipated – around 18 months – but now means the college and university 
can develop fully integrated learning pathways, and make robust commitments to their students 
on transfer and recognition of qualifications. Both institutions expect benefits including reduced 
costs through sharing back-office functions and professional services, and improving the experience 
for students and staff by sharing facilities, training opportunities and co-developing outreach 
programmes. For Lambeth College the merger provides financial stability; for LSBU it provides the 
opportunity to extend its reach into the community; and for learners the merger provides clear 
pathways through the education system and into high quality careers.
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We have noted the evidence of over-capacity in 
some places and believe that further rationalisation 
is required. We note too that some small and fairly 
isolated FECs, while important for their local areas, 
are too small to employ adequate high quality 
staff full time in specialised areas, and are very 
vulnerable to shifts in demand. We believe that their 
integration into groups, which can share staff and 
expertise, and cushion against sudden enrolment 
shifts, would be highly desirable. Geographical 
contiguity is important in this context. 
We recognise the political pressures and arguments 
that stand in the way of consolidation. However, not 
only is further change desirable, it is also the case 
that there simply is not enough money to upgrade 
every FEC in every field. Government needs to be 
much more robust in using the levers it has, especially 
in the allocation of capital, and prioritise quality 
improvement and the development of well resourced 
specialisms to make them accessible to all learners. 
Recommendation 4.6
4.6.1 The structure of the FE college network, 
particularly in large cities, should be further 
modified to minimise duplication in reasonable 
travel to learn areas. 
4.6.2 In rural and semi-rural areas, small FE 
colleges should be strongly encouraged to form 
or join groups in order to ensure sustainable 
quality provision in the long term.
Recommendation 4.7
Government should develop procedures 
to ensure that – as part of a collaborative 
national network of FE colleges – there is 
an efficient distribution of Level 3, 4 and 5 
provision within reasonable travel-to-learn 
areas, to enable strategic investment and 
avoid counterproductive competition between 
providers. 
Workforce
The vision we have for FE requires a greatly 
enlarged and professionalised FE workforce 
with clear progression routes and development 
opportunities. We encourage the Association 
of Colleges and employee groups to work with 
government and colleges to develop this, building 
on the DfE’s recent programmes in this area. 
These are intended to attract more industry 
professionals into teaching in FE, to provide tailored 
professional development targeted at teachers who 
will be teaching T levels and to fund a series of 
development programmes for FE sector leaders.
However, the most important barrier to workforce 
improvement is simply a lack of money. FECs 
currently cannot afford to match salaries in schools 
or HEIs. Our recommendations would, if accepted, 
improve colleges’ financial position and, therefore, 
their ability to attract and retain good staff. We 
also reiterate the point that it is easier to attract 
and retain good staff to larger institutions or 
groups, where they can find professional colleagues 
and, generally, better facilities: and that larger 
workforces provide a cushion against the problems 
caused by normal staff turnover. 
Recommendation 4.8
Investment in the FE workforce should be a 
priority, allowing improvements in recruitment 
and retention, drawing in more expertise 
from industry, and strengthening professional 
development. 
Chapter four: Further education 
137
Data collection
We have been struck by the paucity of data 
available to the college sector compared to both 
higher education and schools. The government 
has made some recent improvements (notably 
through the funding of the Centre for Vocational 
Education Research, on whose work we have 
drawn heavily). But ‘Individualised Learner Record’ 
data, which are the main source of quantitative 
information on the sector, focus almost exclusively 
on individual qualifications, and are under-utilised 
by government. There is limited information on 
workforce and facilities. The data for ITPs is even 
more sketchy.
FE sector leaders therefore lack the opportunities 
to use data for benchmarking. Basic descriptive 
data on trends in enrolment are not in the public 
domain: we have been unable, for example, to 
obtain good detailed time series data on the 
nature of higher level enrolments in FECs (e.g. 
what proportion are franchised) or on the student 
population (e.g. what proportion are unemployed). 
Better information is a basic precondition 
for sector-wide improvement in workforce 
management and college leadership. 
Recommendation 4.9
The panel recommends that government 
improve data collection, collation, analysis and 
publication across the whole further education 
sector (including independent training 
providers).
Fit for purpose regulation
Under the current system, the main support 
to FECs requiring improvement is from the FE 
Commissioner. This role was established in 2013 
as an independent advisor to ministers, and 
the Commissioner’s role includes intervening in 
cases of financial and quality failure, particularly 
to strengthen leadership and governance, 
and engaging with colleges earlier to support 
improvement and reduce the number that require 
formal intervention. This is an ad hoc arrangement 
but given the importance of the FE system there 
should be a permanent core of regulatory expertise 
within the DfE, and the ESFA also has an important 
role to play in working towards a risk based 
regulatory regime.
As discussed in chapter 2, we recommend that the 
OfS becomes the national regulator for all non-
apprenticeship provision at Levels 4 and above, 
and chapter 5 makes further recommendations to 
simplify apprenticeship regulation. We believe that 
these changes would reduce regulatory complexity 
and in the light of repeated evidence from FECs and 
the Association of Colleges that current regulatory 
requirements for higher level qualifications are 
ill-designed for colleges, recommend that this is 
progressed rapidly. 
Recommendation 4.10
The OfS and the ESFA should establish a joint 
working party, co-chaired by the OfS and ESFA 
chairs, to align the requirements they place 
on providers and improve the interactions 
and exchange of information between these 
bodies. The working party should report to the 
Secretary of State for Education by March 2020.
Chapter four: Further education 
138
Protected title for colleges
Our vision of a national network of collaborative 
FECs that provide high quality technical and 
professional education, maintain strong 
relationships with employers and act as engines 
of social mobility and inclusion is central to our 
overall vision for post-18 education in England. 
Although FECs are established and well-known 
institutions in their towns and cities, both the 
public at large and prospective learners have 
been left confused by a succession of sometimes 
contradictory reforms and initiatives over recent 
decades. They have resulted in institutions with 
an extremely broad focus, with no single defining 
purpose and with no consistent identity nationally, 
and we seek a means of restoring that. 
University is a protected title in the UK, which 
helps provide clarity to any prospective student or 
employer about their chosen institution’s mission 
and status. As we have seen, FECs also have a 
unique role in the English education system. 
They are the only institutions to offer the range 
of vocationally oriented and basic skills provision 
outlined elsewhere in this chapter. Looking forward, 
we believe not only that FECs should have a 
strengthened role but that they must be able to 
articulate this role clearly, and be easily identifiable 
as core institutions in a national system. 
Conferring a protected title on FECs, as universities 
are entitled to, would instil confidence in potential 
learners that their chosen college and the courses 
it offers are part of a respected national adult 
education network.
Increased clarity on the role and status of FECs 
would also send a clear signal to employers that 
these are high quality, reliable providers they 
can engage with over the long term to meet their 
skills needs. 
Recommendation 4.11
FE colleges should be more clearly 
distinguished from other types of training 
provider in the FE sector with a protected title 
similar to that conferred on universities.
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Context
Apprentices are part of the employed labour force, 
although they and their employers are bound by 
very specific rights and duties, which are set out 
in legislation and/or formal sectoral agreements. 
These cover, among other things, wages (which will 
typically be lower for apprentices) and rights to 
formal training.
Formal apprenticeships have characterised 
England’s labour market, and its education and 
training system, for many hundreds of years, 
as they have those of other European countries. 
Today, they are both important and central to the 
government’s education and skills policies. They 
are also associated with positive employment 
and income returns, as discussed further below. A 
wholesale reform of apprenticeships is in process, 
following several decades in which governments 
first neglected them, and then implemented 
successive changes which created a surge in 
numbers but were at odds with the traditional 
employer-centred model. 
Because the current reforms remain very much in 
progress, and the government has been gathering 
views on the future of the programme, we do not 
think it appropriate to undertake a wholesale 
evaluation of current apprenticeship arrangements. 
However, a number of issues have emerged which 
deserve immediate attention, and which have a 
direct bearing on whether the current reforms 
succeed. This chapter therefore makes a number 
of concrete recommendations. First, however, it 
provides a summary of developments prior to the 
current reforms, and of the reforms themselves. 
These are not generally well known, but are 
important in understanding the current situation, 
and the panel’s recommendations.
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How it was
Until the late 1970s, apprenticeships were very 
common in England. In 1961, for example, 34 
per cent of boys left school at age 15 and went 
straight into apprenticeships (though only 7 per 
cent of girls).1 However, the 1970s were a period 
of recession, spiralling inflation, and rising 
unemployment. Employers pulled back, and 
apprenticeship numbers plummeted. 
In 1981, the number of registered unemployed 
in the UK topped 3 million and in 1983, 
unemployment among males aged 15-24 was 
over 20 per cent. The government moved to 
create emergency employment and training 
programmes, especially for the young: these 
focused on establishing new centrally directed 
programmes, fully funded by the public purse, 
and which were intended to create a high-status, 
practical workplace-based route for school-
leavers. There was no enthusiasm at this period 
for reviving apprenticeship numbers but there 
were huge ambitions for a national ‘Youth Training 
Scheme’, organised around new National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQs), of which nearly 800 had 
been created by 1995.2 Large amounts of money 
were paid to ‘training providers’ who ran training 
schemes and were reimbursed on the basis of each 
NVQ completed by a trainee.
However, by the mid-1990s, with the economy 
reviving, it was obvious that this set of reforms 
had failed. The payment scheme had incentivised 
trainers to focus on short, easy-to-deliver 
qualifications. NVQs had low status, very poor 
economic returns, and were subject to growing 
criticism.3 Apprenticeships, meanwhile, continued 
to exist, though at reduced volumes, in key 
industries such as engineering where intensive 
skill training of young employees was a business 
necessity, and also retained high respect among 
the general public. Government policy-makers 
decided that there should be a move back to 
apprenticeships, but this time as a government 
programme, centrally administered and funded. 
Moreover, government retained the key delivery 
mechanism established for the previous schemes: 
training providers were awarded contracts and 
paid on the basis of numbers delivered. This is 
still the basic approach today for much of the 
apprenticeship programme.
Apprenticeships of this type were launched in 1995 
as ‘Modern Apprenticeships’ and the programme 
grew under the Labour governments of the 1997-
2010 period. Formal ‘apprenticeship frameworks’ 
were developed, in conjunction with a network 
of government-supported quangos and advisory 
bodies. Each apprenticeship was assigned a level 
in the qualifications framework (see chapter 1), 
its own specific funding rate, and a combination 
of detailed activities and qualifications required 
for completion.4 In 2009, the Apprenticeships, 
Skills, Children and Learning Act codified many 
of these developments and confirmed that the 
regulation and oversight of apprenticeships in 
England were now the statutory duty of the 
central government. Many of the apprenticeship 
frameworks covered traditional occupations, but 
others included occupations which had never 
developed an apprenticeship route, or seen any 
need to: for example, Level 2 apprenticeships for 
retail assistants, or Level 2 in customer relations. 
Traditional apprenticeships were several years 
in length: some of these new ones were as short 
as 6 months.
The Labour governments of 1997-2010 were 
enthusiastic adopters of delivery targets in the 
public services. In post-18 education, the Leitch 
Review of 2006, commissioned by the Treasury, 
adopted ambitious quantitative targets for 
qualifications at all levels.5 These targets were 
expressed simply in numerical or percentage terms 
per level, with little account taken of vocational 
pathway or evidence of skills shortages. Raising 
apprenticeship numbers made an important 
contribution to meeting these targets, and 
government contracts were accordingly driven 
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in substantial part by the desire to ‘achieve’ as 
many starts, and thereby completers, as possible. 
The importance of quantitative targets in driving 
apprenticeship policy remains a distinctive feature 
of the current English system.6
During the 1990s and 2000s independent 
training providers (ITPs) also became a major 
part of the ‘provider’ landscape. Traditionally, 
apprentices trained in their local technical (further 
education) colleges, but new entrants were actively 
encouraged by the government funding agencies, 
and contracts frequently given to new providers 
(many of which were for-profit). As noted in chapter 
1, the large size of this sector is a distinctive 
feature of English post-18 education and training, 
and this is especially true of apprenticeships. A 
decade ago, ITPs accounted for over 70 per cent 
of all apprenticeship starts for over 19s7 and in the 
2017/18 academic year, they still made up 65 per 
cent of apprenticeship starts.8
The Coalition government of 2010-2015 initially 
made few changes to apprenticeships policy. The 
most important change was in scale rather than 
fundamental principle: namely a large increase in 
the number of ‘adult’ apprenticeships. The increase 
was largely because the government replaced Train 
to Gain, an adult workplace skills development 
programme, with apprenticeships. English 
apprenticeships (like English qualifications) are not 
formally age-specific, but in the past, they were 
overwhelmingly a route for young school-leavers to 
acquire skills – as is still the case in other European 
countries. From 2010 onwards, in order to drive up 
numbers successfully, the government explicitly 
encouraged the growth of adult apprenticeships 
for older workers. Moreover, it accepted that 
these apprentices could be existing employees, 
receiving training and accreditation for jobs they 
already held. This, too, was a highly distinctive 
development.
The other important change made in the early 
years of the Coalition was to place a minimum 
level on the size of contracts. This meant that 
many small providers could no longer contract 
directly to provide apprenticeships (or other 
public funded training provision) and encouraged 
a rapid growth in sub-contracting. Complicated 
sub-contracting relationships make it hard to 
track and monitor the quality of provision, and 
also impose costs, since money is spent on 
additional layers of administration: sub-contractors 
frequently are charged overheads of 20 per cent 
or more. Subcontracting remains a major feature 
of apprenticeship provision in England and has 
been criticised recently by the House of Commons 
Education Committee.9
However, although the early years of the Coalition 
were marked by continuity, there was growing 
criticism regarding the quality of apprenticeships 
and the perverse incentives built into the 
funding system. In 2012, therefore, government 
commissioned an independent review of 
apprenticeships: the subsequent Richard Review 
provided the basis for current reforms.10
Critique and subsequent reform
The main criticisms of the system which is now 
being phased out were as follows:
• It was not driven by or, often, even responsive to 
the needs of employers and the labour market. 
Training providers were contracted and paid to 
‘provide’ apprentice numbers. They then found 
employers who were willing to sign people up 
as apprentices, often on the understanding that 
they would incur no expense and administration 
would be undertaken by the provider. These 
might be new employees but might also be 
existing staff. In some cases, where employers 
were in serious need of apprentices, significant 
skill development took place in the traditional 
way, but in many cases, employers were barely 
involved. The Richard Review emphasised that 
“the relationship between an employer and an 
apprentice must once again rise to the fore.” 11
• Apprenticeships were heavily weighted towards 
Level 2, a lower level than is standard for 
apprenticeships in other countries.12 Returns are 
generally higher for Level 3 than for Level 2, and 
skill shortages are much more evident at higher 
levels (discussed further later).
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• Apprenticeships were also heavily weighted 
towards non-technical subjects (see Figures 5.1 
and 5.2 below). This was in large part because 
of the incentives which both providers and 
government agencies faced. Non-technical 
subjects (such as Retail and Business 
Administration) required little specialist 
provision or investment, and could be delivered 
fast and profitably. This was particularly 
attractive to new entrants dependent on short-
term contracts (and as noted above, the bulk of 
apprenticeship provision involved ITPs – new 
entrants). Shorter and cheaper apprenticeships 
also contributed faster to meeting the targets to 
which government procurement was oriented. 
The Richard Review therefore recommended 
that apprenticeships should be for “a job or 
role that requires sustained and substantial 
training”.13 
• In many cases, little training or acquisition of 
new skills occurred. Researchers reported this 
to be particularly common in the case of adult 
apprentices who were already employed before 
becoming apprentices, and where what was 
happening was generally just a certification of 
existing skills.14 In some cases there was overt 
fraud, but the more common problem was 
that private providers made large profits by 
offering little or no training.15 In 2015, a major 
and critical review of training quality by Ofsted 
found that: 
“Some learners on low-level, low-quality 
programmes were unaware that they were even 
on an apprenticeship.” 16
The Department for Education (DfE) evaluations 
also highlighted that ‘apprentices’ were quite 
frequently unaware of their status, reporting in 
2017 (when reforms were just starting) that: 
“Awareness that individuals were undertaking 
an apprenticeship has continued to increase, 
with seven in ten (70 per cent) aware they were 
on an apprenticeship, up from 67 per cent in 
2015, 65 per cent in 2014 and 63 per cent in 
2013”. 17
The Richard Review recommended that:
“An apprentice must be new to a job or job role” 
and that “upskilling of the adult workforce 
should not be bundled with apprenticeships”. 
Though important, such training is a separate 
activity. 18
• Employers reported that the frameworks, 
and the system generally, were controlled by 
governmental organisations and awarding 
bodies rather than employers, to the detriment 
of apprenticeships; and that outcomes were 
often not satisfactory, in considerable part 
because attention was given to processes 
required to draw down funding rather than to 
the requirements of the job.19 
The government accepted the Richard Review’s 
major recommendations and a programme of 
reform was launched. Frameworks are now being 
phased out, replaced by apprenticeship standards 
that have been developed and written by employer 
(‘Trailblazer’) groups. External qualifications 
may be but need not be included, but there 
must be an independent end point assessment. 
Apprenticeships should last a minimum of 12 
months, and at least 20 per cent of an apprentice’s 
time must be spent on off-the-job training. The 
establishing of an Institute for Apprenticeships 
(IfA) was included in 2009 legislation: the 
Enterprise Act of 2016 amended this and gave 
the IfA power to oversee standards development, 
approve standards, advise on funding levels, and 
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quality-assure assessments.20 It has since become 
the Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical 
Education (IfATE). The system is still evolving. 
Between August and October 2018, 42 per cent of 
apprenticeship starts were on old-style frameworks, 
rather than new standards, and the former will 
continue to be funded until 2020.21 Many standards 
are still under development, and funding rates are 
under ongoing review.
In addition, a number of additional policy changes 
have been introduced in recent years, which 
were not within the Richard Review’s remit or 
recommendations, but nonetheless affect the 
way in which the reform programme has been 
developing. 
First, a new target for apprenticeship starts 
was introduced. The 2015 Conservative 
manifesto committed to creating 3 million new 
apprenticeships by 2020 and this was subsequently 
written into legislation.22 Apprenticeship policy in 
England therefore remains subject to pressures to 
meet a numerical target. 
Second, in 2015, government embraced new 
‘degree apprenticeships’ as a flagship policy 
and provided seed funding for universities to 
develop provision. These apprenticeships must be 
aligned with new standards (not old frameworks). 
Degree apprenticeships are a new concept for 
England and not found in other large European 
apprenticeship systems. 
Third, and most importantly, an Apprenticeship 
Levy was announced in November 2015 and 
introduced in April 2017. It takes the form of 0.5 per 
cent levy on employers’ annual pay bill over £3m. 
Employers with a pay bill lower than £3m do not 
need to pay the levy. 
Levies are quite common in other countries 
as are apprenticeship taxes, while some ‘high 
apprenticeship’ countries have a fund into which 
employers all pay.23 Normally, the money is 
hypothecated – i.e. ring-fenced, and useable only 
for training: in some cases (for example Austria) 
it is controlled by an organisation of employers. 
Normally, the charges apply to all or all but the 
very smallest employers. The UK-wide levy is 
unusual in having a high and absolute cut-off 
point. The money is not formally hypothecated, 
going instead direct to the Treasury.
Levy-paying employers can offset the full amount 
of their training costs against the levy within two 
years of the levy being raised; after that, their 
unspent levy is lost.24 They do so by paying the 
levy but then creating a digital account into which 
levy funds can be paid and from which they can in 
turn pay training providers. The latter can be drawn 
from among any providers who have been listed on 
the Register of Apprenticeship Training Providers 
(RoATP), an approved list maintained by the DfE, 
and the choice is the employers’. Levy-payers may 
also choose to transfer up to 25 per cent of their 
levy amount for other employers in their supply 
chain to use on apprenticeship training.
The vast majority of employers with a wage bill 
below this level pay no levy. They obtain apprentice 
training from providers who have been awarded a 
contract to provide it, and who make contact with 
them, or vice versa. They will be providers who are 
(a) on the Register but also (b) have bid for and won 
a contract from government – as under the old 
system. 95 per cent of the apprenticeship training 
costs for non-levy employers are met by the 
government who pay the costs direct to providers. 
Employers make a 5 per cent contribution, reduced 
from 10 per cent in April 2019.25 Although the levy 
is not formally hypothecated, current spending 
plans assume that the costs of all apprenticeship 
training will be covered by it: in other words, they 
assume that a large part of the levy will not be 
spent by levy-payers.
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This system is unique to England, and, very 
unusually, creates two completely different 
processes for levy and non-levy payers. 
ITPs continue to dominate delivery. There are 
currently 1,097 ITPs on the register of approved 
apprenticeship providers.26 ITPs range in size 
from regional, such as TDR Training who delivered 
270 specialist science training apprenticeship 
starts in the North East in 2017/18, and national, 
such as Kaplan, who provided 5,050 accountancy 
apprenticeship starts across the country 
in 2017/18.27
Much attention has been focused on an initial 
decline in the number of apprenticeship starts 
in the period since the levy was introduced. This 
decline has partly resulted from a greater emphasis 
on quality. The new requirement for off-the-job 
training made many former apprenticeships 
ineligible to continue without substantial reform. 
We understand that demand is increasing and 
that the full levy amount is likely, in the near 
future, to be spent (partly by levy-payers and 
partly by others). As noted above, it is too early to 
evaluate the reforms overall. However, it is possible 
and important to see whether apprenticeships 
are developing in ways which address the 
major problems with the old system and, most 
importantly, make the system better suited to 
meeting skill needs.
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How it is now: strengths, weaknesses 
and recommendations
We have noted that strengthening and expanding 
apprenticeships are at the centre of this 
government’s post-18 education and training 
policy. The literature on apprenticeships – both 
national and international – confirms that ‘good’ 
apprenticeships, which combine acquisition of 
substantive new skills with the work experience 
gained as an employee, are good both for the 
apprentice and for enterprise productivity.28
In the case of England, and taking wage 
returns as a proxy for the economic value of a 
qualification, most Level 2 and 3 apprenticeships 
perform well. Averaged across 3-5 years after the 
apprenticeship, recent results indicate earnings 
differentials to be on average 16 per cent and 11 
per cent at Level 3 and Level 2 respectively for 
apprentices who complete compared to starters 
who fail to complete.29 However, these returns vary 
significantly by sector.30 
Results are also available comparing young 
people who completed an apprenticeship with 
contemporaries who completed a comparable 
level of vocational qualification, but in college 
not through an apprenticeship. In general, there 
is a positive earnings differential that persists up 
to at least age 28, and apprenticeships are also 
associated with better employment prospects. 
Again, though, the returns vary greatly by sector 
and gender – for example, 38 per cent at Level 3 
for men doing engineering apprenticeships rather 
than a college course, compared to a 5 per cent 
differential for women in child development and 
wellbeing.31 Returns are also lower for older (‘adult’) 
apprentices.32 Older apprentices are much more 
likely to be in the large, lower-returns sectors 
(Business Administration, Health and Social care) 
but their earnings premia are also lower within 
the sectors. 
Subjects studied 
155,500 (41 per cent) of the apprenticeships started 
in 2017/18 were by people aged 25 or over. A further 
113,700 (30 per cent) were started by those aged 
between 19 and 24, meaning that over 70 per cent 
of apprenticeships were started by people aged 
19 or over. The remaining 106,600 (28 per cent) 
apprenticeships were started by those aged under 
19.33 Younger apprentices were far more likely to be 
new recruits, with 90 per cent of those aged under 
19 recruited specifically to an apprenticeship. The 
comparable figures for older people are 70 per 
cent of those aged 19-24 and only 20 per cent of 
those aged 25 and over.34 CVER research has also 
found that the earnings returns to apprenticeships 
for those aged 19-24 is around twice that of those 
aged 25+.35 We understand that older workers are 
more likely to be ‘rebadged’ as apprentices and we 
question whether this always represents good value 
in the programme.
In light of these figures, and what is known 
about skill shortages and needs, the distribution 
of apprenticeships across sectors is a cause for 
concern. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the vast 
majority of apprenticeships are in Business, 
Administration and Law and Health, Public 
Services and Care. There has been a welcome 
shift in the balance between Level 2 and Level 3 
apprenticeships: there were slightly more Level 
3 starts than Level 2 starts in 2017/18, whereas 
(see Figure 5.2) Level 2 apprenticeships have 
dominated apprenticeship starts in recent years.36 
However, there remain very few apprenticeships at 
Levels 4 and above, and apprenticeships remain 
heavily concentrated in a few sectors with low 
average returns. 
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Figure 5.1: Apprenticeship starts by Level and sector subject area 2017/1837
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of apprenticeship starts by level (time series)38
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Levels 2 and 3 account for 87 per cent of all 
apprenticeship starts; apprenticeships at Levels 
4 and 5 – the higher technical level crucial to the 
economy’s current skills needs – account for only 
10 per cent of the total.39 Level 4/5 apprenticeship 
starts in the key engineering, manufacturing and 
construction sectors totalled just over 2,400 in 
2017/18.40 Meanwhile, Business, Administration and 
Law, and Retail and Commercial Enterprise make 
up 44 per cent of 2017/18 starts at Level 2 and 39 
per cent of starts at Level 3.41 Only 28 per cent of all 
starts at Levels 2 and 3 are in ICT, Construction and 
Engineering (including Transport) – i.e. the subjects 
with the highest returns.42 Moreover, as Figure 
Chapter five: Apprenticeships 
151
5.3 demonstrates, while there has been some 
significant shift in distribution across sectors, not 
only does Business remain the dominant sector, 
but in Construction, where there are major and 
well-documented skill shortages, growth is best 
characterised as very low. We await the full effects 
of the new approach but the most numerous starts 
in 2017/18 under new standards, as opposed to old 
frameworks, were first, ‘Team Leader/Supervisor’ 
with 17,300 starts (up from 1,800 the previous 
year), Adult Care Worker, Lead Adult Care Worker, 
and Customer Service Practitioner.43 
Figure 5.3: Percentage of apprenticeship starts in selected sectors44
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The low number of apprenticeships in the priority 
areas in the Industrial Strategy, and the small 
numbers at Levels 4 and above, indicates a clear 
mismatch between the economy’s strategic 
demands and current apprenticeship starts 
and employer activity. We question whether 
this is consistent with the original spirit of the 
apprenticeship reforms, including whether it 
reflects the intention to reflect employer demand 
directly, rather than being driven by government 
contracts with providers. In the levy-based part 
of the system, employers are indeed determining 
expenditures: but as noted above, in the non-levy 
part of the system, which covers the vast majority 
of employers, the system remains similar in 
structure to the pre-reform approach which was 
producing unacceptable results. As discussed 
further below, we also heard other evidence 
indicating that there remain major problems 
with the implementation of the reforms. Given 
the central importance of apprenticeships to the 
Industrial Strategy and to economic productivity 
as highlighted below, we recommend that the 
government take a more proactive role, especially 
with non-levy funding. 
“We expect the Institute for Apprenticeships 
to prioritise the development of standards 
in sectors which are priorities for the 
Industrial Strategy.” 
Industrial Strategy, 2017 45
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Recommendation 5.1
The government should monitor closely the 
extent to which apprenticeship take up reflects 
the priorities of the Industrial Strategy, both 
in content – including the need for specific 
skills at Levels 3 through 5 – and in geographic 
spread. If funding is inadequate for demand, 
apprenticeships should be prioritised in line 
with Industrial Strategy requirements. 
Recommendation 5.2
The government should use data on 
apprenticeships wage returns to provide 
accessible system wide information for learners 
with a potential interest in apprenticeships.
Level 6 and above, and degree 
apprenticeships
Apprenticeship starts at Level 4 and above include 
Levels 4, 5, 6 and 7 (Masters level) as shown Figure 
5.1 above. They are also very small in number other 
than in Business, Administration and Law, and (to a 
lesser degree) Health and Social Care.
This uneven pattern is reflected in the sub-group 
of apprenticeships at Levels 6 and 7, including 
those which actually include a degree. These 
degree-level and above apprenticeships have only 
recently been introduced and, as noted above, are 
a distinctive feature of the English system. With 
no cohorts yet complete, there is no evidence 
about the value derived. There were 10,800 Level 
6 and above learners on higher apprenticeship 
standards in 2017/18: however, these figures are for 
Level 6 and above starts broadly and not degree 
apprenticeships specifically. This approximates to 
3 per cent of all apprenticeship starts but numbers 
have been growing fast.46 Starts at Levels 6 (both 
standards and frameworks) and above grew from 
1,700 in 2016/17 to 10,900 in 2017/18.47
At Level 6, in 2017/18, the most popular subjects are 
Chartered Manager (36 per cent of starts), Digital 
& Technology Solutions Professional (21 per cent) 
and Chartered Surveyor (13 per cent). At Level 7, in 
2017/18, starts are dominated by the Accountancy 
and Tax Professional standards (over 80 per cent 
of 4,500 starts).48 In a recent report on degree 
apprenticeships, the Higher Education Commission 
found that many degree apprenticeship standards 
were not, in practice, available to non-levy 
employers, because there were few or no providers 
with contracts who could offer them: for example, 
63 per cent of degree apprenticeship standards 
have no or just one provider that can deliver to 
non-levy payers. Moreover, 50 per cent of degree 
apprenticeship standards have no or just one 
provider that can deliver to levy payers. Chartered 
Management standards dominate: 69 providers 
currently offer them, compared to just 17 for the 
next most common (Chartered Surveyor).49
Other information reinforces our concerns about 
how degree apprenticeships are developing. We 
have heard reports of employers rebadging existing 
training activity – including graduate schemes – 
to claim apprenticeship funds, and putting senior 
managers through Level 7 courses paid for by the 
levy. We question whether this represents good 
value to the public purse. Early figures show that 
degree and higher level apprentices are more 
likely to come from areas with higher participation 
in education, and companies in education and 
employment ‘cold spots’ are usually far further, 
geographically, from degree apprenticeship 
providers than are companies in more advantaged 
areas.50 We also acknowledge the comment of skills 
minister Anne Milton: “the fear of a middle-class 
grab on these apprenticeships is valid.”51
Large employers, especially in engineering, 
have for many years supported some of their 
apprentices through degrees, and will naturally 
expect to continue this using levy funding. 
However, at national level, with finite resources, 
and 95 per cent reimbursement of non-levy-
payers’ costs, the picture becomes more complex. 
A degree student going down one route gets paid 
to do so and emerges debt free; another degree 
student incurs a large debt on graduation and 
an income contingent repayment commitment. 
There are particular problems when existing staff 
are involved (which, as noted above, was also a 
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major concern of the Richard Review). Currently, 
funding rules state that funds can only be used 
to train apprentices in new ‘knowledge, skills and 
behaviours’; and providers and employers are 
also meant to take account of prior learning and 
adapt content and price accordingly.52 However, 
there are concerns that this is not happening: for 
example, the 2018 annual report of the Ofsted 
Chief Inspector highlighted that accreditation of 
existing skills remained a problem in spite of the 
reform programme.53 We understand that the DfE 
is continuing to look into this ‘prior learning issue’, 
but we also note how difficult and expensive it 
is to monitor this at an individual employer and 
provider level.
Degree-level apprenticeships have the potential 
to be an expensive draw on the levy fund – 89 per 
cent of standards at this level are in the £15,000 
funding band or higher, compared to 33 per cent 
at Level 4 and 5 and 23 per cent of Level 2 and 
3 standards.54 The NAO in a recent report on 
apprenticeships warned of ‘a clear risk that the 
budget may be insufficient should demand pick up’ 
and we are concerned that the rapid growth in the 
apprenticeships programme at the most expensive 
levels increases this risk.55 Furthermore, paying 
for expensive courses for well-qualified, socially-
mobile learners is unlikely to be the most valuable 
use of limited funds. 
The NAO report notes:
“However, these new types of apprenticeship 
raise questions about whether public money 
is being used to pay for training that already 
existed in other forms. Some levy-paying 
employers are replacing their professional 
development programmes – for example, 
graduate training schemes in accountancy 
or advanced courses in management – with 
apprenticeships. In such cases, there is a risk 
that the additional value of the apprenticeship 
to the economy may not be proportionate to 
the amount of government funding.” 56 
We therefore believe that the regulation of degree 
apprenticeships should go beyond the current 
broad requirements relating to ‘new’ learning. 
In accordance with our principles on the cost 
of education being shared between taxpayers, 
employers and learners, and in order to ensure that 
scarce funding provides national value-for-money, 
we recommend restricting funding for Level 6 
and above apprenticeships to those who have 
not previously undertaken a publicly-supported 
degree. Exemptions may be required under certain 
circumstances particularly in the public sector. 
Recommendation 5.3
Funding for Level 6 and above apprenticeships 
should normally be available only for 
apprentices who have not previously 
undertaken a publicly-supported degree.
Regulation
The large number of training providers and the 
wide range of levels of apprenticeship provision 
make supervision a complex but essential task. At 
present, there are seven responsible bodies working 
together under the Quality Alliance umbrella. 
The Quality Alliance
• The DfE, through the Education and Skills Funding 
Agency (ESFA), has overall responsibility for the 
programme, policy and strategy.
• The IfATE has overall responsibility for quality 
assurance of all end point assessment. It is also 
accountable for designing and running approvals 
and review processes for standards and 
assessment plans and for advising employers on 
how to write standards and assessments.
• Ofsted inspects the quality of apprenticeship 
training provision, both at provider and 
programme level, from Levels 2 to 5.
• The Office for Students (OfS) is responsible 
for the quality assurance of Level 6 and 7 
apprenticeships at providers on their register 
of institutions. They carry out desk-based 
analysis at provider level, not course level.
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 They also share information with Ofsted on 
Level 4 and 5 provision at providers on their 
register.
• Ofqual are responsible for qualifications 
and assessments if they are the registered 
external quality assurance organisation for 
the qualification. 
• The Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) 
provides advice and monitoring for higher 
education (HE) across the UK, and advises 
the OfS on what they should look for in 
registered providers.
We believe this complex environment creates 
duplication, stretches the regulators involved, 
leaves gaps and risks poorer quality provision. 
There is one important gap in coverage: the OfS 
remit to regulate providers at Levels 6 and 7 who 
are on their register leaves no-one responsible for 
quality assurance for Level 6 and 7 apprenticeship 
providers who are not on the OfS register. We 
believe this should be addressed immediately.
Another concern is that of the rapidly growing 
apprenticeship provider market. The proportion 
of providers that have been inspected fell by 26 
percentage points, from 88 per cent in August 
2017 to 62 per cent in August 2018. Over 500 
apprenticeship providers that are both open and on 
the register remain to be inspected, meaning we 
know very little about the quality of this provision.57 
In August 2018, the DfE agreed additional funding 
for Ofsted for them to visit all new apprenticeship 
training providers (within their remit) within 24 
months of the provider’s funding start date, but 
further improvement remains necessary. Ofsted 
has noted: 
“While we fully support the government’s goal 
of boosting apprenticeship numbers, we are also 
seeing some early warning signs of a dilution 
of quality. Our new monitoring visits to some 
of these providers have shown common issues 
around poor governance, low-quality teaching 
and not enough time for off-the-job training.” 58 
At present both the OfS and Ofsted are expected to 
have the necessary expertise to ensure the quality 
assurance of apprenticeship provision which we 
believe is wasteful. One regulator should inspect 
apprenticeship provision at all levels to ensure 
consistency in standards and in-house expertise. 
We believe this should be Ofsted, thus maintaining 
a single knowledge hub for apprenticeship quality. 
This would reduce duplication and the risk of 
providers being overlooked. While we recognise 
this may not be welcome by some HEIs, we believe 
a sole inspection body is vital when new and 
untested providers are entering the market and 
offering provision at a variety of levels. 
The problems created by the currently tangled and 
under-resourced system have been compounded 
by a flawed contract award process. Providers on 
the register bid for contracts from government 
(as they did pre-reform): these contracts cover all 
provision to non-levy-payers. This process takes 
place with insufficient regard for quality and 
experience; after the first bidding round for new 
contracts a number of highly experienced colleges 
which are central to local apprenticeship training 
were left without contracts while new, uninspected 
providers with no experience received contracts. 
We recognise that the DfE has made some 
improvements to the contracting process but do 
not believe these yet go far enough. 
Re-establishing provision at local level has added 
further complexity to an already complex system, 
as we discovered during our provider visits. In 
order to sustain provision for local employers, 
established providers who did not receive contracts 
have entered into more and complex sub-contracts, 
a process which drains funds from front-line 
provision. We accept that some sub-contracting is 
necessary, especially if a minimum contract size is 
required (thus excluding small specialist providers). 
We also acknowledge that the House of Commons 
Education Committee has recently made some 
specific recommendations with respect to sub-
contracting, which the government is considering.59 
However, we consider it unacceptable that contracts 
should be awarded to apprenticeship providers 
without what we see as due quality control. 
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Recommendation 5.4
Ofsted become the lead responsible body for 
the inspection of the quality of apprenticeships 
at all levels.
Recommendation 5.5
No provider without an acceptable Ofsted 
rating should receive a contract to deliver 
training in their own right (although a provider 
who has not yet been inspected could sub-
contract from a high-quality provider pending 
their own inspection).
Complexity, transparency and 
accountability
As noted above, England’s current apprenticeship 
system is very new and needs to bed down before 
it can be fully evaluated. However, it is clear that, 
within what is now a highly bifurcated system, 
SMEs find engagement a struggle. Numerous 
examples of complexity were reported to us by 
SMEs who found the system difficult to navigate 
and overly bureaucratic. This is consistent with the 
findings of other recent reports referenced in these 
pages, by the House of Commons Education Select 
Committee, the House of Lords Economic Affairs 
Committee and the Higher Education Commission. 
The Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) recently 
found that the barriers for SMEs include lack of 
time and resources to train apprentices and quality 
of applications.60 We believe that the specific 
problems for SMEs should now be examined. 
Such a review might also usefully consider the 
problems created by current very tight restrictions 
on apprentices’ ability to interrupt or resume 
apprenticeships. While we do not have access 
to good data on this issue, we believe it may be 
particularly important in the SME sector, and act 
as a deterrent to both employers and prospective 
apprentices.
Recommendation 5.6
The IfATE and the DfE (through the ESFA) 
should undertake a programme of work to 
better understand the barriers that SMEs face 
in engaging with the apprenticeship system 
and put in place mechanisms to address these, 
including raising awareness of the programme 
and making the system easier to navigate.
An employer told a member of the panel 
about their experience:
The Digital and Technology Solutions degree 
apprenticeship standard was first submitted 
to the Skills Funding Agency (SFA) (prior to 
the IfA being set up) for review in the summer 
of 2016, it (the standard) then went through 
multiple reviews (each involving input from 
SFA/IFA) before being published in November 
2017. The corresponding assessment standard 
was not published until July 2018. Multiple 
universities had made agreements with 
employers to provide apprenticeship courses 
in that area. The standard was returned for 
further work so often that employers delayed 
commitments from 2017 to 2018 because 
they could not ask learners to commit without 
greater certainty that the courses would run. 
At each step, revisions were undertaken in line 
with the recommendations of the SFA/IFA. The 
standard was finally accepted so late in 2018 
that only one university was able to launch a 
course in September of that year – more than 
two years after the standard was first submitted 
for approval.
We consider that the process by which standards 
are approved should be made clearer and more 
transparent, and that this would greatly increase 
efficiency for providers. In this area, again like 
other enquiries, we heard that the process of 
standards approval was highly problematic. Clearly, 
the IfATE must scrutinise properly, but complaints 
about delay and slowness would be greatly 
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mitigated, and provision more efficient, if it was 
always clear what point a set of draft standards 
had reached in the approval process and when, 
under normal conditions, they might be expected 
to receive approval. The NAO point out that the lack 
of prioritisation within the process has led to eight 
of the top ten subjects remaining on frameworks 
rather than standards.61 They also highlight the five 
years it has taken to approve 360 out of ‘a potential 
600’ standards.62
If there had been a clear timetable, with internal 
deadlines, and if the IfA committed to providing 
formal interim information on whether a standard 
had reached and passed critical approval points or 
gateways, the standards approval process would 
be greatly improved. We recognise that the IfA 
introduced the Faster and Better programme but 
do not think this went far enough.63 
Recommendation 5.7 
The IfATE improve transparency when 
processing standards that have been 
submitted for approval. Trailblazer groups 
and providers should have a clear indication 
of progress, available on-line, so they can 
start to plan, recruit and invest within 
workable timelines.
Finally, we consider that greater accountability 
is required, not only with respect to eligibility for 
contracts (recommendation 5.5) but also in system 
administration and rules for disbursement. One 
of the reasons for the reform programme was 
the poor quality of many providers, including 
successive cases of failure and indeed fraud which 
left many apprentices without training, and many 
others receiving substandard or little training. 
Several years into the reform programme, such 
cases continue to occur: for example, Learndirect, 
the country’s largest training provider, was judged 
inadequate by Ofsted in 2017. There have been a 
number of high-profile failures of ITPs, including 
3aaa: the latter stopped trading in October 2018 
after the ESFA issued a notice to terminate their 
contracts. These failures have left large numbers 
of students without training – 4,216 apprentices 
have been affected by the collapse of 3aaa.64 These 
apprentices, and their employers, now have to be 
supported to find other options for completing their 
apprenticeships.
The panel is concerned by the lack of controls over 
apprenticeship spending. At present no reporting is 
required of how much and what off-the-job-training 
has actually occurred and government does not 
currently measure the delivery of training or link 
apprenticeship funding to the delivery of training. 
While funding rules make it clear that off-the-job 
training must impart new knowledge, skills and 
behaviours, this can occur in a number of ways. 
Indeed, it is perfectly possible and legal for a 
provider to spend the entire apprenticeship fee on 
expenses such as mentoring and ‘observation’ by 
company employees, administration and progress 
reviews, leaving no direct funding at all for off-the-
job training.65
Productivity gains are tied to the acquisition of new 
skills, learnt off the job and not just in the course 
of working. This is why other countries mandate 
levels of off-the-job training which are generally 
higher than in England; and why the government 
supports training costs, reimbursing 95 per cent 
of the costs for non-levy payers. It is the receipt of 
training that justifies lower wages for apprentices 
and we were disturbed to encounter employers – 
hopefully a small minority – who did not seem to 
accept the need for apprentices to leave the job for 
training purposes.
Since the new system is still embedding, and the 
DfE is working to understand the impact of the 
new rules, while noting that this situation is highly 
unsatisfactory, we do not propose any precise 
changes relating to funding and expenditure rules. 
However, we draw these issues to the attention of 
the reader. We do consider it imperative to provide 
a level playing field across post-18 education 
and training with respect to the protection of 
apprentices and students.
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All parts of the post-18 system other than ITPs have 
some form of insolvency provision. The recently 
introduced insolvency regime for further education 
colleges (FECs) provides statutory protection for 
current students and the new HE regulatory regime 
requires providers registered with the OfS to have 
a student protection plan in place. The OfS also 
monitors the financial viability of HE institutions 
(HEIs). We note that ITPs are not required to make 
any such provisions and recommend that this be 
rectified.
Recommendation 5.8
All approved providers of government-funded 
training, including apprenticeship training, 
must make clear provision for the protection of 
learners in the case of closure or insolvency.
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Introduction
Starting in 1962 and throughout almost four 
decades of university expansion, full-time UK 
students attended university free of charge and 
were eligible for a means-tested maintenance 
grant paid by their local authority. The tax and 
rates payer paid the student’s fees and part of 
their living costs. In 1998, following the Dearing 
Report, the newly elected Labour Government 
introduced tuition fees on two grounds. The first 
was the principle that students should contribute 
towards the cost of their university education 
because they, as well as society, generally benefit 
financially. This is now a well-established principle 
and is included in our own principles at the front of 
this report. The second was that the rapid growth 
in university numbers since the 1970s, which the 
government aimed to grow to 50 per cent of 18 to 
30-year-olds, could not be sustained on the basis 
of funding by the taxpayer alone.
Previous chapters have set out how the upfront 
share of costs between the state and students 
is determined by: the size of government grants 
to providers; the level of student fees and 
accompanying loans; and the nature of - and 
eligibility for - maintenance support. Chapter 3 has 
proposed a reduction in the maximum student fee 
from £9,250 to £7,500 with a matching increase 
in the government grant to providers of higher 
education (HE) for their reasonable teaching 
costs. Chapter 7, immediately after this chapter, 
recommends a replacement of a portion of the 
maintenance loan by a maintenance grant for 
students from low-income households. These 
changes will tilt the share of upfront costs from the 
student to the government and reduce the debt 
students will take on, lowering loan balances and 
interest accrued for all students. 
The eventual balance of contributions between 
the state and students is also shaped by the 
terms of the income-contingent loan system 
and the earnings of the borrowers within it. 93.6 
per cent of eligible undergraduate full-time HE 
students took tuition loans in 2016/17.1 This 
chapter reviews the current student finance regime 
and makes proposals to recalibrate the system. 
When combined with our fee and maintenance 
proposals and by setting clearer principles for 
the contributions collected from students, our 
recommendations are intended to maintain a fair 
balance between taxpayers and students.
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The current student finance system and 
how we got there
Two critical features of England’s current student 
finance system are a statutory entitlement 
to a government loan to cover tuition fee and 
maintenance costs, and repayment of the loan 
after graduation on an income-contingent basis, 
i.e. according to the borrower’s capacity to pay 
based on their income. These distinguish it 
from many other countries’ arrangements for 
university funding and ensure that it encourages 
access and collects contributions in a broadly 
progressive way. The loan entitlement guarantees 
that students do not have to pay the substantial 
fees and maintenance costs in advance from their 
own pockets. The pay-as-you earn principle is 
designed to produce a fair balance of contributions 
between the taxpayer and students and to 
collect a contribution from high, medium and low 
earners in a progressive way. Borrowers who find 
themselves on a relatively low income – possibly 
because they are at the start of their careers, or 
on no income at all perhaps having temporarily 
left the labour market to raise a family – are 
protected. Recent research carried out for the 
Department for Education (DfE) showed that 
the income-contingent nature of loans – no 
repayments are required until earnings are above a 
predefined amount – is the most important factor 
in persuading people to enter HE, despite concerns 
about overall costs.2 
The income-contingent principle of the loan 
repayment system is a framework for fairness but 
it is the specific terms of the loan that determine 
the balance of contributions between the state and 
students and the relative contributions made by 
high and low earning borrowers. The key variables 
are: the income threshold at which repayments 
are due; the repayment rate (as a percentage 
of income); the income thresholds for interest 
charges; the interest rate(s); the maximum period 
during which repayments are due; and eligibility 
for forgiveness of the loan (if any). The terms 
matter: small adjustments can make a considerable 
difference to the overall proportion of loans that are 
repaid, and to the profile of lifetime repayments for 
different income groups among students. 
What constitutes a fair balance of contributions 
towards the cost of HE is a matter of judgement. 
This needs to take into account the public interest 
in a high-performing HE system – which warrants a 
substantial taxpayer subsidy – and the affordability 
of repayments by individual borrowers, whose 
lifetime earnings have generally been enhanced 
as a result of their studies and training. Responses 
to our call for evidence left us in no doubt that 
particular features of the current system, notably 
the charging of interest while the student is 
studying, and the level of interest charged, are 
widely regarded as unreasonable. We are also 
aware of concerns raised in the past two years by 
parliamentary committees including the Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee3, the Treasury Select 
Committee4 and the Public Accounts Committee5, 
and more widely in the media. These concerns 
include the way the system is communicated, as 
well as its terms and outcomes. In reviewing the 
current system, and making recommendations 
for change, we have given these views careful 
consideration.
The current undergraduate loan system’s terms are 
summarised in Figure 6.1 below.
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Figure 6.1: The terms of the current undergraduate student finance system
Parameter Level for 2018-19 Explanation
In-study  
interest rate
RPI+3 per cent Interest is charged from the day a loan is taken out at 3 percentage points 
above the Retail Price Index (RPI) measure of inflation, until the date a 
student becomes eligible to make repayments.
Post-study  
interest rate
RPI to RPI+3 per 
cent variable
When students enter their repayment period (the April after study has 
ended), interest is charged on a sliding scale each year depending on 
their earnings in that year. Annual earnings below the lower threshold 
attract interest set at the same level as RPI inflation – keeping the balance 
constant in real terms. The interest rate scales linearly up to a maximum of 
3 percentage points above RPI at (and above) the upper earnings threshold. 
The rate a borrower’s earnings attract applies to their loan balance for that 
whole year, applied retrospectively once the earnings are known.
Post-study  
interest  
thresholds
£25,000 and £45,000 
annual earnings
In 2018-19 the earnings thresholds that determine interest rates (referred 
to above) were set at £25,000 and £45,000. This is in 2018-19 prices – in 
subsequent years they will rise by average earnings.
Repayment  
threshold
£25,000 annual earnings In 2018-19 the earnings threshold above which repayments are required was 
set at £25,000. This is in 2018-19 prices – in subsequent years this will rise 
by average earnings.
Repayment  
rate
9 per cent 9 per cent of earnings above the repayment threshold are collected as loan 
repayments.
(Note: Borrowers with an undergraduate and a Master’s (and in future 
doctoral) loan pay 9 per cent of earnings on their undergraduate loan plus 
6 per cent of earnings towards their Master’s loan, totalling 15 per cent of 
earnings above the threshold for as long as both loans require payments.)
Repayment  
period
30 years from the April 
after study has ended
Payments cease after 30 years, irrespective of whether any debt remains.
Student loans with income contingent repayments 
originate from 1998/99 (those original loans are 
now known as ‘Plan 1’). Since then the core of the 
system has remained unchanged but parameters 
have been altered to change the amounts collected 
from borrowers, and in the wake of major increases 
in student fees. The loan terms were changed in 
2012 following the Browne review (‘Plan 2’), and 
in recognition of greatly increased fee debt that 
graduates would incur as a result of the raising of 
the fee cap to £9,000. 
However, governments have also made changes 
in response to fiscal or political pressures. For 
example, the Plan 2 repayment threshold, which 
was originally set to track national trends in 
earnings, was frozen in April 2016 and was intended 
to stay frozen until at least April 2021. This meant 
that the threshold would fall each year in real 
terms and therefore require higher and earlier 
repayments, in real terms, from all graduates. This 
prompted complaints and threats of legal action 
from borrowers who considered that they had 
signed up to the terms as stated at the time of loan 
issue. It was followed by a groundswell of concern 
about the growth in student debt and in late 2017 
the government announced that it would unfreeze 
the threshold and also raise it above its previous 
level, from £21,000 to £25,000, from April 2018.
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Postgraduate student loans
The government has also introduced loans 
for postgraduate study. Loans for Master’s 
degrees were introduced in August 2016, up 
to a set maximum (£10,609 in 2018/19). Loans 
for doctoral degrees were introduced in August 
2018 for which the maximum is £25,000, with a 
maximum of £10,609 per year at 2018/19 prices. 
Both loans’ maxima will rise with Retail Price 
Index inflation in future years. Both of these 
loan types can support fee and maintenance 
costs as determined by the borrower; the 
government does not regulate the fee charged 
on most Master’s and doctoral courses and 
there is a wide range. The repayment terms 
are 6 per cent above an income threshold 
of £21,000, in parallel with any remaining 
repayments on a borrower’s undergraduate loan
As with other parts of this review, we have 
focused our attention on the undergraduate 
system. Master’s loans are forecast on average 
to be repaid in full and postgraduate loans have 
only been introduced recently. We consider 
it premature to examine or propose changes 
to these loans now and none of our proposals 
apply to them. It is the undergraduate system 
that is accessed by the vast majority of HE 
learners and that is the principal focus of public 
and government attention.
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the marked impact 
of these changes on the balance between the 
forecast long-term contributions of the taxpayer 
and undergraduate students and the relative 
amounts collected from individual borrowers as 
a result of differences in their income. Figure 6.2 
shows that the forecast tax payer contribution 
was reduced from 60 per cent to 40 per cent after 
the introduction of the £9,000 student fee and 
new loan terms in 2012 and further reduced to 
35 per cent in 2016 when the government froze 
the income threshold for repaying the loan and 
removed maintenance grants, but rose again to 50 
per cent after the income threshold was unfrozen 
and taken up to £25,000 in 2018.
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Figure 6.2: Relative contributions of the taxpayer (grants and loan write-offs) and students (up-
front and loan repayments) to the costs of full-time undergraduate HE in the pre-2012, 2012-2015, 
2016-2018 and current (post-2018) system6
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Figure 6.3 below shows the average lifetime 
repayments expected from student borrowers, 
categorised in deciles by their lifetime earnings, 
for different fee and finance arrangements. It 
demonstrates that, contrary to the widespread 
assumption at the time, the tripling of student 
fees in 2012 made little difference to the lifetime 
repayments made by graduates with relatively 
modest incomes (the bottom four deciles) but 
markedly increased the total amount repaid by 
higher earners. In other words it made the student 
finance system fiscally much more progressive. 
The progressive gradient of the system steepened 
further after the changes in 2018.
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Figure 6.3: Forecast lifetime contribution for a sample cohort of undergraduate student borrowers, 
categorised in deciles by their lifetime earnings, deflated by average earnings to today’s prices, 
for recent student loan systems7
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The student contribution system: concerns, 
considerations and recommendations
We have considered all of the representations 
made about the student contribution in the call for 
evidence. We have arrived at our recommendations 
in the light of extensive examination of a wide 
range of options. We examined the estimated 
impact on the state/student balance and on the 
relative contributions collected from different 
income groups of graduates from changes to 
each of the parameters of the system, singly 
and in various permutations. We chose not to 
consider the recently introduced loan schemes for 
graduates (Master’s and doctoral) and make no 
recommendations about those. 
Some of the concerns we heard from stakeholders 
and respondents related to factual financial 
outcomes of the system for borrowers, others 
were based on common misunderstandings. 
Many commentators and advocates of reform 
often fail to recognise that, although graduates 
can accrue significant notional debt, and see that 
grow with interest, what they will actually repay 
largely depends on the relationship between their 
earnings, the income threshold for repayments 
(£25,000 in 2018-19) and repayment percentage 
(currently 9 per cent) levied on income above the 
threshold.
For many, the system will feel like a 30-year 
tax, after which any remaining debt is written 
off. Borrowers will not have to pay if they are 
not earning, and their notional ‘debt’ – precisely 
because it is only payable if they are earning – 
is not counted as debt by commercial creditors 
when considering credit worthiness. According 
to government forecasts based on a sample of 
full-time borrowers in the current system, and 
categorised by their lifetime earnings: 8
• the top 30 per cent of lifetime earners will 
repay more than 100 per cent of their original 
debt on average (due to the repayment of 
both their original debt and a large portion of 
interest accrued);
• the middle 40 per cent will repay 45 per cent of 
their debt on average;
• the lowest-earning 30 per cent will repay less 
than 10 per cent of their debt. 
Yet we received many pleas to lower fees and 
interest rates in order to ‘make education less 
expensive’ despite this having a very limited impact 
on learners with the lowest or even middle incomes. 
This misunderstanding is a key challenge for an 
income-contingent student contribution system. 
How language can be altered and information, 
advice and guidance (IAG) strengthened to 
improve understanding is covered in this chapter’s 
final section.
We firmly endorse the principles that students 
should not have to pay up-front costs on entering 
HE, and that borrowers on low incomes should be 
protected from making repayments. However, the 
design of the existing system results in too high a 
proportion of borrowers repaying very little: about 
70 per cent of student borrowers are currently not 
expected to clear their loans (including the interest) 
before the 30-year end point, and overall only 55 
per cent of the total value of loans will be repaid. 
9 The taxpayer will foot the bill for the other 45 
per cent of the loans (the government’s resource 
accounting and budgeting – RAB – charge) and the 
taxpayer contribution to the HE system rises to 50 
per cent when grants are included.
We question whether it is right to have a fee and 
loan system where so few borrowers can expect 
to clear their debt fully. Although our proposals to 
reduce the maximum student fee to £7,500 would 
enable more students to clear a greater proportion 
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of their loan, and maintenance grants would 
improve this still further for eligible borrowers (see 
Chapter 7), the current loan terms would still write 
off very significant amounts of money unless they 
are changed. We believe that the state should 
reduce this write-off in a way that is principled and 
affordable for student borrowers.
Because the student finance regime has figured so 
heavily in the debate about post-18 education, we 
consider its principal features in turn below, each 
followed by a recommendation. We emphasise 
from the outset that it would be unfair to adjust 
loan terms retrospectively for existing borrowers 
and that the core recommendations in this chapter 
are proposed as a package that constitutes a new 
system of student contributions that would apply 
to future students after an implementation period. 
There is one exception – Recommendation 6.6 – 
which is covered later.
The overall system for collecting 
contributions
Some commentators and some respondents to our 
call for evidence called for the current system to 
be replaced by the abolition of or major reduction 
in student fees and a graduate tax. We believe 
that universal eligibility for a government loan 
to cover student fees combined with an income-
contingent system of loan repayments is the fairest 
way to collect a contribution from students. We 
cannot know a student’s lifetime earnings benefit 
in advance; this system protects borrowers from 
being required to contribute while they are not 
earning but ensures that they pay towards the cost 
of their education when they can, in a progressive 
way. It is preferable to a graduate tax, which would 
not cap the total amount any graduate contributes, 
and of course high earners in the UK are already 
subject to progressive earnings-linked income tax.
Recommendation 6.1
Continue the principle of loans to cover the 
cost of fees combined with income-contingent 
contributions up to a maximum. 
The contribution threshold
A key determinant of the level of written-off loans is 
the income threshold at which repayments start. By 
increasing the threshold from £21,000 to £25,000 
in 2018, the government took many borrowers 
out of repayment at very significant cost to the 
taxpayer. The raising of the threshold reduced 
the estimated student contribution from 65 per 
cent to 50 per cent (see Figure 6.2), equivalent to 
additional public expenditure of £2.3bn per year.10 
The current repayment threshold of £25,000 is 
higher than the median graduate salary three years 
after graduation of £22,80011 (2015-16 prices) and 
also in excess of the median earnings of all working 
age non-graduates which is around £23,00012 (2017-
18 prices). We question the justification for a system 
which excludes so much of a borrower’s earnings 
from any repayment and which helps to reinforce the 
“no win, no pay” element in student choice. We note 
recent research carried out for the DfE which found 
that 52 per cent of people agreed that the £15 per 
month paid by those earning £27,000 is too low.13 This 
research also found that people would prefer higher 
repayments in return for lower fees and interest rates.
We believe that there should be a stronger 
expectation that student contributions will be 
made once a financial benefit is secured. For 
students in degree-level education we therefore 
recommend that the most suitable threshold is 
median non-graduate earnings. In 2018-19 prices, 
this would mean reducing the threshold from 
£25,000 to £23,000. However, the panel would 
expect this change to be implemented alongside 
changes described in chapters 3 and 7, beginning 
in academic year 2021/22. At this point – on 
current earnings forecasts – the recommended 
threshold would have risen to approximately 
£25,000, around the same nominal level as today. 
By the time the first typical cohort of 3-year 
students would be due to contribute repayments 
under these new terms – in financial year 2025-26 
– the recommended income threshold is forecast 
to be approximately £28,000. Once introduced, that 
threshold should continue to increase with average 
earnings over time, as is currently the case. 
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The threshold has been set by reference to 
differences in earnings between graduates and 
non-graduates because degree-level graduates 
make up the majority of borrowers. However, this 
threshold is fair to all borrowers, because those 
leaving education with lower-level qualifications 
can on average expect to earn less, and so will 
on average find that a lower proportion of their 
earnings is subject to contributions.
We recommend retaining the principle that the 
real interest charged should be increased linearly 
between the repayment income threshold and 
an upper threshold in order to protect borrowers 
on relatively modest incomes while charging real 
interest rates to those on relatively high incomes. 
This is one of the components of the system 
that leads to progressive outcomes. The interest 
thresholds should therefore be retained and shift in 
line with the initial repayment threshold to £23,000 
and £43,000 in 2018-19 prices. Once again, we 
expect this change to be implemented in academic 
year 2021/22 and for the levels to track earnings.
Recommendation 6.2
Set the contribution threshold at the level of 
median non-graduate earnings so that those 
who are experiencing a financial benefit from 
HE start contributing towards the cost of their 
studies. This should apply to new students 
entering HE from 2021/22.
Adjust the lower interest threshold to match, 
with the higher interest threshold moving by 
the same amount. This should apply to new 
students entering the system from 2021/22.
The contribution period
A second feature of the current system with an 
impact on the level of loan write-offs is the 30-year 
limit on repayments (which was raised from 25 
years in 2012). It can result in a substantial portion 
of a borrower’s lifetime earnings being ineligible for 
repayments: earnings data shows that the median 
graduate continues to earn more in their 50s than 
early in their working life. 
Figure 6.4: Median salary of graduates of 
different ages, from the Graduate Labour 
Market Statistics for 2017 (2017 prices)14
Graduates Median Salary (nearest £500)
Age  
21-30 £25,000
31-40 £38,000
41-50 £42,000
51-60 £42,000
The large amount of student debt not cleared by the 
30-year point is covered by the taxpayer through 
loan write-offs. Given the financial benefits that 
accrue to most students over their lifetime from 
their HE and the major investment the government 
makes on borrowers’ behalf through loan write-
offs, we believe borrowers should continue to repay 
their loan for as long as they benefit; we judge 
this to be 40 years after study has ended. This 
would enable the contribution threshold to stay 
relatively high (Recommendation 6.1), protecting 
graduates from high repayments when they are 
lower-earning, but recouping payments later in 
life when graduates are likely to be earning more. 
This would bring the system closer to other state 
contribution systems such as national insurance, 
but borrowers would still be protected by the other 
features of the student finance system, in particular 
the income-contingent basis of contributions 
and the termination of payments once the loan is 
cleared. This is consistent with the recent research 
completed for DfE which showed that people would 
prefer a longer repayment period in return for lower 
fees and interest rates.15
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Recommendation 6.3
Extend the repayment period to 40 years 
after study has ended so that those who have 
borrowed continue to contribute while they are 
experiencing a financial benefit. This should 
apply to new students entering the system 
from 2021/22.
The rate of interest while a student is 
studying
Previous chapters have reported the decline in 
the proportion of students who think they are 
getting value for money and growing concerns 
about student debt and the risk of this deterring 
some prospective students from entering higher 
education. Our proposals to lower the maximum 
student fees to £7,500 and to reintroduce 
maintenance grants for students from low-income 
households would reduce upfront student debt. 
Nonetheless loans would remain substantial and 
the nominal debt would grow over time as a result 
of real interest rates. 
Currently students are charged an interest rate 
3 percentage points above the level of inflation 
whilst studying – i.e. before the point when they 
can reasonably be expected to begin to make 
repayments. This particular feature has attracted 
widespread criticism, including in responses to 
our call for evidence. At current inflation rates, a 
new student doing a one-year Level 4 HE course 
in 2018, taking out maximum HE maintenance 
and fee loans, will take a loan of £17,950 and by 
the time they enter their repayment term this 
will have increased to £19,250 – a rise of £700 for 
inflation with an addition of £650 in-study interest. 
A new 3-year degree student in 2018 taking out 
maximum HE maintenance and fee loans will see 
£3,800 added to their debt during their study years 
because of the above-inflation interest element. 
Students on longer courses will accrue even greater 
in-study interest, owing to both their larger balance 
and the longer duration spent under the in-study 
interest regime. A student studying for 5 years 
could accrue £10,000 in real interest while they 
are studying (e.g. if a student enrolled on a 4-year 
Master’s course and retook one year). Figure 6.5 
sets out the nominal loans taken, the inflation 
adjustment, and the real interest added, for 
borrowers taking maximum (outside London) loans, 
in HE for different numbers of years.
Figure 6.5: Nominal maximum debt, split into loan and interest elements, for a student starting a 
new course in 2018 outside London
Length of Course Loan Amount 
(Year 1) 
Maximum fee 
plus maximum 
non-London 
maintenance
Total of Nominal 
Loan Amounts 
on entering 
repayment16
Interest Added Total Debt 
on entering 
repaymentOf which, 
inflation 
adjustment
Of which, real 
interest 
(3ppt on top of 
inflation)
One year full-time HE £17,950 £17,950 £700 £650 £19,250
Three year full-time HE £17,950 £55,450 £3,800 £3,800 £63,050
Five year full-time HE £17,950 £94,650 £9,600 £10,000 £114,300
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest £50 and may not sum
A key part of the government’s case for in-study 
interest is that it deters students from taking 
on student loans if they can self-finance their 
education.17 In the absence of any in-study interest 
students would have an incentive to take out a 
loan and instead of using it to pay their student 
fees, could invest it. The in-study interest also has 
the effect of increasing the overall contribution 
made by high earners because it is they who 
predominantly repay this interest – helping to 
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make the system progressive – whereas most lower 
earners will not repay it because it will form part of 
the remaining debt written off at the end of their 
loan term.
However, this interest serves to increase all 
borrowers’ debt balances when most borrowers 
are in no position to make payments, adding to 
concerns about rising debt levels as outlined in 
Figure 6.5. Furthermore, some lower earners - 
albeit a minority - will repay this interest. These 
repayment terms apply not only to students taking 
full degrees with large loan balances but also to 
many other borrowers, for example those taking 
Advanced Learner Loans (ALLs). ALLs, which are 
typically taken out by older adults with quite low 
initial achievement levels, can be far smaller and 
these borrowers may well repay in full – including 
in-study interest. We consider that there should 
continue to be a single set of repayment terms at 
Level 6 and below, across different routes, and that 
this should be as fair as possible for all borrowers. 
Furthermore, the extension to the repayment 
period we are proposing would increase the 
proportion of students having to eventually repay 
this interest.
We consider it unfair that students should incur 
an above-inflation increase in their debt while 
studying full-time at a time when they are unable 
to generate earnings to start to repay their loan. 
We do however believe it is fair to increase loan 
balances with inflation during study, to maintain 
the real value of the debt and to mitigate the risk 
of wealthy students taking on debt for investment 
purposes. 
Recommendation 6.4
Remove real in-study interest, so that loan 
balances track inflation during study. This 
should apply for new students entering the 
system from 2021/22. 
The rate of interest after a student finishes 
their studies
Some of our respondents argued that student 
loans should never attract real interest – not even 
for borrowers who have left education and begun 
earning. We do not accept this view: a level of real 
interest should continue to be charged on the 
grounds that it would be imprudent and wasteful 
for government to provide entirely costless finance. 
It is worth reiterating the point that the variable 
interest rate mechanism protects low earners 
from high real interest rates, while increasing the 
contribution from higher earners. The provision 
of loans at zero real interest throughout the whole 
loan period could encourage almost all students 
to take out loans (as opposed to paying fees with 
their own funds) and to continue to hold this 
‘debt’ throughout the contribution period as it 
may eventually be written off. This would be at 
considerable additional cost to government at 
the expense of investment elsewhere in tertiary 
education. 
Recommendation 6.5
Retain the post-study variable interest rate 
mechanism from inflation to inflation plus 
3 per cent.
The inflation index to which interest rates 
are linked
Some feedback in the call for evidence questioned 
the use of the Retail Price Index (RPI) rather than 
the Consumer Price index (CPI) as the appropriate 
measure of inflation in the student loan system. 
We have also considered recommendations from 
the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee’s 
recent report Measuring Inflation18, and the joint 
letter from this committee and the House of 
Commons Treasury Committee to the UK National 
Statistician regarding the need to reform the RPI 
measure.19 We recognise widespread concerns 
about the quality of the RPI measure, but note 
that HMT continues to use RPI in a range of cases, 
especially for inward payments (e.g. interest) as 
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distinct from outward payments (e.g. pensions). 
This is a matter for the Treasury; different inflation 
measures are in use in different areas of public 
finance and we recognise a change would need to 
be considered in a wider context than the student 
loan system alone.
Concerns about the non-progressive nature 
of lifetime contributions in the upper end of 
the earnings range 
A student borrower’s debt and repayment profile 
is particularly sensitive to the trajectory of their 
lifetime earnings. In a system with real interest 
some borrowers will repay more than 100 per cent 
of their initial loan, and those that pay back more 
slowly – in the middle to upper end of the earnings 
distribution – can pay proportionally more than 
the very highest earners who are exposed to real 
interest for a shorter time. In the words of the 
Treasury Select Committee Report into student 
loans: “…the civil servant, the teacher and the 
accountant pay broadly similar amounts for their 
loan, but a graduate joining a “magic circle” law 
firm pays less, owing to rapid pay growth in the 
early stages of their career.”20
Figure 6.6 shows this effect. The earner at the 95th 
percentile repays more quickly and spends less 
time accruing interest than the earner at the 90th 
percentile, resulting in the 90th percentile borrower 
repaying more in real terms over their lifetime, for 
the same starting balance. The system is therefore 
not producing progressive outcomes for this part of 
the earnings distribution.
Figure 6.6: Cumulative lifetime student loan repayments, for a set of illustrative borrowers with 
the same initial loan balance, deflated in to today’s prices by average earnings21
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We acknowledge that over the longer repayment 
period recommended by the panel the problem 
would be somewhat exacerbated. We considered 
a wide range of options for solving this difficult 
issue. If real interest is charged, some borrowers 
are bound to accrue more interest than others, so 
we have sought mechanisms to limit the extent 
to which the highest earners paid back into the 
system less than those in the deciles below. 
Options we considered included the adjusting of 
interest charges and thresholds; the addition of 
a further higher threshold with higher interest 
charges; forgiving unpaid interest each year; and an 
additional fixed charge on the highest earners who 
had cleared their loan. Many of these resulted in 
higher costs to the taxpayer due to the inefficient 
targeting of borrowers, benefiting fast high earners 
in particular. Some options incentivised fast high 
earners to opt out of the loan system altogether 
or to accelerate the repayment of their loan; in 
such cases the highest earners of all would be 
contributing less in interest overall to the system 
than borrowers with lower earnings. Other options 
would have been scored as a tax under accounting 
rules and hence are beyond our terms of reference. 
We concluded that the most efficient way of 
addressing this problem would be to introduce a 
cap on real terms total repayments. Any borrower 
that reached the cap would have the remainder 
of their loan written off at that point (all of which 
would be accrued interest). We propose that this 
cap be set at a multiple of 1.2 times the initial 
loan in real terms. This level of cap broadly 
limits borrowers to a similar maximum level of 
repayment to that which was being contributed 
by the highest earners (relative to the initial 
loan). Because the protection of the cap is only 
triggered if a borrower has already fully repaid the 
real value of the initial loan, it is well targeted at 
a specific group of borrowers. Because it scales 
with the initial loan amount it would protect 
borrowers with any size of loan in a proportional 
way. Given the number of permutations of initial 
balance and earnings in each year of a borrower’s 
working life, there could be some instances where 
borrowers with lower lifetime earnings would 
repay proportionally slightly more than someone 
with higher lifetime earnings, but we believe this 
mechanism is the best available for limiting the 
number and extent of such instances.
We would expect the Student Loans Company 
(SLC) to monitor the real value of the initial loan, 
alongside the other data it holds on repayments, 
and regularly notify the borrower of the proportion 
of the real loan repaid and when the cap had been 
reached. Although the cap is a component of the 
new system we recommend that the government 
implement the same cap for graduate borrowers 
who are still repaying their Plan 2 loans. While this 
would not affect most borrowers, it would increase 
the fairness of the system.
Recommendation 6.6
Introduce a new protection for borrowers to 
cap lifetime repayments at 1.2 times the initial 
loan amount in real terms. This cap should be 
introduced for all current Plan 2 borrowers, as 
well for all future borrowers.
The terminology used to describe the 
system
It is widely recognised that the current terminology 
used to describe student finance (loans, debt, 
interest, liability etc.) can be unhelpful and 
misleading. For conventional debt such as bank 
loans, mortgages and consumer credit, total 
balance and interest rates are central to a correct 
understanding of what will ultimately need to be 
repaid. The student finance system by contrast 
behaves quite differently for most borrowers, for 
whom it operates in effect as an additional tax on 
earnings for the length of the repayment period. 
This leads to a gulf between perception and reality, 
to a misalignment of concern about how much is 
owed and how much will in fact be repaid. Indeed, 
the consumer champion Martin Lewis, and the 
Treasury Select Committee in its 2018 report on 
student finance, have advocated scrapping the 
term ‘loan’ altogether.22 
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Commentary on the student finance system 
tends to focus on total debt balances. This 
makes for attention-grabbing headlines but is 
often misleading because a borrower’s monthly 
repayment amount is linked to earnings, not 
the debt, as is their total lifetime repayment. 
Misperception is reinforced by annual statements 
from the SLC, which present borrowers with their 
total balance and the interest accrued but do 
not, for example, include any reference to the 
government subsidy or to the predicted scale of 
write-off. We note the helpful recent work of the 
Russell Group and Martin Lewis in testing a new 
student loans statement which emphasises these 
points.23 We have also heard students point out that 
the name ‘Student Loans Company’ does not aid 
understanding because some borrowers perceive 
it as a commercial enterprise that profits from the 
interest rates charged on student loans.24 
In 2018 a Universities UK survey found that only 
43 per cent of 16 to 24-year-olds agreed that they 
“have/had sufficient information about the full 
long-term cost to me of studying at university”. 
25 We recommend that communication of the 
student finance system, including by government 
departments and agencies, should be significantly 
improved and updated. Specifically, the unique 
protections and benefits it offers borrowers 
beyond conventional debt obligations should be 
emphasised and the way in which it operates 
as a limited-period supplement to income tax 
rather than as a conventional loan should be 
prominent. The language of loans and debt is 
deeply embedded in public discourse about the 
student finance system and will not be eradicated 
without a comprehensive, targeted and sustained 
communications strategy. 
We envisage that our proposals would become 
a new student finance plan with a new name to 
represent more accurately the new system: the 
“student contributions system”. This should include 
a public engagement campaign to introduce 
wider changes being made to the student finance 
system and ensure they are properly understood 
by students, parents and the media from the 
beginning. In parallel, government should consider 
how understanding of ALLs could be improved. 
Finally, government should also consider renaming 
the ‘Student Loans Company’. 
We recognise that the primary legislation 
underpinning the student finance system uses the 
term ‘loans’ and the terminology common to loans 
(borrower, rates of interest, repayment, liability, 
etc.) and that this constrains the extent to which 
the government is able to change the terminology 
used. We believe that the government should 
seek changes to this terminology ahead of the 
introduction of a new system.
Recommendation 6.7
Introduce new finance terms under the banner 
of a new ‘student contribution system’. Define 
and promote the system with new language 
to make clearer the nature of the system, 
reducing focus on ‘debt’ levels and interest and 
emphasising contribution rates.
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Implementation
A comparison of our proposals for a new student contribution system and the current system is presented 
in Figure 6.7 below.
Figure 6.7: Proposals for a new student contribution system with a comparison to the current 
system, including the forecast threshold levels for the first year in which we would expect 
repayments to be made in the new system (2025-26) 
Parameter
Current system Proposed contribution system
2018 prices 2018 prices 2025 prices
In-study interest rate RPI+3 per cent RPI only
Post-study 
interest rate
RPI to RPI+3 per 
cent variable RPI to RPI+3 per cent variable
Post-study interest 
thresholds
£25,000 and £45,000 
annual earnings
£23,000 and £43,000 
annual earnings
£28,100 and £52,525 
annual earnings
Repayment threshold
Contribution threshold
£25,000 
annual earnings
£23,000 
annual earnings26
£28,100 
annual earnings
Repayment rate
Contribution rate 9 per cent 9 per cent
Repayment period
Contribution period
30 years from the April 
after study has ended
40 years from the April 
after study has ended
Maximum real terms 
repayment above 
initial loan value All of the interest accrued
Remaining debt and accrued interest written off if total 
repayments reach 1.2 times the real initial loan value
If accepted, these student finance proposals should 
be implemented as a package, with the exception 
of the 1.2 times real terms cap on repayments, 
which we are keen to see introduced immediately. 
This would be a new plan type, defined by new 
regulations within the framework of existing 
primary legislation, but as proposed above, we urge 
the government to rebrand the system and adopt 
a new terminology. We expect the government to 
be able to introduce the new system for 2021/22 
entrants, synchronised with the introduction of 
lower fees and the improved arrangements for 
maintenance to avoid any one cohort of students 
being particularly advantaged or disadvantaged. 
More detail on the impacts of the proposals and the 
implementation timeline are set out in Chapter 8.
It is important that students should be able to 
access finance support that is compatible with 
their religious beliefs. The government will need 
to consider carefully how the changes we are 
proposing to the student finance system affect 
plans to introduce a system of alternative student 
finance for students who feel unable to access 
interest-bearing student loans for reasons of faith.
Education policy, including student loan repayment 
terms, is devolved. However, England and Wales 
have set the same repayment terms for their 
loans since 1998. All student loans in the UK are 
administered by the Student Loan Company. The 
majority of loan repayments from UK borrowers are 
collected by HMRC on behalf of England and the 
devolved administrations. Due to the commonality 
of loan terms, the Welsh Government in particular 
may wish to consider the implications of any 
changes made to repayment terms in England.
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Impact
Impact on the balance of contributions between 
the state and graduates 
Our proposed changes to the student fee, 
government funding, maintenance support and 
the student contributions system would result 
in a lower initial borrowing requirement for 
students; more direct government investment in 
post-18 education; but also in graduates repaying 
a greater proportion of their reduced loans. We 
estimate that the population of graduate borrowers 
as a whole would repay approximately 70 per 
cent of their smaller loans (Figure 6.8) under our 
recommendations. 
Figure 6.8: The proportion of debt repaid by 
borrowers and the proportion written off by 
government, under recent loan systems and the 
proposed system27
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After accounting for the proposed increase in 
government grant funding this would represent a 
50 per cent student contribution to the total costs 
of HE (Figure 6.9). This is a similar balance to the 
current system but with more grant support for 
both teaching and maintenance and therefore 
lower levels of student debt. Because the proposals 
include a resource freeze for universities, while 
the proportional contribution of government and 
students would remain similar, they would both be 
reduced in real terms.
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Figure 6.9: Relative contributions of the taxpayer (grants and loan write-offs) and students to the 
costs of full time HE in the proposed system, compared to the pre-2012, 2012-2015, 2016-2018 and 
current (post-2018) systems28
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Impact on the contributions made by 
graduates with different earnings 
We consider that in return for the substantial 
taxpayer subsidy and the income-contingent 
protection of their loans, students should be 
required to contribute to those costs once they 
benefit financially. This is the basis for our 
recommendation that the income threshold for 
starting contributions should be aligned to non-
graduate median earnings and should continue for 
40 years or until the loan is fully repaid, whichever 
is the earlier. The maximum change in payments 
that any borrower could experience, relative to 
the current system, is £15 per month in 2018-19 
prices, with those earning lower than £25,000 
seeing a smaller increase and those earning below 
£23,000 seeing no increase at all. In every case, 
monthly payments are lower than the loan system 
that existed before 2018 which had its repayment 
threshold frozen at £21,000 until 2020-21. This is 
set out in Figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10: Monthly repayments for borrowers with different salaries, under the 2016-2018, post-
2018, and proposed system (all compared at 2018 threshold levels)
Monthly Loan Repayment (£)
Annual Earnings 2016-2018 terms 2018-19 terms Proposed terms
£21k threshold £25k threshold £23k threshold
Up to 21,000 0 0 0
23,000 15 0 0
25,000 30 0 15
27,000 45 15 30
30,000 68 38 53
40,000 143 113 128
50,000 218 188 203
75,000 405 375 390
100,000 593 563 578
The impact of all the changes combined, on 
different borrowers’ lifetime contributions, and 
on the percentage of the loan that they repay, is 
shown in the two figures below.
Figure 6.11: Average total of lifetime repayments, by borrowers’ decile of lifetime earnings for 
a sample cohort, under the current and proposed loan systems, deflated to today’s prices by 
forecast CPI
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Figure 6.12: Proportion of loans written-off by government, by borrowers’ decile of lifetime 
earnings, under the current and proposed systems
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We are clear that student fees should not exceed 
the reasonable costs incurred by universities, 
further education colleges and other institutions in 
providing a student’s course of study and so have 
proposed a cut in the maximum student fee to the 
level of the lowest cost degree programmes. We 
are also clear that charging interest above inflation 
during study is unfair in principle, and should be 
eliminated from the graduate contribution system. 
Both of these changes, together with the cap on 
lifetime repayments, would mainly impact those 
borrowers who expect to repay their loans in full 
by directly reducing their debt and therefore their 
lifetime repayments, or by stopping their payments 
when they reached the cap. On average, the top 
30 percent of earners would benefit most from 
these changes. We consider this fair: these students 
would still repay more than the real-terms value 
of their initial loan and would receive the lowest 
state subsidy. The plain fact is that the affordability 
of the whole system depends on those that repay 
their loans in full.
The lifetime contributions made – on average – by 
lower earning deciles under our proposals would be 
similar to the contributions made under the 2016-
2018 and pre-2012 systems, but higher than under 
the current system, as shown in figure 6.11. For this 
group, our proposals are intended to collect a fair 
contribution – they would only repay if they were 
earning more than the median non-graduate – and 
retain a considerable government contribution in 
the form of loan write-offs and grants. Loan write-
offs are shown in figure 6.12. The overall outcomes 
of the proposed system remain very progressive: 
the more someone earned in their lifetime the 
more they would pay back.
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Introduction
The English higher education (HE) maintenance 
system provides financial support for living costs 
while an individual is studying. It is distinctive 
by international standards in consisting entirely 
of loan support, with no government grants, and 
it is also noteworthy that the level of support is 
generous by this country’s historical standards. In 
further education (FE), there is no universal support 
for living costs: some learners are eligible for the 
full HE loan package; others are entitled only to 
small, often discretionary awards. It is another 
story of the cared for and the neglected. 
The belief that ‘everyone should have the 
opportunity to be educated after the age of 18’ 
is the second of the principles we set out at the 
beginning of this report. To achieve this, we believe 
that maintenance should be available to all learners 
on equal terms, whether in HE or FE. This should 
apply to higher levels of study (Levels 4 to 6), 
adjusted for the duration and intensity of study. 
We believe that maintenance support should be 
fair and affordable, set on a principled basis, and 
reflect the needs and characteristics of learners 
at different levels and across different modes of 
study. This chapter sets out our recommendations 
in this key area.
Context
The English maintenance system is open to all 
full-time and some part-time degree level students 
attending an HE institution (HEI).1 Maintenance is 
available for some but not all Level 4 to 5 students. 
Level 4/5 courses in the Office for Students (OfS) 
regime, including Higher National Diplomas (HNDs), 
Higher National Certificates (HNCs) and Foundation 
Degrees are eligible for the full HE maintenance 
package. However, approximately 20 per cent 
of Level 4/5 courses – those not ‘prescribed’ as 
part of the OfS regulated system for HE, are not 
eligible: these include professional Certificates and 
Diplomas.2 A separate, combined fee and living cost 
loan is provided for postgraduate Master’s degree 
students at Level 7 and postgraduate doctoral 
degree students at Level 8. Small-scale support is 
available for Level 3 and below. The table below 
summarises this provision.
Figure 7.1: Post-18 maintenance support in England
Level Nature of support for 2019/20
Level 3 and below 
+ 
Non-prescribed Level 4/5 provision
Full and part-time: No access to maintenance support. Small-scale support 
through bursary funds administered by providers for non-fee costs such as books, 
travel and childcare and in exceptional circumstances of financial need.
Prescribed HE Level 4/5 
+ 
Level 6 (undergraduate degree)
Full-time: Income contingent loan of up to £8,944 per year (£11,672 in London) 
for students attending courses with the amount available partially means-tested 
according to household income.3 
Part-time: pro-rata access to the same income-contingent loan support for 
Level 6 students attending courses from 2018/19.4 
Level 7 (postgraduate Master’s degree) Full and part-time: combined loan towards fees, course costs and living costs of 
up to £10,906.
Level 8 (postgraduate doctoral degree) Full and part-time: combined loan towards fees, course costs and living costs of 
up to £25,700 over the course.
However, the majority of PhD students receive government support directly from 
one or more of the research councils, and students in receipt of such funding are 
ineligible for loan support. 
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The patchwork provision below prescribed HE is 
complicated for students to navigate and has no 
doubt reinforced the perception that a full-time 
degree is the most advantageous path for post-
18 education. This chapter develops a single, 
principled maintenance offer for students taking 
post-18 qualifications at Level 4 and above, and 
then considers what support should be made 
available for those taking Level 3 qualifications 
and below.
Maintenance: past and present
Over the past 40 years the English maintenance 
system has changed on several occasions and at 
times has been provided as all-grant, as all-loan 
and as a combination of the two. A major recent 
change abolished maintenance grants, at the time 
£3,387 for the 2015/16 cohort of full-time new 
undergraduate students, moving England to an 
all-loan system. 5 At the same time, the maximum 
amount (outside London) was increased by 10.3 per 
cent in cash terms over the previous year, making 
the level of cash support, in real terms, higher than 
at any point before. The level of the loan was then 
increased by retail price index (RPIX) inflation for 
each academic year since 2016/17.
England’s HE maintenance system is relatively 
expensive. The outlay in loans was £5.5bn in the 
2017/18 financial year and is currently projected to 
be around £7.5bn in 2020/21.6 Although the level of 
support is reasonably generous compared to many 
countries, as noted later, our discussions with 
learners and submissions to the call for evidence, 
as well as plentiful survey evidence, all reveal that 
the cost of living is a preoccupation of students 
across HE and FE. Accommodation costs are a 
particular concern. 
The English HE maintenance system will, in 
2019/20, provide up to £8,9447 of loan per year 
for those living away from home and studying 
full-time outside London.8 The amount received 
is partially means-tested: students in households 
with income below £25,000 receive the maximum 
of £8,944, and students in households with income 
above £62,2129 receive the minimum of £4,168 with 
the amount scaled linearly in between. The premise 
is that for young students (aged 24 or below on the 
first day of the academic year) in households with 
income above £25,000, families will contribute on a 
sliding scale according to their income. In 2016/17, 
of those students taking out a loan, just under 40 
per cent10 of students received the maximum level 
of support and around 40 per cent received the 
minimum level of support. 
The figures below show the maintenance support 
allowances at different household incomes, and 
how the level and form of maintenance support 
have changed over time.
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Figure 7.2: Maintenance support available to new students entering the academic year 2019/20 
(rates given are for new entrants living away from home and studying outside of London)
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Our findings
The current system works well for most 
groups but debt is still a deterrent for the 
disadvantaged 
Despite the tripling of tuition fees in 2012, and the 
replacement of maintenance grants with loans 
from 2016, participation rates in HE for 18 to 21 
year-olds has steadily increased since 2012, and 
participation rates for the most disadvantaged 
groups in POLAR 3 areas have increased the 
fastest. However, participation remains lower 
among the more disadvantaged and evidence 
suggests that those from lower and middle-income 
families are more debt-averse than those from 
high-income households and that the gap has 
grown in recent years.12 As reported in chapter 3, 
the panel have concluded, with concern, that debt 
adversity appears to deter entry into HE for those 
from lower income households.
Disadvantaged students leave with higher 
levels of debt 
Since the removal of maintenance grants, students 
from low-income households are likely to graduate 
with the greatest debt, because they are entitled 
to a higher level of loan. The difference in debt 
compared with their more privileged peers can be 
as much as £15,000 for someone living away from 
home and studying outside London undertaking 
a three-year degree. They potentially face 
considerably higher lifetime repayments purely as 
a result of their family background. 
There are growing concerns about the 
student cost of living
A significant theme in the call for evidence was 
concern about the student cost of living; indeed 
several surveys13 have found that this is often 
a greater cause of anxiety for students than 
the level of debt incurred from tuition fees. The 
Accommodation Costs Survey14 calculates that 
in 2018/19 weighted average rents for student 
accommodation absorbed 73 per cent of the 
maximum funding available to students in the 
form of grants and loans, up from 58 per cent in 
2011/12, reflecting the significant recent increase 
in accommodation costs described later in 
this chapter. 
Median expenditure by full-time students living 
away from home and studying outside London is 
£11,67915 in 2018/19 prices, significantly higher 
than the £8,700 maximum level of loan available 
in that year for such students. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, 52 per cent16 of students earn some 
income from employment alongside their study in 
order to supplement their loan support. 
In considering the evidence on maintenance costs, 
we do not doubt that the cost of living is a problem 
for students but are mindful that the overall level 
of support provided is high by historical standards, 
and competitive by international standards as 
illustrated in Figure 7.4.
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International approaches to maintenance support
A comparison of maintenance support between England and ten comparator countries identifies four 
distinctive features of the English system: 
1. Most countries use a combination of loan and grant funding, with the majority of funding coming 
from loans. Only France and Australia have a predominantly grant-based system and England is 
alone in having a system of loans only. 
2. The maximum cash support available in England for students’ living costs is higher than that 
provided by central governments in the USA, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, Scotland, New 
Zealand and Australia, whilst only Wales and the Netherlands offer a comparable amount.17 A 
lower level exists outside London, but even so, this is competitive with the maximum awarded in 
most other countries. 
3. Most countries subject loans and grants to a means test with higher levels available for those with 
greater financial need or from more disadvantaged backgrounds. 
4. Most countries make an implicit or explicit assumption that parents will contribute to the 
living costs of children while in study. Indeed, some countries have no minimum maintenance 
entitlement. For example, all maintenance is means-tested in Germany; students from the most 
affluent backgrounds receive no support from the German federal government.
Figure 7.4: International comparison of maximum maintenance support available from central 
government, per month of study18
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Notes
With the exception of the England (non-London) figures, the figures in this chart represent the maximum maintenance available to students studying in 
that country; this is usually dependent on a student’s means and in some cases region. These figures reflect only funding provided by central government 
and therefore do not include any funding offered by regional or local government. Figures have been converted into GBP based on currency rates as of 
July 2018. 
Different countries provide funding on different time bases; these have been adjusted to a monthly basis assuming that an academic year consists of 9 
months of study.
Maintenance funding in Norway is provided initially as a loan, with up to 40 per cent being converted into a grant upon graduation.
The USA and Canada do not separate out maintenance from tuition funding; consequently they are not included on this chart.
Wales offers a higher rate of funding for Welsh-domiciled students studying in London; this is not reflected in the chart as it shows maintenance available 
for students studying in their home country.
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The assumption of a parental contribution 
raises access issues
Concerns were raised in the call for evidence about 
the impact on access made by the assumption 
of a parental contribution to students’ living 
costs. In particular, the absence of any explicit 
information about the expected level of parental 
contribution appeared to result in many students 
receiving less support than they need; in some 
cases parents made no contribution at all even 
though the maintenance system assumes that 
they could afford to do so. Students from families 
with multiple children at or close to university age 
were particularly affected. Lower than assumed 
levels of parental support might also lead to some 
students deciding that they needed to live at home, 
restricting their choice of university. 
Differences in maintenance eligibility are a 
factor in student choice
We have no doubt that the lower levels of 
maintenance support for some Level 4 and 5 study 
courses deter students from pursuing them. Many 
of these are higher technical routes which we note 
elsewhere in this report are economically and 
strategically important yet under used.
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Analysis and recommendations
Maintenance support is a key enabler in the post-18 
system. A fair maintenance system is essential to 
ensuring that all individuals with the desire to do so 
can be educated after the age of 18 to the benefit 
of society, the economy and a fast changing 
labour market. 
Maintenance grant
Calls for the reinstatement of maintenance grants
The call for the reinstatement of maintenance grants was one of the dominant themes in the call for 
evidence and has been advocated by several external reports and think tanks:
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee: “…the loans impose the greatest burden on students 
from the poorest households; the most disadvantaged students graduate with the largest debt…] The 
structure of student maintenance support must not place students from poorer backgrounds at a 
long-term disadvantage. A maintenance system based only on income-contingent loans will deter 
some prospective students from applying; a grant-only system would be too big a burden on public 
funds. We therefore recommend that the government reinstate the means-tested system of loans and 
grants that existed before the 2016 reforms.”19
Education Select Committee Report: “Based on the overwhelming evidence we have heard during 
the inquiry, we recommend that the government return to the pre-2016 system and reinstate the 
means-tested system of loans and maintenance grants.”20
Higher Education Policy Institute: “The abolition of maintenance grants in 1998 was an error 
that had to be reversed in 2004, when it was recognised that too little progress had been made in 
improving access to higher education among more disadvantaged parts of society. It was just as big 
an error when the abolition of grants was repeated in 2016.”
Intergenerational Foundation: “This review states the need for the student finance system to be 
“progressive.” To achieve this, it is imperative that maintenance grants are reinstated as a means of 
supporting students from less well-off backgrounds.” 
Although participation in HE has continued to grow 
among the most disadvantaged, an access gap 
remains when compared with the more affluent. 
The panel are persuaded that this gap partly arises 
from the fact that it is the disadvantaged who 
are most likely to be deterred by loans, and we 
note the strong concern expressed in the call for 
evidence about the highest levels of debt being 
incurred by disadvantaged students as a result of 
grants being abolished in 2016. We recognise that 
the income-contingent feature of loan repayments 
means that the scale of graduates’ repayment of 
loans over their lifetime is determined by their 
earnings, not the size of the loan. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the size of loans has an appreciable 
impact on prospective students’ perceptions of 
debt, particularly amongst the disadvantaged, 
and acts as a deterrent. More pertinently, a 
disadvantaged student who progresses to a high 
earning career will pay more for their education 
than a student from a more affluent background, 
purely as a consequence of the circumstances of 
their birth. 
We therefore propose that students from low-
income households should receive a substantial 
part of their maintenance support in the form of 
a grant in order to reduce their level of debt on 
graduation. We recommend a minimum grant 
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of £3,000 per year for those with the maximum 
entitlement. The precise amount of grant would 
be for government to determine in the context 
of public spending but the combined value of 
the grant and loan for such students should 
be set at a principled level, which we discuss 
further on. Combined with the reduction in the 
level of tuition fee recommended in chapter 3, 
this recommendation would see the maximum 
debt for a disadvantaged student on graduation 
from a 3 year degree decrease by £15,000, from 
approximately £60,000 to approximately £45,000.  
We would expect the additional call on public 
funds from this proposed change to be fairly 
modest. The cost to the taxpayer of replacing loan 
funding with grant funding depends on the level 
of loan repayments that would have been made. 
As earnings tend to be lower for graduates with 
lower prior attainment and from disadvantaged 
backgrounds,21 that level of foregone loan 
repayments from students from low-income 
households is likely to be low. 
Parental contribution 
The panel considered carefully the maintenance 
policy adopted in Wales following the Diamond 
Review, in which no parental contribution is 
expected for any student and a full loan at the 
highest level is available to all students, irrespective 
of their household income. 22 Although attractive 
in principle, we do not believe that the large state 
subsidy this would incur in the form of loan write-
offs should be a priority for additional investment 
in tertiary education in England and we do not 
recommend such an approach.
“Currently, the MoneySavingExpert.com website 
explains how much parents are expected to 
contribute to their student children’s living 
costs. But the government has refused to 
publish this information, which hinders the 
abilities of families to prepare for their children’s 
higher education.” 
HEPI 
Approximately 40 per cent of students in England 
who apply for a loan are entitled to the maximum 
maintenance support because their household 
income is below £25,000. A further 40 per cent 
either have parental income above the maximum 
threshold or do not apply for the higher levels for 
other reasons.23 
The loan entitlement of students from the 
more affluent families will be approximately 
£4,80024 below that of their more disadvantaged 
counterparts in the year 2019/20. This difference 
has increased from £4,350 since 2016/17.25 Parents 
are implicitly expected to make up the rest but 
data show that only 15 per cent of full-time 
students received parental income at or above 
this level.26 
This is consistent with concerns we heard that 
parents are often uncertain about the provision 
they will need to make to cover their children’s 
living costs whilst at university and evidence that 
some families earning above £25,000 do not make 
the expected level of parental contributions. Not 
all parents are aware of the contributions expected 
of them and greater clarity in communicating this 
expectation is a matter we expect the Student Loan 
Company (SLC) to address. The expected parental 
contribution should be made explicit in all official 
descriptions of the maintenance support system. 
Parental income is taken into account only 
for young students (age 24 and below). Older 
students or students who are married, have 
children, or have certain parental circumstances 
such as estrangement are assessed on their own 
– and where applicable, their partner’s – income 
regardless of age. This means that such students 
should be able to access the highest available level 
of maintenance support. This approach should be 
retained but needs to be sensitively administered 
according to family circumstances. We note that 
most universities operate hardship funds to help 
students who need additional support through 
exceptional circumstances and we encourage 
universities to further develop and promote 
such support. 
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Recommendation 7.1
The government should restore maintenance 
grants for socio-economically disadvantaged 
students to at least £3,000 a year.
Recommendation 7.2
The expected parental contribution should be 
made explicit in all official descriptions of the 
student maintenance support system.
Maximum level of support 
The panel believe that maintenance support 
should be set with reference to an established 
standard linked to minimum wage rates. We 
have concluded that the age 21 to 24 national 
minimum wage (NMW) provides an appropriate 
level for the majority of students – 80 per cent of 
undergraduate students27 are under 25 in age – 
with the level set assuming 37.5 hours a week of 
study and 30 weeks a year. Higher levels of support 
should continue, as now, for courses which are 
longer in duration. This would produce a level of 
£8,663 for April 2019, only slightly lower than the 
2019/20 maximum maintenance level after an 
expected above inflation increase in the NMW in 
April 2020. Our view is that this marginal reduction 
would be acceptable given the future benefits of 
fixing maintenance to a principled benchmark and 
the proposed reintroduction of grants. 
Figure 7.5: NMW and current maximum maintenance entitlement for 2019/20 and 2020/21 
(national rates)
 April 2019 
(19/20 AY)
Projected 2020 
position
Current maximum maintenance entitlement £8,944 £9,212
Age 21 to 24 NMW for age 21 to 24 (37.5 hours per week, 30 weeks per year) £8,663 £9,095
Notes: Assumes maintenance entitlement increases by 3 per cent28 and assumes NMW increases in proportion with the 
national living wage, estimated to be £8.62 per hour by 2020.29
We noted that this recommended level of 
maximum maintenance support is slightly lower 
than the median amount spent by students outside 
London, detailed earlier in this chapter. As also 
noted above, student income and expenditure 
survey (SIES) data shows that over half of students 
are able to – and do – work alongside their study. 
We do not believe that students, who in practice 
are often studying for less than 37.5 hours, should 
receive a higher income than the minimum 
received by young people in full-time employment. 
Recommendation 7.3
Maximum maintenance support should be set 
in line with the National Minimum Wage for age 
21 to 24 on the basis of 37.5 hours per week and 
30 weeks per year.
Detailed design: loan and grant thresholds
A system which expects parental support needs to 
set family income levels at which the maximum 
and minimum levels of support would be provided. 
Similarly, a system with a grant component needs 
to set income thresholds for grant support. 
The natural starting point for receipt of the full 
level of maintenance grants is family income 
of £25,000, below which maximum support is 
currently available, with the amount of grant 
tapering downwards as family income rises up to 
£42,620 (in 2015/16 prices), the previous ceiling for 
maintenance grants. 30 However, the lower income 
threshold has been frozen at £25,000 since 2008/09 
and so has fallen in real terms. The higher income 
threshold – above which minimum loan support is 
received – has remained at the current level since 
the changes in 2016/17. We therefore recommend 
increasing the grant and loan thresholds in line 
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with inflation to extend both grant and higher loan 
support up the family income spectrum. 
We considered recommending that the minimum 
level of support should be increased significantly, 
given the evidence suggesting that the level of 
parental contribution is frequently below means 
tested assumptions and concerns about students’ 
living costs. However, this would come with a 
significant cost to the taxpayer and our view is 
that the need to provide grant, and invest in other 
aspects of the post-18 system are greater priorities. 
Our proposals are illustrated in the diagram below. 
Figure 7.6: Illustrative post-18 maintenance package 
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Recommendation 7.4
In delivering a maintenance system comprising 
a mix of grant, loan and family contribution, 
the government should ensure that:
• The level of grant is set as high as possible 
to minimise or eliminate the amount of 
additional loan required by students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds.
• The income thresholds within the system 
should be increased in line with inflation 
each year.
Eligibility for maintenance at Levels 4 to 6
Although the current system of maintenance 
offers some financial support to all students 
following courses at Levels 4 to 6, the amount 
and structure of provision differs according to the 
type of qualification. We believe that this variation 
should cease and that all students at Levels 4 to 6 
should be treated equally under a single system of 
maintenance. 
The current system of maintenance distinguishes 
between study for ‘prescribed’ HE qualifications at 
Levels 4 and 5, such as Foundation Degrees, HNDs 
and HNCs and ‘non-prescribed’ qualifications at 
Levels 4 and 5 such as professional Certificates, 
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Diplomas and Awards including those awarded by 
City and Guilds.31 In 2016/17, at least 20 per cent 
of Level 4/5 students took these non-prescribed 
courses.32 The prescribed courses are eligible for 
the full HE maintenance package described earlier 
but students on non-prescribed courses are much 
less well supported. If they are taking out an 
Advanced Learner Loan (ALL) to fund their tuition, 
they have access to a bursary fund through the ALL 
facility delivered direct from their provider, which 
is limited to contributing to the costs of study such 
as books, course equipment, accommodation, 
travel and childcare, but does not extend to general 
living costs. FECs and other local providers allocate 
bursaries to individual students on a case-by-case 
basis according to national rules.33 
The unsatisfactory result is that students at the 
same institution and in the same circumstances 
(e.g. both living at home) are eligible for widely 
differing levels of support purely on the basis 
of the type of qualification for which they are 
studying. This creates unnecessary confusion and 
complexity for students and providers alike, and if 
not addressed will continue to act as a brake on the 
expansion of provision at Levels 4 and 5. 
We therefore propose that the full range of 
qualifications at Levels 4 to 6, should be eligible 
for maintenance on the new terms recommended 
earlier. Maintenance support should be reserved 
for those studying at a minimum level of intensity, 
currently 25 per cent intensity, or, as proposed in 
chapter 2, one 30 credit module, with the amount 
of support (both loan and grant) over this point 
being scaled to reflect part-time and modular 
study. In due course, once the new ‘kitemarked’ 
Level 4/5 qualifications have been fully rolled out 
as described in chapter 2, government should 
consider the status of and support for non-
kitemarked qualifications. 
Recommendation 7.5
The new post-18 maintenance support package 
should be provided for all students taking 
Level 4 to 6 qualifications. The government 
should take steps to ensure that qualifications 
which are supported through the maintenance 
package are of high quality and deliver 
returns for the individual, society, economy 
and taxpayer.
A system that flexes for different 
circumstances
The current system adjusts the levels of 
maintenance support available to students to 
reflect a number of circumstances other than their 
household income, in particular additional costs. 
We agree with this approach but make the following 
comments and suggestions for further enquiry. 
• London weighting: living costs in London are 
higher than elsewhere because rents are higher 
but this is also a factor in some other towns and 
cities. This is a subject worthy of further enquiry. 
• Students with children: we believe it is essential 
for students with children to be adequately 
supported. We have not examined closely 
whether the present arrangements adequately 
reflect the higher cost of living, as well as 
childcare, for families with children. This too is a 
subject worthy of further enquiry. 
• Commuter students: leaving home to go to 
university is a deep-seated part of the English 
culture but approximately 18 per cent of full-
time HE students with maintenance loans live 
at home.34 These students currently receive a 
maintenance loan entitlement 20 per cent below 
the level for those who live away from home and 
is broadly equivalent to the spending differences 
between students who live at home and away.35 
We support the principle that the differential 
should be based on the different cost of living 
for those living at home but suggest a detailed 
study of the characteristics and in-study 
experience of commuter students and how to 
support them better.
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• Age: the current system provides the standard 
loans for students up to the age of 60. We 
question whether this in the taxpayers’ interest 
given that the level of repayments is likely to 
be minimal. 
Accommodation
The panel have heard widespread and 
significant concerns about the cost of student 
accommodation. The 2018 Unipol Report36 
estimated that average rents increased by 6 per 
cent over the previous twelve months and have 
grown by a third since 2012/13, which amounts 
to an average yearly increase of 4.8 per cent on a 
compound basis, significantly in excess of inflation. 
We recognise that the standard and nature of 
student accommodation has improved as shown in 
the accompanying box.
Increasing standard of student 
accommodation
The proportion of student accommodation that 
is ensuite has risen from 21 per cent in 2001/02 
to 48 per cent in 2009/1037 and further to 58 
per cent in 2018.38 Meanwhile, standard rooms 
with shared facilities have declined from 24 to 
17 per cent of all student accommodation since 
2012/13.39 The proportion of studio provision 
has doubled from 4 per cent in 2012/13 to 9 per 
cent in 2018/19 and high-cost studios continue 
to be the fastest area of growth. 
We also note that the private sector provision 
of student accommodation has increased 
significantly, from 39 per cent of rooms in 2012/13 
to 50 per cent in 2018/19.40 The concerns we 
heard about the cost of student accommodation 
extended to quality and to the lack of transparency 
about costs and profit. We believe that HEIs retain 
a responsibility for overall student welfare and 
delivering value for money and that this extends 
to university accommodation, whether or not they 
are the direct provider. We recommend that the 
government and the OfS should work with HEIs to: 
• Ensure that students are given improved and 
more consistent data on the range and cost of 
available accommodation. This should include 
cost to student and cost to provider to highlight 
the level of surplus made and where this 
is directed.
• Improve transparency around rent models and 
profit levels for student accommodation.
• Devise appropriate benchmarks for the 
proportion of maintenance support spent by 
students on accommodation.
The public subsidy of student maintenance, much 
of which is spent on accommodation, gives the OfS 
a legitimate stake in monitoring the provision of 
student accommodation in terms of costs, rents, 
profitability and value for money. The government 
should also provide a clearer picture of private 
sector involvement in student accommodation by 
commissioning a comprehensive financial analysis 
of private developers and operators of purpose-built 
student accommodation to understand the profits 
that private business and investors are making 
from student rents.
Recommendation 7.6
The OfS should examine the cost of student 
accommodation more closely and work with 
students and providers to improve the quality 
and consistency of data about costs, rents, 
profits and quality.
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Maintenance at Level 3 and below
Our proposed maintenance system for students at 
Levels 4 to 6 is a centrally-administered national 
scheme for the whole of England. We believe that 
such an approach would not be appropriate for 
learners at Level 3 and below and prefer a method 
of providing financial support that better reflects 
the characteristics of this group.
Around 70 per cent of FE students travel less than 
10km from their home to their place of study; 50 
per cent travel under 6km.41 They are therefore less 
likely to need support for living expenses. Moreover, 
courses at Level 3 and below vary widely in terms 
of study intensity and length, some involving 
over 1,000 guided learning hours, others only 150 
guided learning hours.42 Many other courses at 
Levels 1 and 2, consist of just a few hours of study 
each week. Most adult learners continue working 
full or part-time, fitting in other commitments 
around study: 88 per cent of 19-24 year old FE 
learners study part-time, and this increases to 97 
per cent for those aged 25 or older.43
Currently individual FECs administer their own 
bursary schemes for learners at Levels 1 to 3, 
funded from their adult education budget (AEB) 
and their ALL bursary fund,44 in line with broad 
guidelines from the Department for Education 
(DfE). The two schemes’ objective is to contribute 
to key costs such as books, travel and childcare, 
but not to support living costs. This approach, 
involving providers allocating funds directly to 
their students, gives providers the freedom to 
determine priorities (within a national framework) 
and to assess diverse needs on a case by case 
basis. We believe that this remains the best way 
to accommodate the variations in need among 
learners at Levels 1 to 3. However, FECs and other 
providers need to be clearer in their prospectuses 
and marketing material about available support so 
that learners can better plan their finances. 
Our recommendation in chapter 2 to extend the 
free first Level 2 and 3 entitlements to those aged 
24 and over is intended to increase the number 
of learners. We therefore recommend that the 
government increase the bursary funding in line 
with the resulting growth in numbers. 
Recommendation 7.7
Funding available for bursaries should increase 
to accommodate the likely growth in Level 2 
and Level 3 adult learners.
Recommendation 7.8
The support on offer to Level 2 and Level 3 
learners should be made clearer by both the 
government and further education colleges so 
as to ensure that prospective learners are aware 
of the support available to them.
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Impact
This chapter provides a summary of the impact of our proposals on different groups within the post-18 
sector. It also sets out a high-level summary of the costs of the package, alongside key implementation 
considerations. 
Students
Group Impact 
Students • No student to pay more for post-18 education than the reasonable cost of provision on any subject
• Consistent maintenance support for all approved higher technical and degree courses 
• Reintroduction of maintenance grants for the most disadvantaged students on higher technical 
and degree courses 
• Reduced debt from lower tuition fees at degree level and lower in-study interest rates for all 
students who borrow
• Reformed higher technical qualifications as alternative to degrees
• OfS to bear down on poor value courses 
• Lifelong learning loan allowance for Levels 4 to 6 to encourage part time study, retraining, modular 
and ‘second chance’ learning 
• Clear, accessible information, advice and guidance on the full range of post 18 education options
• Renamed student contribution system with clearer explanations of how much students would 
pay and when 
• Funding for adults 24 and over for first full Levels 2 and 3 qualifications
• Better funded, high quality FE college network, offering high value provision, well distributed 
across the country
Borrowers • An expectation of a higher proportion of loans being repaid through a lower repayment threshold 
and a longer repayment period
• The highest earners - on whose contributions the system depends - would continue to pay the 
most but less than now due to lower fees, reduced in-study interest and a lifetime cap
• More middle-earning graduates would repay their loans in full, with slightly higher 
contributions each year
• Some middle earners would pay less over their lifetimes, for example those completing 1 year 
higher technical courses
• Low earning graduates would remain protected by repayment threshold: nothing to pay if they did 
not earn above that threshold
Current students 
and graduates 
with existing 
student loans
• Current fees and loan terms remain unchanged
• Higher-earning graduates could repay less than current expectations by applying the 1.2 times cap 
on repayments to existing Plan 2 loans
Disadvantaged  
students 
• Maintenance grant of at least £3,000 for all approved higher technical and degree courses
• Disadvantaged students would see the greatest reduction in debt on graduation
• Better support while at university from increased Student Premium 
• More effective Access and Participation Plans through OfS focus on outcomes
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Group Impact 
Older and / 
or part time 
students 
• Lifelong learning loan allowance for study and reskilling later in life 
• Modular funding for learning in smaller chunks, allowing study to fit around work and other 
commitments and for qualifications to be built up over time and at learner’s own pace
• Interim qualifications within degrees to allow students to pause study or transfer courses or 
institutions more easily 
• Full funding for adults 24 and over for first full Level 2 and Level 3 qualifications
Apprentices • Higher quality learning programmes through better regulation
• Alignment with local skill gaps and employer needs
• Better information on apprenticeship wage returns
• Funding for degree apprenticeships prioritised on those who have not already undertaken a 
publicly-supported degree
• Protection for all apprentices in the event of provider closure or insolvency
Taxpayers, parents, employers
Taxpayer • Increased control over and better value from public spending on tertiary education 
• Public investment aligned with Industrial Strategy
• Socio-economic benefits from:
 – Fairer deal for those not attending university 
 – National network of properly resourced FE colleges
 – More and better directed resources for disadvantaged students
Parents • Greater clarity on expected contribution to maintenance costs
• Lower contribution to living costs expected of middle-income households through uprating the 
income thresholds for maintenance support 
• Improved information, advice and guidance enabling better support for prospective 
students’ choices
Employers • Graduate workforce better equipped to meet the economy’s needs
• More young people with higher technical skills
• More opportunities to upskill and reskill older workers through the extension of the Level 2 and 3 
entitlements and lifelong learning
• Rejuvenated FE network better able to collaborate with employers and regional bodies 
• Streamlined and flexible apprenticeship system to support SMEs in key sectors 
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Providers
HE providers • Existing freeze in overall funding extended to 2022-3
• All institutions expected to use resources more efficiently 
• Change in mix between tuition fee and teaching grant by cutting fees from £9,250 to £7,500 and 
topping up with better-directed grant
• Funding more effectively targeted on cost of provision and characteristics of students:
 – Institutions providing predominantly high value and/or high cost provision likely to receive a 
boost in funding
 – Institutions providing predominantly low value and/or lower cost provision likely to see a 
reduction 
 – Protection for high quality specialist institutions
 – Some providers might choose or need to diversify provision to adjust their market position. 
 – Renewed focus and more resources for disadvantaged students while studying
• Academic autonomy remains protected
• Funding for research is outside the scope of this review. It is for government, business and other 
interested bodies to fund this adequately and directly
FE Providers • Restore prestige by clarifying mission, protecting title and refunding the sector 
• Increased student numbers and funding through reformed Level 4/5 qualifications, full funding 
for first Level 2 and 3 qualification and increase in core funding rate for 18 year-olds
• Clearer regulatory approach and simplification of funding rules enabling more response to local 
labour market needs
• Significant injection of capital funding 
• Additional revenue funding and workforce reform to allow colleges to better train, recruit and 
retain staff
• Rationalised college network to address under-supplied rural areas, wasteful duplication in others 
and enable the strongest colleges to widen their influence 
Apprenticeship  
providers
• Clearer regulatory approach and simplification of contracting process 
• Simpler and more transparent standards approval process
Devolved administrations 
Devolved 
administrations
The English system retains enough similarities, and differences, with systems in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales that we do not anticipate any major change in cross-border student behaviour 
as a result of our proposals 
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Costings of the proposals
We believe that the proposed package of reforms would result in a system that delivered better education 
for students, a fairer sharing of costs, and supported a stronger economy and more high skills workforce. 
The table below sets out our estimates of the likely annual costs. The subsequent box explains the 
uncertainty around these estimates.
Deficit impacts  Debt impacts
Recommendations1 
One-off capital 
investment 
(spread across 
multiple years)
Estimated ongoing 
annual costs
(based on ‘steady 
state’ in 2024-25)
Estimated ongoing 
annual costs
(based on ‘steady 
state’ in 2024-25)
Student finance and funding
Net savings from changes to repayment 
terms, reduction in tuition fees, freeze in per-
student resources in HE, and re-introduction of 
maintenance grants2 and increase in teaching grant -£0.5bn -£0.5bn
Level 4 and 5
Additional investment in tuition and maintenance £0.3bn – £0.6bn £0.6bn – £1.2bn
Foundation years
Savings from removal of funding -£0.2bn -£0.8bn
Levels 2 and 3 
Cost of extending entitlements   £0.5bn £0.5bn
FE Capital 
Cost of additional investment spread across a 
number of years.  £1bn   
Other recommendations 
Including FE Teaching Grant, Careers Strategy,  
increases in Level 2/3 bursary and in 18 year-old base rate £0.2bn £0.2bn
Net increase in spend on post 18 education 
in England  England Total
£1bn  £0.3bn – £0.6bn*  -£0.1bn – £0.5bn
Funding for devolved administrations under 
the Barnett formula3 is estimated to add an 
additional cost of approximately £0.9bn. 
Total UK Costs
£1.2bn £1.2bn – £1.5bn £0.7bn – £1.4bn
*Note: figures may not sum due to rounding. Figures are rounded to the nearest £0.1bn.
The estimates above are underpinned by established models4 and methodologies used in the DfE’s main 
estimates of the student finance system.
In December, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) announced their decision to reclassify the way that 
student loans are treated in the national accounts so that some of the spending on student loans will 
be included in the deficit when the money is first lent to students, instead of at maturity after 30 years. 
The work to develop the methodology for this treatment is ongoing, and will not be implemented in the 
national accounts until September 2019. This means that there is significant uncertainty around the cost 
of the panel’s proposed package of reforms in the meantime, and these numbers could move significantly 
once the ONS decision is fully incorporated. In addition, further work is required to understand fully the 
incentive effects on students and institutions, as well as the implementation and ongoing administrative 
costs of the reforms before we can reach a complete understanding of the costs of the package.
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Implementation of the proposals 
Implementation must be planned carefully with adequate consultation and transition time. If introduced 
individually and out of sequence many of the reforms could lead to suboptimal results. For instance, 
the changes to the HE fee, repayment terms and maintenance support would need to be made 
simultaneously to avoid students in the transition year getting a better or worse deal than those on either 
side. These changes should be introduced for successive new cohorts only, in order to give providers 
adequate time to respond. 
We are aware that many students who would be eligible to go to university from 2020 might be concerned 
about whether or not to delay their plans. However, these are recommendations only; the government 
response is unknown. If implemented, the impact of our recommendations on the level of eventual 
repayments for any student would depend on their future earnings. As shown by the graphs in chapter 
6, many students would pay marginally more under our proposals than under the current system, and 
thus might theoretically be advantaged by attending university before any new system came into effect. 
However, the differences are small, future earnings trajectories are unknown and we believe that students 
should set these considerations aside and make their decision in the light of trusted advice and their own 
personal circumstances and interests. 
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List of recommendations 
CHAPTER 2: SKILLS 
2.1 The government should introduce a single lifelong learning loan allowance for tuition loans at Levels 4, 5 and 
6, available for adults aged 18 or over, without a publicly funded degree. This should be set, as it is now, as a 
financial amount equivalent to four years’ full-time undergraduate degree funding.
2.2 Learners should be able to access student finance for tuition fee and maintenance support for modules of credit-
based Level 4, 5 and 6 qualifications.
2.3 ELQ rules should be scrapped for those taking out loans for Levels 4, 5 and 6.
2.4 Institutions should award at least one interim qualification to all students who are following a Level 6 course 
successfully.
2.5 Streamline the number and improve the status of Level 4/5 qualifications.
2.6 The OfS should become the national regulator of all non-apprenticeship provision at Levels 4 and above.
2.7 Government should provide additional support and capital funding to specific FE colleges in order to ensure a 
national network of high quality technical provision is available.
Government should work with the OfS to determine how best to allocate this using, for example, quality indicators 
and analysis of geographic coverage.
2.8 From 2021-22 the fee cap for Level 4 and 5 qualifications currently prescribed by the OfS should be £7,500 – 
the same as that proposed for Level 6 qualifications and in line with current arrangements for prescribed HE 
qualifications. Longer term, only kitemarked Level 4 and 5 qualifications that meet the new employer-led national 
standards should be able to charge fees up to the Level 6 cap and be eligible for teaching grant. From that point, 
any other Level 4 and 5 courses should have a lower fee cap.
2.9 The current age cap should be removed so that a first ‘full’ Level 3 is available free to all learners whether they are 
in work or not.
2.10 Full funding for the first ‘full’ Level 2 qualification, for those who are 24 and over and who are employed should 
be restored.
2.11 The careers strategy should be rolled out nationally so that every secondary school is able to be part of a careers 
hub, that training is available to all careers leaders and that more young people have access to meaningful careers 
activities and encounters with employers.
CHAPTER 3: HIGHER EDUCATION
3.1 The average per-student resource should be frozen for three further years from 2020/21 until 2022/23. On current 
evidence, inflation based increases to the average per-student unit of resource should resume in 2023/24.
3.2 The cap on the fee chargeable to HE students should be reduced to £7,500 per year. We consider that this could be 
introduced by 2021/22.
3.3 Government should replace in full the lost fee income by increasing the teaching grant, leaving the average unit of 
funding unchanged at sector level in cash terms.
3.4 The fee cap should be frozen until 2022/23, then increased in line with inflation from 2023/24.
3.5 Government should adjust the teaching grant attached to each subject to reflect more accurately the subject’s 
reasonable costs and its social and economic value to students and taxpayers.
Support for high-quality specialist institutions that could be adversely affected should be reviewed and if 
necessary increased.
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3.6 Government should take further steps to ensure disadvantaged students have sufficient support to access, 
participate and succeed in higher education. It should do this by:
• Increasing the amount of teaching grant funding that follows disadvantaged students, so that funding flows to 
those institutions educating the students that are most likely to need additional support.
• Changing the measure of disadvantage used in the Student Premium to capture individual-level socio-economic 
disadvantage, so that funding closely follows the students who need support. 
• Requiring providers to be accountable for their use of Student Premium grant, alongside access and 
participation plans for the spend of tuition fee income, to enable joined up scrutiny.
3.7 Unless the sector has moved to address the problem of recruitment to courses which have poor retention, poor 
graduate employability and poor long term earnings benefits by 2022/23, the government should intervene. This 
intervention should take the form of a contextualised minimum entry threshold, a selective numbers cap or a 
combination of both.
3.8 We recommend withdrawing financial support for foundation years attached to degree courses after an 
appropriate notice period. Exemptions for specific courses such as medicine may be granted by the OfS.
CHAPTER 4: FURTHER EDUCATION
4.1 The unit funding rate for economically valuable adult education courses should be increased.
4.2 The reduction in the core funding rate for 18 year-olds should be reversed.
4.3 ESFA funding rules should be simplified for FE colleges, allowing colleges to respond more flexibly and 
immediately to the particular needs of their local labour market.
4.4 Government should commit to providing an indicative AEB that enables individual FE colleges to plan on the basis 
of income over a three-year period. Government should also explore introducing additional flexibility to transfer a 
proportion of AEB allocations between years on the same basis.
4.5 4.5.1 Government should provide FE colleges with a dedicated capital investment of at least £1 billion over the 
next Spending Review period. This should be in addition to funding for T levels and should be allocated primarily 
on a strategic national basis in-line with Industrial Strategy priorities. 
4.5.2 Government should use the additional capital funding primarily to augment existing FE colleges to create 
a strong national network of high quality provision of technical and professional education, including growing 
capacity for higher technical provision in specific FE colleges. 
4.5.3 Government should also consider redirecting the HE capital grant to further education.
4.6 4.6.1 The structure of the FE college network, particularly in large cities, should be further modified to minimise 
duplication in reasonable travel to learn areas. 
4.6.2 In rural and semi-rural areas, small FE colleges should be strongly encouraged to form or join groups in order 
to ensure sustainable quality provision in the long term.
4.7 Government should develop procedures to ensure that – as part of a collaborative national network of FE colleges 
– there is an efficient distribution of Level 3, 4 and 5 provision within reasonable travel-to-learn areas, to enable 
strategic investment and avoid counterproductive competition between providers.
4.8 Investment in the FE workforce should be a priority, allowing improvements in recruitment and retention, drawing 
in more expertise from industry, and strengthening professional development.
4.9 The panel recommends that government improve data collection, collation, analysis and publication across the 
whole further education sector (including independent training providers).
4.10 The OfS and the ESFA should establish a joint working party co-chaired by the OfS and ESFA chairs to align the 
requirements they place on providers and improve the interactions and exchange of information between these 
bodies. The working party should report to the Secretary of State for Education by March 2020.
4.11 FE colleges should be more clearly distinguished from other types of training provider in the FE sector with a 
protected title similar to that conferred on universities.
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CHAPTER 5: APPRENTICESHIPS
5.1 The government should monitor closely the extent to which apprenticeship take up reflects the priorities of 
the Industrial Strategy, both in content – including the need for specific skills at Levels 3 through 5 – and in 
geographic spread. If funding is inadequate for demand, apprenticeships should be prioritised in line with 
Industrial Strategy requirements.
5.2 The government should use data on apprenticeships wage returns to provide accessible system wide information 
for learners with a potential interest in apprenticeships.
5.3 Funding for Level 6 and above apprenticeships should normally be available only for apprentices who have not 
previously undertaken a publicly-supported degree.
5.4 Ofsted become the lead responsible body for the inspection of the quality of apprenticeships at all levels.
5.5 No provider without an acceptable Ofsted rating should receive a contract to deliver training in their own right 
(although a provider who has not yet been inspected could sub-contract from a high-quality provider pending 
their own inspection).
5.6 The IfATE and the DfE (through the ESFA) should undertake a programme of work to better understand the barriers 
that SMEs face in engaging with the apprenticeship system and put in place mechanisms to address these, 
including raising awareness of the programme and making the system easier to navigate.
5.7 The IfATE improve transparency when processing standards that have been submitted for approval. Trailblazer 
groups and providers should have a clear indication of progress, available on-line, so they can start to plan, recruit 
and invest within workable timelines.
5.8 All approved providers of government-funded training, including apprenticeship training, must make clear 
provision for the protection of learners in the case of closure or insolvency.
CHAPTER 6: STUDENT CONTRIBUTIONS
6.1 Continue the principle of loans to cover the cost of fees combined with income-contingent contributions up to 
a maximum.
6.2 Set the contribution threshold at the level of median non-graduate earnings so that those who are experiencing 
a financial benefit from HE start contributing towards the cost of their studies. This should apply to new students 
entering HE from 2021/22.
Adjust the lower interest threshold to match, with the higher interest threshold moving by the same amount. This 
should apply to new students entering the system from 2021/22.
6.3 Extend the repayment period to 40 years after study has ended so that those who have borrowed continue to 
contribute while they are experiencing a financial benefit. This should apply to new students entering the system 
from 2021/22.
6.4 Remove real in-study interest, so that loan balances track inflation during study. This should apply for new 
students entering the system from 2021/22.
6.5 Retain the post-study variable interest rate mechanism from inflation to inflation plus 3 per cent.
6.6 Introduce a new protection for borrowers to cap lifetime repayments at 1.2 times the initial loan amount in real 
terms. This cap should be introduced for all current Plan 2 borrowers, as well for all future borrowers.
6.7 Introduce new finance terms under the banner of a new ‘student contribution system’. Define and promote the 
system with new language to make clearer the nature of the system, reducing focus on ‘debt’ levels and interest 
and emphasising contribution rates.
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CHAPTER 7: MAINTENANCE
7.1 The government should restore maintenance grants for socio-economically disadvantaged students to at least 
£3,000 a year.
7.2 The expected parental contribution should be made explicit in all official descriptions of the student maintenance 
support system.
7.3 Maximum maintenance support should be set in line with the National Minimum Wage for age 21 to 24 on the 
basis of 37.5 hours per week and 30 weeks per year.
7.4 In delivering a maintenance system comprising a mix of grant, loan and family contribution, the government 
should ensure that:
• The level of grant is set as high as possible to minimise or eliminate the amount of additional loan required by 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds.
• The income thresholds within the system should be increased in line with inflation each year.
7.5 The new post-18 maintenance support package should be provided for all students taking Level 4 to 6 
qualifications. The government should take steps to ensure that qualifications which are supported through the 
maintenance package are of high quality and deliver returns for the individual, society, economy and taxpayer.
7.6 The OfS should examine the cost of student accommodation more closely and work with students and providers to 
improve the quality and consistency of data about costs, rents, profits and quality.
7.7 Funding available for bursaries should increase to accommodate the likely growth in Level 2 and Level 3 
adult learners.
7.8 The support on offer to Level 2 and Level 3 learners should be made clearer by both the government and further 
education colleges so as to ensure that prospective learners are aware of the support available to them.
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